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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
In 2004, the British Broadcasting Company’s (BBC) World Service produced a special 
series on the social and environmental problems generated through globalization, 
including a story about modern agriculture in Carchi, Ecuador, entitled Dying to Make a 
Living.1 The program opened with an explanation that medical researchers working with 
the International Potato Center (CIP) had discovered serious health problems associated 
with pesticide use in potato production – among the highest rates of poisoning reported 
anywhere. The problem was not due to the continued distribution and sale of pesticides or 
products that had been made illegal in Europe or the United States. Instead, it was the 
result of the widespread use of properly registered products combined with a reality 
identified by the pesticide industry itself (Atkin and Leisinger, 2000:126): “pesticides are 
used unsafely under the socio-economic conditions of developing countries” and “…it 
appears that there are few if any easy ways to promote change among large numbers of 
poor smallholders.” Provided those unsavoury facts, the industry financed study 
recommended: “…any pesticide manufacturer that cannot guarantee the safe handling and 
use of its toxicity class 1a and 1b products should withdraw those products from the 
market.” As a result of the widespread use of these “highly toxic” pesticides and other 
problematic but less toxic products, the CIP-led studies in Carchi concluded (Yanggen et 
al., 2003:195), “The health problems caused by pesticides are very severe and affect an 
important percentage of the population.” 
 
During the story, Euan McIlwraith of the BBC interviewed Christian Verschueren, Global 
Director of Crop Life International – the umbrella group representing the international 
agrochemical companies – about the pesticide concerns in Carchi. 
 
McIllwraith: Is there a pesticide problem? 
Verschueren: Mostly what we have identified in the South – whether we are 
talking about Latin America, Africa, or Asia – are problems with practices 
of using crop protection products. 
McIllwraith: Is it the responsibility of the chemical manufacturers to assure the 
safe use of their products? 
Verschueren: It is clearly a shared responsibility to educate the farmers, and we 
have shared the responsibility for educating and training them. And we 
have done this sort of training for the better part of the last 12 years now, 
educating over 12 million farmers in over 80 countries. It is quite 
considerable, but of course it is but a drop in the bucket if you compare it 
to the four billion farmers that live in the world.  
McIllwraith: In Carchi, the North of Ecuador, we came across farmers and 
shopkeepers completely unaware of the dangers of the products they were 
                                                       
1 The two-part BBC series on pesticides in Carchi, entitled Dying to Make a Living, is available at: 
www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/1646_dying/index.shtml 
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using. Do you think it is morally acceptable to sell these products if you 
cannot guarantee that they will be used safely? 
Verschueren: It is difficult to assure 100 percent awareness and 100 percent 
safety. I think we do recognize that, but we also try to lead by examples, by 
providing training and education in those particular areas. We recognize 
that we do not live in a perfect world. But, I do not think that that is a 
reason for saying that we should stop selling those products. Clearly, 
farmers in those regions realize that it is a challenge to produce food and 
cultivate crops, and doing that without their products is not going to be 
possible. 
 
The industry blamed farmers for abusing their products and passed on the responsibility 
of controlling biocides to governments. This led McIllwraith to ask a rhetorical question: 
“Then, why don’t countries do something about it?” He went on to interview Carlos 
Navas, the National Director of Pesticide Regulation at the government Servicio Ecuatoriano 
de Sanidad Agropecuario (SESA), charged with registration and licensing of pesticides in 
Ecuador, with one central question in mind: “Why has Ecuador not been able to ban 
highly toxic pesticides, the products that were found to be killing its public and making it 
sick?” 
 
McIllwraith: Does Ecuador need these dangerous chemicals? 
Navas: We need scientific and technological support to be able to cancel product 
registrations. This office does not have the staff or resources to conduct 
those studies. So we need studies from abroad or someone to pay us to do 
studies. Only then could we ban a product. 
McIllwraith: Why don't they do it? 
Navas: As I said, as well as scientific and technological support, we need cost 
effective substitutes for certain pesticides. When alternatives are available, 
then we can ban highly toxic pesticides. There is no possibility to do that 
without alternatives to the products. 
McIllwraith: Do the private companies have any influence over you? 
Navas: About 97 percent of the companies that produce chemicals are not 
national companies. Almost all ingredients are imported, and the State does 
not have control over those. The companies give courses independently to 
farmers and only tell them about the good side of pesticides, which 
influences farmers when they make decision on what to purchase and 
apply. We cannot control private companies. 
 
In its summary, the program explained that modern potato farming in Carchi presented a 
conundrum. Farmers said they could not produce without pesticides. CIP researchers 
agreed that as a result of a number of nefarious pests, commercial potato production in 
Carchi without pesticides was not realistic. At the same time, the medical researchers and 
economists argued that the negative health consequences associated with pesticide use 
placed into question the productivity of potato farming. Meanwhile, the industry did not 
accept responsibility for harm generated by its products, claiming that they were necessary 
for “feeding a growing population,” and the national regulatory agency claimed it did not 
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have the means to control the companies. The program ended with a single, concise 
question: Could anything be done? 
 
Uncanny timing: a prelude 
 
I did not arrive in Ecuador in May of 1998 to work on pesticide concerns or to write a 
dissertation, but rather to purchase an old jeep. My partner Myriam Paredes – the reason 
why I had moved to South America – had been accepted to study her MSc at Wageningen 
and would depart for The Netherlands a few months later, leaving me to fend for myself 
in her native Ecuador. After working day and night for over ten years on sundry rural 
development projects in Central America, Myriam looked forward to graduate study, and I 
looked forward to taking a break and getting to know her country. We had lived a 
minimalist lifestyle in Honduras and rarely took vacations, so money would not be a 
problem for a while. My immediate goal was to purchase a jeep and spend the ensuing two 
or three months getting it ready for the rugged roads of the Andes. After Myriam left for 
Europe, the plan was for our dog Cacho, a Honduran aguacatero (literally an “avocado 
eater” or mutt)2 and I to travel the countryside for a year. I aimed to acclimate myself to 
the culture by hanging out in villages and camping and hiking in the mountains. My self-
financed sabbatical, as I described it, lasted less than a week. 
 
Prior to departing Honduras, I sent out a letter of interest to Hubert Zandstra, the 
Director General at the International Potato Center (CIP) in Lima, Peru. I was not 
immediately interested in finding employment, but felt that I should put out a feeler for the 
future. Amused by a mistake with the date of birth in my curriculum vitae (instead of 1966, I 
had put 1996), Zandstra forwarded my message to Charles Crissman, the person in charge 
of the CIP-Ecuador station, with the note, “This person has impressive experience for a 
two year old!” This must have captured Charlie’s attention, because he sent me an 
immediate email reply, “Please come visit us at the CIP research station in Quito upon 
your arrival to Ecuador. We are in search of a participatory trainer in IPM and may be able 
to use your services.” Two days after my arriving to Ecuador, I found myself seated with 
Greg Forbes, a CIP plant pathologist, and Charlie over coffee amongst the green houses 
of the CIP-Ecuador research station, located at the Instituto Nacional de Investigación 
Agropecuaria (INIAP) in Santa Catalina, about 20 kilometres south of Quito. 
 
Charlie told me, “You couldn’t have come at a better time.” He explained that Canada’s 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) had just approved funding for the 
three-year EcoSalud (in Spanish, salud means “health”) project, which centred on 
continued research into the health effects of pesticides but also interventions to help rural 
families to decrease their exposure to harmful pesticides. Charlie went on to briefly 
summarize nearly a decade of economic and health research in Carchi, Ecuador’s 
northernmost province. Referring to a copy of his recently published book, Economic, 
Environmental, and Health Tradeoffs in Agriculture (Crissman et al., 1998), he explained the 
basic concepts behind economic Tradeoffs of Agriculture Analysis (ToA) as a policy 
formulation tool. He drew on a white board a figure composed of productivity and health 
                                                       
2 Unless otherwise noted, the author is responsible for all Spanish to English translations in this 
dissertation. 
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axes and ran different technology-based scenarios. For example, he explained, through 
ToA they had identified a “win-win” scenario where pesticide safety education combined 
with “off-the-shelf” Integrated Pest Management (IPM) technologies could help rural 
families avoid exposure to highly toxic pesticides without adversely affecting production. 
The follow-up EcoSalud project, he explained, proposed additional production and health 
data collection. More importantly, he emphasized, it was time to take all of this research 
and change things on the ground. Greg explained that they wanted to test the Farmer 
Field Schools (FFS).  I found their enthusiasm contagious and volunteered a summary of 
my experience. 
 
Since 1988, I had worked with different agencies on peer-based, “farmer-to-farmer” 
movements in Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.3 From a technical perspective, my 
experience centred on helping hillside farmers improve their agriculture through soil 
conservation and the use of green manures and cover crops as well as Integrated Pest 
Management. Growing up in rural New Jersey, I had a strong appreciation for the 
ingenuity of farmers, which shaped my outlook on development. At university and during 
my Peace Corps service in Honduras I became steeped in knowledge-based approaches to 
rural development based on the ideas of Paulo Freire (1973 and 1990). I later worked with 
Keith Andrews and Jeffrey Bentley at Zamorano, the Pan-American School of Agriculture 
in Honduras, to train networks of Central American farmers on certain hidden biological 
phenomena, such as nitrogen fixation or the existence of beneficial insects. During that 
period I conducted Masters research at Cornell University, which involved a collaborative 
project with Zamorano to help smallholders to “master the mystery” of plant disease 
through action research on pathogens and disease management (Sherwood, 1995). My 
colleagues and I had found that improved “ecological literacy” enabled farmers to better 
understand the relationships between their agriculture and the environment, thereby 
leading to more purposeful innovation (Bentley, 1989; Bentley and Andrews, 1996; 
Sherwood, 1997).  
 
I told Charlie and Greg that while I did not have specific experience with FFS, I was quite 
familiar with the approach through the literature and interactions with colleagues at the 
FAO, especially Pat Matteson, a pioneer of FFS in Asia and Southeast Asia, who had 
joined us at Zamorano’s Plant Protection Department the previous year. I explained that 
our courses at Zamorano similarly focused on helping farmers “to read” the biology and 
ecology of their agriculture through the study of specific insect pests and diseases. FFS 
applied similar discovery-based approaches, while also tying learning more broadly to the 
cropping season – from soil preparation through planting, crop protection, and harvest. 
Additionally, during my time at Cornell, I had spent a summer working with New York 
                                                       
3 Farmer-to-farmer emerged from the experience of World Neighbors in Central America in the 1970s, as 
described in the groundbreaking book on people-centred development Two Ears of Corn (Bunch, 1982). Rather 
than rely on professional extensionists for social organization and capacity-building, farmer-to-farmer 
depended on the initiative of local volunteers who both developed technology on their farms and worked to 
diffuse innovation among fellow farmers in their community and surrounding villages. Due to its impressive 
results, farmer-to-farmer subsequently became both a methodology and movement throughout Central 
America, Mexico, South America and elsewhere, as described by Selener, Chenier, and Zelaya (1997), Pretty 
(1994 and 2002) and Uphoff, Esman, and Krishna (1998) and Holtz-Gimenez (2006). 
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potato growers on IPM. I was confident that with technical support from INIAP’s potato 
team and farmers, we could quickly adapt FFS to potato farming in the Andes.  
 
The timing of my arrival to Ecuador was uncanny. Charlie offered me a job on the spot as 
a “Participatory IPM Training Specialist,” a temporary charge tied to the EcoSalud project 
that potentially could become a more permanent CIP position. I agreed to start the 
following Monday. I left the research station thinking to myself, how was I going to 
explain to Myriam, not to mention Cacho, my sudden change of plans? 
 
Arrival in Carchi: discovering the challenges of abundance 
 
During my first trip to the EcoSalud project site in Carchi, a four-hour drive from Quito, 
Charlie and I talked about the difficulties of agriculture in Central America, a region where 
smallholder farmers were relegated to eke out a living on steep rocky hillsides with little to 
no rainfall. Education levels were low, infrastructure poor, and access to commercial 
markets and modern technology limited to non-existent. Admittedly, those conditions 
made proposals of rural development ambitious. Upon arriving in Carchi, the 
conversations shifted to the on-going research and the totally different context than the 
one to which I had become accustomed in Central America. Unknowingly, Charlie framed 
the issues that would come to occupy much of the next ten years of my life.  
 
In contrast to my experience in Central America, the challenge in Carchi, Charlie 
explained, was how to support rural development when you've got it all: deep, highly 
organic soils, 12 hours of sunlight per day, rainfall throughout the year, an educated rural 
population, good infrastructure, and access to national and international markets. Looking 
out the window over the green landscape, it was immediately clear to me that the 
challenges of Carchi were not associated with scarcity but rather abundance. Admittedly, 
after a decade of working with farmers under the difficult conditions of Central America, 
the prospect of spending the next few years with these relatively resource rich farmers 
seemed like a nice breather. Not unlike my previously mentioned sabbatical plans, this 
respite proved short-lived. 
 
Charlie explained that there were serious problems in the agricultural paradise of Carchi – 
the “model of modern agriculture.” The CIP research confirmed that Carchense potato 
farmers out-produced the rest of Ecuador – 21 t/ha or three times the national average, 
but it also uncovered a number of hidden problems that placed into question the ultimate 
returns and sustainability of the potato system. Soils were rapidly degrading, and, in 
response, farmers over applied fertilisers, which increased productivity but created long-
term soil nutrient and biological imbalances. Intensive farming did not just produce a lot 
of potatoes but also pests, which in recent years had grown out of control, leading farmers 
to apply more and more pesticides. They came to rely on the cheapest products on the 
market, which also tended to be the oldest and most toxic. Medical research had found 
that chronic exposure to pesticides could cause dermatitis, neurological disorders and 
reproductive problems. In fact, pesticides had become the second leading cause of death 
in the province and the farmers most exposed were poorer decision-makers and less 
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efficient producers. Meanwhile, potato prices were increasingly variable and unpredictable, 
leading farmers to lose money on nearly half of their potato crops.  
 
I spent my initial time in Carchi – a good six months – talking with farmers, extensionists, 
commercial agents, and public officials about the CIP research. The typical farmer argued 
that he had to compete in the market to survive, and potato was the only viable cash crop 
in the highlands. Labour had become too expensive for manual ploughing of soil, so 
tractors needed to be employed. Soils had become “tired,” so crops no longer responded 
without chemical fertilizers. The pests were so aggressive that they would wipe out an 
entire crop without continual pesticide applications. How could a farmer pay for the 
modern technologies without cash? For farmers, low prices and highly variable markets 
were to blame for the situation. They asked for cheap credit and new technologies that 
could improve production. The typical extensionist commonly argued that technologies 
were responsible for the prosperity of modern agriculture, a fact that was borne out in 
statistics showing increased production by area. Alternatives to agrochemicals were 
“romantic” – i.e., they were either not productive or not cost effective. For extensionists it 
was irresponsible to question the value of technologies. What farmers needed was greater 
access to technologies and more training on how to use them appropriately. Extensionists 
requested funds for more courses and research on new technologies such as improved 
varieties and better pesticides. The typical agrochemical vendor claimed that the crop 
protection industry bore a responsibility for feeding the growing population. Without 
agrochemicals, they argued, many more people would go hungry. Yes, improper 
management of pesticides could cause harm, but farmers themselves were responsible for 
misusing products. Vendors generally believed that the benefits of technology far 
outweighed their harmful effects. They argued that government agencies and NGOs 
should provide more courses on Safe Use of Pesticides (SUP), as well as access to cheap 
credit, ostensibly so that farmers could purchase more products.  
 
The different actors argued for what I viewed as more of the same: greater market access 
and more externally based knowledge and technology, i.e., further agricultural 
modernisation. The problems associated with agriculture were defined as an oversight or 
lack of technology or market integration, rather than the product of modern agriculture 
itself. None of the explanations were wrong, but they were only partial representations.  
 
Andean agriculture was age-old, and farmers had grown potato on the hillsides of Carchi 
for millennia. What had gone wrong in recent times? No one I consulted placed the 
problems of agricultural in historical context. There was no questioning of the origins of 
the pests or market exclusion and even less discussion about relationships between 
problems and the institutions of science, development, government, and industry that 
championed ideals of modernity. The problems associated with modern agriculture were 
an accepted part of modern life; they had become integral with the bucolic Andean 
landscape. 
 
Charged with enabling a response to the crisis, I eventually realised that I had greatly 
underestimated the difficulties posed by Carchi. It became clear to me that the same logic 
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that had created the problems of modern agriculture was not going to help farmers 
overcome their predicament.  
 
A PhD project 
 
The thought of writing a dissertation based on the Carchi experience did not occur to me 
until after the EcoSalud project. In March 2001, I met Niels Röling, who would become 
my supervisor at Wageningen, at the meeting of the CGIAR System-wide Program for 
IPM that took place in Nairobi, Kenya, where I was invited to present the CIP-led activity 
in Carchi. 
 
During my presentation, I argued that despite a wealth of research on the harmful effects 
of pesticides as well as impressive farm-level results of FFS in enabling alternatives, it was 
far less clear whether meaningful change was possible for more than a fraction of farmers 
in Carchi. We had effectively established a “best practice” that was congruent with goals 
for human and ecological health, productivity, and farmers’ incomes. Yet we encountered 
great difficulty in making it standard accepted practice. We had made substantial efforts to 
disseminate the research results in communities and at all levels of local and national 
government. Thousands of farmers, government officials, scientists and development 
practitioners had participated in seminars on the research findings, and they had seen first-
hand how FFS graduates had decreased reliance on pesticides, especially the highly toxics, 
while sustaining or improving agricultural productivity. Nevertheless, greater forces 
perpetuated present practice. Local pesticide salesmen, though sometimes visibly moved 
by the accounts of poisonings, continued to argue that they were tied to the bottom line: 
sales goals. In fact, a friend in the industry informed me that sale of highly toxics in Carchi 
were at an all-time high. Officials at SESA, the national regulatory agency, continued to 
operate under political pressure, which all too often caused them to concede their roles as 
public advocate to influential private interests. Local government officials seemed 
interested only to the point where the dramatic events in Carchi could attract attention to 
their political agenda. Private industry was always quick to step in to prevent “drastic 
measures” that could interfere with their bottom line. Researchers and extensionists 
worked from within institutional constraints of their own that limited their ability to 
respond to promising opportunities that often seemed to lie outside of their disciplinary or 
project boundaries. Meanwhile, preoccupied with feeding their families, all too often 
farmers felt that they could not afford to preoccupy themselves with seemingly abstract 
concerns of health and the environment. Having seen the warnings on product labels, 
farmers tended to blame themselves for not using pesticides safely. Contrary to popular 
belief of the day, I had reached the conclusion that change was not a function of 
knowledge, technology, or cost-benefit analysis. As a result, at the meeting in Nairobi, I 
argued that the CGIAR needed to move beyond its preoccupation with technology and 
efficiency and give greater attention to the institutional and political factors that greatly 
shaped farming outcomes.  
 
I doubt that I was successful at convincing my colleagues to change their agenda, but at 
the very least, following my presentation, Niels came up to thank me for the talk and to 
invite me to join him for breakfast the following morning. The next day Niels told me that 
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he held great appreciation for on-the-ground experience, and he liked the interactive 
agriculture, health, and environmental information included in the presentation. He saw 
what he described as a highly viable “dead body,” which in the sense of an Alfred 
Hitchcock thriller meant a compelling and scientifically relevant story. Niels suggested a 
number of provocative sources that could help me further explore my experience, and he 
encouraged me to come to Wageningen during the summer to write a PhD proposal. I 
did, and in December 2001, submitted my proposal, which started me on this long and 
arduous journey.  
 
The dissertation 
 
The dissertation is the direct outcome of ten years of research and development practice 
in Carchi. It is not a “case study” in the sense of a case that tests a hypothesis. This thesis 
reflects unfolding experience with different phases of hope, discovery, and ambition.  
 
Justification 
 
For a long time, I worked hard to establish the historical causes of the predicament 
Carchense farmers face and to establish alternatives, especially through introducing IPM 
practices by means of Farmer Field Schools (Table 1.1). This process led to “hard” results 
that are themselves of scientific interest, if only because the radically different paradigm 
and approach to agricultural development that are embedded in the FFS are still in need 
of further scientifically documented analysis (see van den Berg and Jiggins, 2006). The 
Carchi experience is perhaps special because of the emphasis we gave to human health, in 
addition to agricultural production. So far, few studies have explicitly looked at this aspect 
(see Mancini, 2006 for a recent study in India). But what makes the experience reported in 
this thesis especially relevant is the fact that the best practice we had established, 
according to criteria for human and ecological health and production that reflect 
“development” in every way, did not significantly change potato production in Carchi.  
 
My colleagues and I made great efforts to systematically understand the challenges in 
Carchi from a multidisciplinary perspective, and we intervened to influence farming 
practices as well as to introduce systemic change at the potato industry level. This work 
was widely published (see Appendix A for a long list of publications that emerged from 
the Carchi activity), and it led to substantial recognition from our peers in both the 
research and development communities in the Andes and beyond. Our best practice was 
strongly supported by quantitative “facts,” and there can be no question that we did not 
succeed to introduce our best practice because of lack of rigorous data, demonstrated 
potential, or exposure of the main protagonists to our results. Thus my long-standing 
experience faced me with an important second-generation issue that seemed worthy of 
scientific analysis and promising, not only in terms of making an original scientific 
contribution as requested of PhD dissertations, but also as an analysis of more global 
relevance, given the anthropogenic predicament that we humans have created for 
ourselves. 
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Table 1.1 Reflective practice: professional developments and milestones associated with 
this dissertation 
 
Period Developments and milestones 
1998  
June Employment with CIP and arrival in Carchi 
November Initiation of IDRC-supported EcoSalud project 
1999  
 Collaborations established with IPM/CRSP and FAO Global IPM Facility 
September Completion of regional training of trainers in FFS methodology and first FFS in Carchi 
October Provincial-wide forum on pesticide impacts in Carchi 
2000  
January Initiation of three-year IDB/PROMSA-supported EcoSuelos project 
June Pumisacho, M and S. Sherwood (eds.). 2000. Herramientas de Aprendizaje: Manejo Integrado de la 
Papa. INIAP-CIP-IIRR-FAO, Quito, Ecuador 
November Initiation of two-year FAO-supported project to scale-up FFS throughout Ecuador 
December Sherwood, S. G., R. Nelson, G. Thiele and O. Ortiz. 2000. Farmer Field Schools in potato: a 
new platform for participatory training and research in the Andes. LEISA. December. 16(4): 
24-25 
2001  
January Initiation of two-year PROMSA/IDB-supported Wachu Rozado project 
March System-wide IPM meeting in Nairobi and meeting Niels Röling 
Mar.-Apr. Independent research at Wageningen 
March Paredes, M. 2001. We are Like the Fingers of the Same Hand: Peasants’ Heterogeneity at the Interface 
with Technology and Project Intervention in Carchi, Ecuador, MSc thesis. Wageningen University, 
Wageningen, The Netherlands 
May National forum on pesticide health, productivity, and environmental impacts, Quito 
June Completion of first Carchi-level training of trainers in FFS 
September Día por Día. 2001. Amarga Cosecha (Bitter Harvest). A television documentary produced by 
Rodolfo Asar. (aired in Ecuador in September and October) 
October Independent research at Wageningen 
2002  
February Colleague Veronica Mera-Orcés dies in an airplane crash on the Colombian border 
April Cole, D., S. Sherwood, C. Crissman, V. Barrera, and E. Espinosa. 2002. Pesticides and health 
in highland Ecuadorian potato production: assessing impacts and developing responses. 
IJOEH: Special series on Integrated Pest Management 8(3): 182-190 
May Sherwood, S., C. Crissman, and D. Cole. 2002. Pesticide exposure is poisoning in Ecuador: a 
call for action. Pesticide News. London, UK, 55:3-6 
June Pumisacho, M. and S. Sherwood (eds.). 2002. El Cultivo de la Papa en Ecuador. INIAP-CIP-
Abya Yala, Quito, Ecuador 
July Departure from CIP 
July-Aug. Independent research at Wageningen 
November Employment with World Neighbors Andes Area Program 
2003  
January CEPIP-W/CERES grant 
February Formation of Carchi research team for CERES-supported research (through 2004) 
February Independent research at Wageningen 
June Yanggen, D., C. Crissman y P. Espinosa (eds.). 2003. Los Plaguicidas: Impactos en Producción, 
Salud y Medio Ambiente en Carchi, Ecuador. Abya-Yala, Quito, Ecuador 
December Carchense farmers shut down Pan-American Highway in protest over farming crisis 
2004  
May  BBC (British Broadcasting System). 2004. Dying to Make a Living. A two-part World Service 
series on globalization and pesticides. Aired worldwide in May 
June Borja, R. 2004. Documenting Farmer Field School in the Ecuadorian Highlands: A Case Study of Carchi. 
MSc thesis, Cornell University: Ithaca, NY 
Oct.-Dec. Independent research at Wageningen 
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2005  
January  Independent research at Wageningen 
January Sherwood, Stephen, Donald C Cole, Charles Crissman and Myriam Paredes. 2005. From 
pesticides to people: improving ecosystem health in the northern Andes. Chapter 10 in: J. 
Pretty (ed.). The Pesticide Detox: Towards a More Sustainable Agriculture. Earthscan Publications, 
London, UK. 147-164 
September Pumisacho, M. and S. Sherwood (eds.). 2005. Guía Metodológica sobre ECAs: Escuelas de Campo 
de Agricultores. FAO-CIP-INIAP-WN. Quito, Ecuador. 
2006  
March Schut, M., 2006. A House Does not Make a Home: Challenging Paradigms through Farmer Field 
Schools. MSc thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands 
Aug.-Sept. Independent research with Donald Cole at University of Toronto 
2007  
March Independent research at Wageningen 
April Sherwood, S., D. Cole, and C. Crissman. 2007. Cultural encounters: learning from cross-
disciplinary science and development practice over ecosystem health. Development in Practice 
17(2): 179-195 
June Cole, D., S. Sherwood, M. Paredes, L.H. Sanin, C. Crissman, P. Espinosa, F. Muñoz. 2007. 
Reducing pesticide exposure and associated neurotoxic burden in an Ecuadorian small farm 
population. IJOEH 13: 281-289 
July-Sept WN-supported sabbatical to write up final chapters 
September Sherwood, S., D. Cole, D. Murray. 2007. It’s time to eliminate highly hazardous pesticides (in 
English and Spanish). LEISA, September. 23(3): 32-33 
October Ecuadorian National Congress’ Health Committee proposes a law for the elimination of 
highly toxic pesticides (interrupted by Constitutional Assembly) 
December Independent research at Wageningen 
Schut, M. and S. Sherwood. 2007. FFSs in translation: scaling up in name, but not in meaning 
(in English and Spanish). LEISA, December. 24(4): 28-29 
2008  
December Delivery of dissertation to reading committee 
 
It appears that scientifically established best practice and public acknowledgement of 
proof of the same are unable to foment social change, be it at the level of farmers, 
extensionists and facilitators, commercial companies, public agencies or politicians, such 
as ministers of agriculture. In fact, at all levels, major stakeholders seem to be locked into 
a non-adaptive, lethal, and eventually self-destructive (from e.g., financial, human health, 
and soil fertility points of view) system of food production. The long experience and the 
very “success” of the team, of which I was part, in establishing best practice supported by 
irrefutable evidence allowed us to hit upon this second-generation problem and gave me 
the opportunity to make an initial attempt to analyse it.  
 
This dissertation has provided me with a unique opportunity to make sense of the whole 
disconcerting chain of events. It will hopefully allow me to be more effective in my 
continuing contributions as an actor and “change agent” in the Andes. The research seems 
particularly relevant in the face of current optimism that, when governments agree on 
clear and “... comprehensive controls on carbon movements into and out of the 
atmosphere, policed with good science, the market is capable of delivering the 
technologies needed for the staggering cuts in emissions we now know to be essential.”4 
In fact, the experience with agriculture technology in Carchi suggests that commercial 
                                                       
4  New Scientist. 2007. December, 22(29): 5 
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pressure is capable of preventing governments from establishing clear and comprehensive 
controls.  
 
Research problems 
 
In all, this dissertation looks at the following series of research problems:  
 
1. The description of the landscape and agriculture in Carchi and analysis of the 
pathology associated with modern-day potato production in terms of human and 
environmental health with major conclusions about longer-term economic 
feasibility and ecological sustainability. This led to the identification of “impact 
points” for the development of scientifically supported and replicable “best 
practice.” 
2. The historical analysis of the emergence of this pathology in a high-potential 
agricultural area such as Carchi. 
3. The ex-post examination of interventions to address the pathology through the 
application of best practice, especially through enhanced cross-disciplinary 
research-development practice as well as the introduction of Farmer Field 
Schools. The latter included the training of a cadre of facilitators to implement 
the FFS approach beyond the initial pilot project by third-party agencies 
(community-based organisations, municipal governments, and NGOs).  
4. The analysis of the failure to date to make an impact at the policy level, with an 
emphasis on the institutional factors that, at different levels of aggregation, 
explain a society-level inability to address the pathologies associated with modern 
agriculture. 
5. An integrated analysis on what we can learn from this rather unique (in the sense 
of running into a second-generation problem after producing a best practice to 
solve the apparent prima facie pathology) experience.  
 
The resultant thesis is a monograph that tries to establish a coherent “story” among 
seemingly independent stories. Many of the experiences and the scientific studies that 
were carried out during the course of my ten years in Carchi and that feed into this thesis 
have already been published elsewhere (Appendix A). Rather than concentrating on a 
single theoretical framework, due to the multiple levels of inquiry and the inherent 
complexity of the study, I placed different conceptual “lenses” on the history of Carchi as 
well as personal experience with local- and national-level interventions to establish 
empirical data. I then searched relevant literature for more critical theoretical perspectives 
at both the levels of discrete (i.e., individual chapters) and integrated (the book) inquiry. 
As a result, the research was guided by an iteration of grounded experience and theory, 
reflecting my perspective as a development practitioner and historical actor in Carchi. 
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Theoretical framing 
 
The overall objective of this research is to provide fresh historical and social perspectives 
on the pathology of modern agriculture in Carchi and the limitations of current research 
and development efforts to address that situation.  
 
Table 1.2 summarizes the overall research approach that I employed in this dissertation. 
Following the identification of the earlier mentioned problems, I applied the following 
investigative lenses: 
 
1. Historical organization of modern agriculture in Carchi for greater social insight 
on how the present-day situation came to be; 
2. Practice of research-development aimed at addressing the problems generated by 
modern agriculture; 
3. Multi-institutional realm of policy and politics; 
4. Socio-biological phenomena of agricultural decline in Carchi. 
 
My inquiry was guided by a series of questions linked to the different research lenses as 
well as theoretical explorations. I found it difficult to see beyond my own paradigms 
because a paradigm – as one’s model of signification and abstraction – defines how one 
sees. As a result, I aimed to be explicit about my own thinking and its evolution over the 
duration of this research. During initial data collection and processing and analysis, I 
continually explored relevant literature for further information, insight, and explanation. 
Sometimes my explorations simply produced additional information. For example, 
Lándazuri’s (1995) work on the violent depopulation of Carchi during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries helped me to understand why the region’s natural resources largely 
remained in tact through the beginning of the twentieth century. Other times, a search led 
me to see things in entirely new ways. For example, Giddens’ (1990) work on the 
phenomenology of modernisation helped me begin to understand agricultural decline in 
Carchi as not just the result of technical oversights or a lack of technology, but the 
expected product of modernisation itself. Theory brought both greater resolution to my 
research lenses as well as entirely new perspectives, thereby providing new colours, shapes 
and contours to my observations and experience. It provided me entirely new ways of 
seeing and thinking as well as further explanatory power.  
 
With regard to the first lens (historical perspective), the main research question became:  
 
What historical events preceded agricultural decline in Carchi? 
 
During my research on the historical events leading up to modern-day Carchi, I immersed 
myself in the Andean historical, anthropological, and sociological literature. Troll (1968) 
explained the geographic division between the southern puna or dry Andes and the 
northern páramo or wet Andes, which helped me to place Carchi’s environment in context 
within the broader Andean landscape. I came across Murra’s (1972) theory of “vertical 
control,” explaining agricultural and agrarian differentiation along altitudinal belts, as well 
as Salomon (1980) and López-Sandoval’s (2004) applications of that theory to the  
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Table 1.2 Research strategy: lenses, theoretical explorations, information sources, and 
methods 
 
Lens/guiding question  Theoretical explorations Information sources Methods  
Lens 1: Historical realm    
• What historical events 
preceded agricultural decline 
in Carchi? 
• Andean socio-cultural 
development: Murra (1972), 
Costales and Costales 
(1974), Uribe (1977), Barsky 
(1978, 1984, 1988), Barsky 
and Cosse (1981), Newson 
(1992), Landázuri (1995), 
Escobar (1995), 
Rostworowski (2001), 
Murra (2002) 
• Agricultural modernisation: 
van der Ploeg (2003) 
• Resilience and adaptive 
management: Holling 
(1973, 2000), Gunderson 
and Holling (2002) 
• Published literature 
• Hacienda records 
• Transcriptions 
• Crissman et al. database 
(1990-1992) 
• National Census data 
(1954, 1974, 2004) 
• Paredes and Sherwood 
database (2003-2004) 
• Critical review of 
secondary 
sources 
• Semi-structured 
interviews with 
key informants 
• Participant 
observation 
• Interactive 
workshops 
Lens 2: Project realm    
• What social and 
institutional factors 
prevented the uptake of 
recommended best practice, 
in the form of cross-
disciplinary research and 
knowledge-based, people-
centred interventions? 
• Development: Röling 
(2000), Röling and Leeuwis 
(2001) 
• Modernisation: Giddens 
(1990, 1994), Beck (1992) 
• Socio-technical change: 
Nelson and Winter (1977), 
Rip and Kemp (1998), 
Gibbons et al. (2000), van 
der Ploeg (2003) 
• Personal experience 
• Notebooks 
• Transcriptions 
• Project documents 
• Paredes and Sherwood 
database (2003-2004) 
• Paredes (2001) 
• Student theses: Paredes 
(2001), Mendizabel (2002), 
Borja (2004), Schut (2006) 
• Reflective 
practice 
• Participant 
observation 
• Semi-structured 
interviews with 
key informants 
• Qualitative 
analysis 
 
Lens 3: Policy realm     
• How did institutional actors 
respond to policy proposals 
for the elimination of highly 
toxic pesticides? 
• Risk society: Haraway 
(1989), Giddens (1990), 
Beck (1992), Beck, et al. 
(1994) 
• Actor Network Theory: 
Callon (1986), Latour and 
Woolgar (1979), Law (2004) 
• Sociology of development: 
Jansen (2000, 2008), Long 
and Long (2002) 
• Personal experience 
• Notebooks 
• Transcriptions 
• Project documents 
• BBC interviews 
 
• Reflective 
practice 
• Semi-structured 
interviews 
• Qualitative 
analysis 
Lens 4: Integration    
• What were the institutional 
features behind the 
production and continuity of 
agricultural decline in 
Carchi?  
• What lessons does Carchi 
hold for more sustainable 
agriculture? 
• Risk society: Beck (1992, 
2000, 2001); Beck et al. 
(1994), Giddens (1990), 
Adam et al. (2000), Van 
Loon (2000) 
• Resilience and adaptive 
management: Holling 
(1973, 2000), Gunderson 
and Holling (2002) 
• Lenses 1, 2, and 3 
 
• Summary 
• Integrated 
analysis 
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northern páramo Andes. This body of literature shed new light on the ecological 
implications of the arrival of the Spanish and the subsequent horizontal redistribution of 
land under the hacienda system, as per the practice in Spanish mesas. With this insight, I 
was better able to explain certain environmental vulnerabilities in Carchense agriculture 
centuries later. 
 
Rostworowski’s (2001) anthropological research exposed me to new details of traditional 
Andean culture, and Uribe (1977) and Landázuri (1995) revealed agricultural practice and 
social differentiation of the Pasto civilisation that settled at the border region of present-
day Ecuador and Colombia. This research enabled me to more fully appreciate the depth 
of social disruption during the colonial period and the absence of native languages and 
indigenous populations in modern-day Carchi. Newson’s book “The Cost of the 
Conquest” introduced me to the diverse patterns of the Spanish Conquest in Latin 
America, and the evolution of its policies to gain control over territory and people. The 
detailed historical analyses of Costales and Costales (1974) and Barsky (1978, 1988) 
provided insight on the historical events leading up to agrarian reform in the 1960s as well 
as its negotiated outcomes and expressions in northern Ecuador. This body of literature 
explained the unique pattern of land distribution in the north that influenced the 
prominence of smallholder agriculture in Carchi today.  
 
I referred to Escobar (1995) and McMichael et al. (2000) for a general introduction on 
how agrarian reform was tied to constructions of poverty and development as well as 
modernist ideals of market integration and technological development. I drew on Barsky 
and Cosse (1981) and Barsky (1984, 1988) to understand how foreign development aid 
and technical assistance arrived in Ecuador and became an integral part of agrarian reform 
and ensuing agricultural modernisation policies. 
 
I close my historical reflections with an examination of the Carchi experience in light of 
van der Ploeg’s (2003) research on the modernisation of Dutch agriculture. I then draw on 
the resilience and adaptive management literature, especially Holling (1973, 2000) and 
Gunderson and Holling (2002), to explore the interactive socio-biological factors 
influencing the historical macro tendencies in Carchi. 
 
With regard to the second lens (project-level perspective), the main research question 
became:  
 
What social and institutional factors prevented the uptake of recommended “best practice,” in the 
form of cross-disciplinary research (i.e., the EcoSalud project) and knowledge-based, people-
centred interventions (Farmer Field Schools)? 
 
During my research on contradictions between development discourse and practice, I read 
Röling’s (2000 and 2005) articles on the “ecosystem challenge.” This work provided fresh 
perspectives on the interactive biological and social dimensions of the “modern 
predicament” and pointed me to new schools of thought, including the Santiago Theory 
on the biological roots of knowledge (Maturana, 1996 and Maturana and Varela, 1998), 
Reflexive Modernisation (Giddens, 1990 and 1994), and Risk Society (Beck, 1992). This 
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material influenced my thinking throughout the remainder of the course of this 
dissertation.  
 
Ensuing dialogue with Röling introduced me to literature on the management of complex 
issues associated with social systems and the environment (Miller, 1983 and 1985; 
Bawden, 2000), as well as the Resilience Alliance (Holling, 1973 and 2000). This 
heightened my awareness of the need to break down disciplinary and professional barriers 
in agriculture research and development practice. Leeuwis’ (2004) review of rural 
innovation and subsequent conversations helped me to appreciate both the opportunities 
and underlying problems of paradigm and process inherent in cross-disciplinary research-
development practice. 
 
Ironically, I struggled most during my explorations of an area where I had gained the most 
experience – the implementation of Farmer Field Schools. It took me over two years to 
write up that experience and my drafts underwent numerous transformations. Eventually, 
I settled on the work of Gibbon et al. (2000) to analyze the experience through an 
application of the Mode 1 (expert-led) and Mode 2 (lay or people-centred) framework of 
knowledge production. A need to explain institutional struggles over the multiple and 
divergent expressions of FFS took me to the literature on socio-technical change (Nelson 
and Winter, 1977; Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2004), technology management 
(Rosenkopf and Tusman, 1994; van de Ven and Garud, 1994), and evolutionary 
economics (Potts, 2000; Schot and Geels, 2007). I also consulted van der Ploeg’s (2003) 
The Virtual Farmer, which provided much insight into the organisation of expert systems 
and their influence over farmers, farming, and rural life. 
 
With regard to the third lens (policy-level perspective), the main research question 
became:  
 
How did institutional actors respond to policy proposals for the elimination of highly toxic 
pesticides? 
 
Nuijten’s (2002) research on corruption in Mexico and Jansen’s (2000 and 2008) work on 
the struggles over pesticide policy agenda in Honduras helped me break through my rather 
conventional understandings of government, governance, and regulation. Following 
further exploration of Latour (1987) and Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) work on the 
“constructedness” of science, I adopted the view of pesticides as a ready-made product of 
science around which networks of actors had consolidated and matured. This led me to 
explore “modes of enactment” – the creative ways in which individuals and networks of 
actors produced myths around the “indispensability” of technologies (i.e., agrochemicals) 
and the translation of prestigious symbols (e.g., FFS and IPM) as means of consolidating 
belief systems through which interests were promoted, rules were created and enforced, 
and discretion was exercised. 
 
I drew on aspects of Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Callon, 1986; Latour and Woolgar, 
1979; Law, 1992 and 2004) to further explore observed processes of “heterogeneous 
engineering” during which social, technical, and conceptual pieces become fitted together 
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into co-evolving structures of influence. I applied this insight to explore how people do 
not just network to interact with other people but also to interact with people and 
materials, in this case over agriculture technology. ANT helped me to explain an 
observation that networks of objects – agrochemicals – participated in the social, thereby 
influencing human relationships and activity. If pesticides disappeared, as I came to argue, 
then so would a particular social order. 
 
I employed aspects of the Risk Society (Beck, 1992 and Beck et al., 1994) and Reflexive 
Modernisation (Giddens, 1994) theories to investigate how a pro-pesticide alliance in 
Ecuador ultimately consolidated influence and authority in its attempt to perpetuate the 
continued sale and distribution of harmful technology. The insights from this body of 
work helped me to understand the rise of dissent over pesticides in the form of a 
breakdown of allegiances and the emergence of sub-political movements and how 
ultimately the institutional claims to knowledge and technology and the deepening and 
broadening of pesticide effects on society and the environment may be providing the pre-
conditions for demise and change. 
 
With regard to the fourth lens (integrated perspective), the main research questions 
became:  
 
What were the institutional features behind the production and continuity of agricultural decline 
in Carchi? What lessons does Carchi hold for more sustainable agriculture? 
 
For integrated analysis of the earlier research, I returned to the Risk Society (Beck 1994, 
2000, 2001; Adam et al., 2000; and van Loon, 2000) and Reflexive Modernisation 
(Giddens, 1994) literature to summarise the general features of the pathology of 
agricultural decline in Carchi and to establish ties to broader processes of globalisation. 
This enabled me to assess the degree to which Carchi had become a theatre of risk. 
 
Additionally, I drew on the Resilience literature (Holling, 1973, 2000; Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002) to explain the interactive socio-biological phenomena associated with the 
development and use of agriculture technology in Carchi and subsequent environmental 
feedback, primarily in the forms of soil fertility loss and the proliferation of pests. I found 
the applications of the metaphor of the “lazy eight” in Hurst (1995), Röling (2002, 2005), 
and Jiggins et al. (2007) useful for describing the seeming oxymoron of sustainable 
development and identifying opportunities to guide needed institutional change.  
 
Research approach 
 
Table 1.2 summarises the research strategies employed in this dissertation. Each chapter 
independently provides details on relevant methodological considerations. As per the 
challenges posed by each particular research lens and its corresponding questions, I drew 
on diverse information sources, research methods, and theoretical explanations. I 
employed both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Due to the wealth of existing 
quantitative information from the earlier research in Carchi (Appendix A), including the 
on-going research of Paredes (in process), I limited quantitative methods to standard 
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descriptive statistics, for example, of historical production data, and relied most heavily on 
qualitative strategies. 
 
Information sources 
 
To ground the research in locality, I focused on four case study sites. Three of the four 
locations (Santa Martha de Cuba, San Francisco de Libertad, and San Pedro de Piartal) 
were chosen a priori by the CIP research team in 1998. Sites were chosen based on 
geographic location (to include both the western and eastern Andean ridges), relevance of 
potato production, and self-selection (i.e., communities agreed to take part in the medical 
studies). In 2004, Paredes and I added a fourth site to our respective research, Mariscal 
Sucre, due to expressed interest of the community to address pesticide health issues and 
an on-going IDRC-funded sister project on “sustainable biodiversity” with the NGO 
EcoPar, which committed additional human resources to data collection.  
 
To avoid selection biases, the research included the perspective of broad categories of 
actors from communities and among public officials, scientists, and development 
professionals working in the province. For community participant selection, I heavily 
drew on Paredes’ (2001 and in process) quantitative and social analyses of “farming styles” 
in the same case study sites as a means of assuring heterogeneity in my populations.  
 
I had access to diverse quantitative information sources, including existing CIP databases 
from the 1990-1992 field research as well as the EcoSalud activity between 1998-2001. 
Additionally, Paredes and I constructed a complementary database of production 
information from 94 potato fields of 92 farmers across the four case study sites during the 
2003-2004 growing season. For historical information, I relied on National Census data 
from 1954, 1974, and 2004 as well as processing of that data by other authors, especially: 
Costales and Costales (1971), Barsky (1984 and 1988), Cosse (1980), and most recently An 
(2004). 
 
My role within the CIP research team permitted unique access to project events, informal 
communications, grey literature, and official documents. Over my professional career, I 
have developed the habit of taking copious notes during daily conversations and project 
activities. For qualitative data, I utilised my field notes from the EcoSalud project between 
1998-2002 as well as those from subsequent work with the FAO between 2001-2003. I 
had access to essentially all of CIP and INIAP’s project documents from Carchi between 
1990 and 2003. Further, I analyzed transcriptions from semi-structured interviews of key 
informants, including community members, researchers, public officials, and 
representatives from private industry. These included interviews that I held directly as well 
as those conducted by my project staff. Additionally, I obtained the original recordings of 
interviews held by the Día-a-Día program during its production of the documentary 
Amarga Cosecha (Bitter Harvest) and BBC’s World Service program Dying to Make a Living.  
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Interpretation and analysis 
 
As a historical actor in Carchi, analyses largely resulted from reflective practice and direct 
observation of agriculture, research, and development in practice. While my role as an 
“insider” provided substantial access to the inner workings of projects, my mixed role as 
intervener-researcher posed considerable methodological challenges, especially over 
measurement bias. This included both my ability to dispassionately listen to informants 
and interpret experience as well as preventing informants from limiting their responses to 
socially desirable answers. Over the years, I expressed my positions in publications, public 
events, and the media. As a result, farmers, public officials, and industry representatives 
tended to tell me what they thought I wanted to hear, which may have been an endearing 
cultural trait but one that could greatly bias research outcomes. Paredes (in process) faced 
similar challenges. 
 
Consequently, between 2003-2004 Paredes and I employed an independent, 
multidisciplinary team of four national researchers made up of an agronomist, forester, 
economist, and sociologist to assist in our respective data collection. We added additional 
people when research demands were high, for example during planting periods. We 
trained the team in quantitative and qualitative research techniques, as per the needs of 
particular inquiries. Throughout that period we held regular bi-weekly discussion sessions 
and planning meetings. The research team collected secondary data, it conducted 
interviews with farmers, agrochemical salesmen, industry representatives, public officials, 
and technical specialists, made homes visits, and held meetings with focus groups to 
discuss and review findings. Team members generated raw data (e.g., notes, interview 
recordings, and surveys) and produced technical reports on topics of particular interest 
(e.g., the arrival of the tractor and agrochemicals or the loss of local potato varieties). This 
material was presented to other team members and discussed as a means of cross-
checking findings. Additionally, I supported specialised research on substantive topics, 
such as over the nuances of the Farmer Field Schools (Paredes, 2001; Borja, 2004; Schut, 
2006), the internal struggles over participatory research at CIP (Mendizabel, 2002), and 
government policy (An, 2004). 
 
Outline 
 
The dissertation unfolds across eight chapters (Figure 1.1). Chapter 2 provides the 
contextual backdrop of the research. It begins with a description of the Carchense 
geography and landscape before explaining the local pasture-potato production system. I 
then summarize the first generation of CIP-led research on the productivity, health, and 
environmental tradeoffs of potato farming. This research identified a number of concerns, 
most notably over soil degradation and a latent, endemic health burden associated with 
pesticides, placing into question the sustainability of modern agriculture. The research 
included integrated tradeoffs analysis that identified a number of promising win-win 
educational and technological scenarios, with the implication that the application of best 
practice would generate corrective action and change.  
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Figure 1.1 Dissertation outline 
 
Chapter 3 initiates my conceptual shift to reflective practice. In order to better understand 
the current challenges in Carchi, I found it necessary to first look back at the foundations 
of its modern agriculture (Lens 1: historical realm). The chapter summarises major 
historical developments since the arrival of the Incas and Spanish up through the hacienda 
period, and agrarian reform. It looks at how traditional Andean agriculture became 
uprooted in terms of land distribution, social organisation, and farming practice and how 
these events shaped modern developments. Chapter 4 concentrates on the period since 
land reform and recounts the story of agricultural modernisation in four communities. It 
examines major events of continuity and change in potato production involved in the 
historic organisation of the “production of decline” – i.e., the establishment of self-
destructive tendencies in Carchense agriculture. 
 
Drawing on the successes and disappointments of personal experience with the CIP-led 
initiatives to install best practice in Carchi, the dissertation then shifts attention to the 
institutional obstacles to enabling change. Lens 2 was placed on project-level 
interventions, particularly the application of trans- and cross-disciplinary approaches to 
research-development (Chapter 5) as well as the people-centred, discovery-based Farmer 
Field Schools (Chapter 6).  
 
In recent time, scientists, development agents, and the public increasingly have become 
aware of the multi-dimensional nature of ecosystem decline, and hence the need to 
increase co-operation across scientific disciplines and professional and practitioner 
cultures (for example, Forget and Lebel, 2001). In Chapter 5, an occupational and 
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environmental health specialist (Donald Cole from the University of Toronto), an 
agricultural economist (Charles Crissman from CIP), and myself as a rural development 
specialist recount our knowledge struggles over the three-year EcoSalud project – a joint 
knowledge generation and development intervention for greater “ecosystem health” in 
Carchi. The chapter examines the challenges encountered and the compromises made, as 
it highlights remaining issues for the design and practice of cross-disciplinary research and 
development. 
 
Farmer Field School methodology – a higher order interactive learning approach that 
employs well-established principles of adult education, in-depth knowledge of 
agroecology, and social organisation – has won recognition as state of the art for enabling 
the transformation of agricultural practice, especially with regard to pesticide use reduction 
(van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007). Based on my efforts to introduce FFS in Carchi as a 
means of enabling farmers to address pesticide health concerns, Chapter 6 examines the 
performance of FFS as well as its spontaneous transformations following its release into 
the hands of researchers, development practitioners, farmer leaders, and their 
organisations. The chapter closes with a wider discussion on how FFS, and in general 
“people-centred” approaches, may evolve from a niche-level contribution to influence the 
broader trajectory of agricultural development. 
 
The third lens focused on policy-level interventions, as per my personal experience with 
multi-stakeholder policy formulation involving farmers, conservationists, public officials, 
scientists, and industry representatives. The diverse donor agencies that supported the 
research in Carchi, including the Rockefeller Foundation, IDRC, and USAID, demanded 
that the CIP-led research be based in communities and linked to public policy. As a result, 
the different projects explicitly sought “community participation,” “gender equity,” 
“collaboration,” and “multi-stakeholder” involvement in deliberative processes of 
education and advocacy for change. Based on ensuing public debate over pesticides, 
Chapter 7 investigates how institutional dynamics came to form, transform, and influence 
policy outcomes and how certain actors sought to cooperate, collude, and collide to shape 
public opinion. It goes on to more closely examine how differently positioned actors built 
and rebuilt allegiances, gained control over public and private resources, and exercised 
discretion. Ultimately, the chapter exposes institutional dynamics of continuity and change 
with regard to agriculture technology and how modern societies generate “organised 
irresponsibility.” 
 
The fourth lens was placed on integrative analysis. Chapter 8 draws from the insights of 
the earlier chapters to precipitate learning from over a decade of activity in Carchi. It 
opens by directly addressing the questions that guided this research before moving on to 
describe the generalizable features of agriculture decline. The chapter ends with a 
discussion on broader lessons from Carchi, potentially useful for informing future 
research and development practice for more sustainable agriculture. 
Chapter 2 
Modern Potato Production in Carchi 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter provides the contextual backdrop of this dissertation. It introduces the 
geography and landscape of the Province of Carchi in Northern Ecuador as well as the 
modern potato-pasture production system. I then summarize the CIP-led multidisciplinary 
research on the environmental, health, and productivity effects of modern agriculture. The 
findings make clear that behind the bucolic setting of the Northern Andes, something has 
gone wrong: at the turn of the twentieth century, Carchi suffers from a pathology that 
places into question the sustainability of its agriculture. Lastly, I introduce the results of 
the integrated tradeoffs analysis that proposed a “win-win” scenario and the identification 
of scientifically supported and replicable impact points or “best practice” for addressing 
the challenges in Carchi. 
 
Geography, climate, and landscape 
 
The dense oceanic Nazca Plate is subducted under the lighter continental South American 
Plate, producing two parallel ridges of the Andes mountain range that run north-south the 
length of the continent. Located where the equator meets the Pacific Coast, the Republic 
of Ecuador encompasses an area of 256,370 km2 and roughly is the size of the United 
Kingdom (Figure 2.1a). The Andean ridges come closest together at Ecuador, spanning 
between 40 and 60 km. This geography divides the country into three distinct regions: the 
Occidente (Pacific coastal lowlands), Sierra (inter-Andean highlands), and Oriente (Amazon 
lowlands). The unique positioning and dramatic geography of Ecuador make it a country 
of mega biodiversity. Carchi is Ecuador’s northernmost province, located on the border 
with Colombia (Figure 2.1b). 
 
Situated near the equator, the region receives intensive sunlight throughout the year 
(Pourrut, 1983). Local convection rather than major weather fronts determines the 
weather of the inter-Andean valley. Rainfall tends to increase at higher altitudes and at 
greater distance from the valley floor (Knapp, 1991), while temperature is negatively 
correlated with altitude. Between the 1930s and the mid-1990s, the National 
Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (INAMHI) collected data from weather stations 
throughout Carchi, with the longest term data collection in Tulcán, San Gabriel, and El 
Angel (Table 2.1). Local hydrological cycles follow a clear bimodal distribution (Figure 
2.2). Two periods of peak rainfall are defined for the periods of March-April and October-
November. Nevertheless, even during the driest periods, no dry months appear, and crops 
can be planted without irrigation throughout the year. Located at high altitudes on the 
equator, temperature variations are not seasonal, but rather diurnal. Means between 11 
and 12˚C occur between 2,500 and 3,000 meters above sea level (masl), while between 
3,000 and 3,400 masl temperature drops to means between ten and 11˚ C and at 3,400 
masl 8 and 9˚ C (Table 2.1). The geographic position and climatic conditions of Carchi 
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permit continual plant growth, making the province potentially one of the most 
productive agriculture regions on the planet. 
 
  
Fig. 2.1a South America Fig. 2.1b Province of Carchi, Ecuador 
Figure 2.1 Location of Carchi 
 
Table 2.1 Meteorological data from four weather stations in Carchi (Crissman, Antle, and 
Capalbo, 1998)* 
 
 Rainfall (mm) Temperature 
Weather station/altitude Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. dev. 
San Gabriel (2,860) 950 848 12 10 
El Angel (3,065) 984 605 12 14 
El Voladero (3,380) 1,314 n.a. 9 n.a. 
Tulcán (2,950) 996 850 12 11 
* Data for San Gabriel, El Angel and Tulcán averaged over 1970-2000. El Voladero data based on 1985-1995 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Rainfall distribution of Carchi (INAMHI, 1970-2000) 
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Termed the “Páramo-Andes” by Troll (1968), rainfall throughout the year distinguishes the 
highland region of northern Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela from the drier “Puna-
Andes” of southern and central Peru and Bolivia. Cool temperatures and wet conditions 
over millennia contributed to the formation of highly organic soils (12-20% by weight) 
and unique alpine environments, including cloud forest and “páramo” or tropical alpine 
grasslands. Carchi has well-defined western and eastern cordilleras that are topped by an 
extensive alpine plain with unique frailejón grasslands (Figure 2.3a). The western ridge 
forms one of the country’s largest natural páramo environments – the El Angel Ecological 
Reserve, covering about 14,000 hectares (ha). On the eastern ridge, the inter-Andean slope 
boasts an extensive 40,000 ha stretch of forest that is perhaps the best surviving example 
of pristine inter-Andean vegetation (Palacios & Tipaz, 1996). The forest lies on steep 
slopes and is circumscribed above by alpine páramo and below by cultivated agriculture 
(Figure 2.3b). 
 
  
Fig. 2.3a. The frailejón páramo landscape of 
the El Angel Reserve, Espejo 
Fig. 2.3b. The inter-Andean valley of San Gabriel, 
Montúfar 
Figure 2.3 The landscape 
 
The highland Andes of Carchi rest between 2,500 and 4,000 masl (Figure 2.4). In the early 
1800s, the German explorer and scientist Alexander von Humbolt famously characterised 
the biotic systems of the Ecuadorian highlands by three ecological floors: inter-Andes 
(2,500-3,200 masl), sub-Andes (3,200-3,600 masl), and Andes (3,600 masl). Two dominant 
regimes of plant populations dominate the natural ecologies: very humid highland 
montane forest (in valleys climbing up to 3,400 masl) and the frailejón (Espeletia pycnophylla 
spp. angelensis) páramo (3,400 up to 4,000 masl) (Sierra, 1999). The native vegetative cover 
of the highland forest consists of diverse tree and scrub species, including aliso (Alnus 
acuminata), arrayán (Mycianthes rhopaloides), chilca (Baccharis spp.), cedro (Cedrela montana), 
pumamaqui (Oreopanax sp.), quishuar (Buddleja bullata), and yagual (Polylepus sericea) 
(Cuamacás and Tipaz, 1995). The frailejón páramo chiefly consists of Espeletia sp. and 
bunch grasses (Calamagrositis sp., Agrostis sp., Stip ichu, Festuca sp.) (Figure 2.3a). Further, 
the páramo contains rosettes, cushion plants, and dispersed forests of yagual. 
 
The soils of Carchi are exceedingly arable. They were formed by pyroclastic material from 
the Chiles volcano located on the Colombian border, followed by processes of glaciation. 
The last eruption of Chiles occurred about ten thousand years ago. The relatively young 
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soils are classified as Andepts and are derived from volcanic ash and pumice (Figure 2.5). 
Soil formation above 3,000 masl has resulted in surface horizons of one to three meters of 
dark topsoil composed of high quantities of organic matter (10-25% by volume). Known 
as black Andean soils (suelos negros andinos), these soils have low bulk density, high water 
holding capacity, and are particularly apt for agriculture. At the same time, an alophane 
clay structure chemically fixes phosphorus, leading potato farmers to apply high quantities 
of phosphate fertilizers. Commonly formed on top of a thick layer of cemented ash (in 
Kichwa known as cangahua) that may run ten to 100 meters deep, the soils are highly 
vulnerable to human activity (Zembrowski, 1997). Absent of topsoil, the subsurface 
cangahua is impenetrable to water and inapt for agriculture (Figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.4 Topography of Carchi (Stoorvogel et al., 2003) 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Soil variation of Carchi (MAG-Orstom, 1980 in Stoorvogel et al., 2003) 
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Fig. 2.6a Road cut revealing “black Andean” top soil 
and sub-soil layer of cemented ash or cangahua (San 
Gabriel, Carchi; Veen, 1999) 
Fig. 2.6b Degraded soil of northern 
Ecuador revealing non-arable cangahua 
(Bolívar, Carchi) 
Figure 2.6 Volcanic soils common to northern Ecuador 
 
Farmers cultivate a diversity of crops in the inter-Andean region of the Páramo Andes, 
including maize, alfalfa, and field bean, as well as pasture for animals, chiefly cattle and 
sheep. In modern time, a potato-pasture rotation on irregular hillsides of up to 45 percent 
slope and altitudes between 2,400 to 3,800 masl dominates production patterns (Figure 
2.3b). Although potato can be found on the flatlands of the central valley, agrarian reform 
commonly placed farmers on surrounding environmentally fragile hillsides, with expected 
consequential effects on soil and water resources. Modern population growth in the 
valleys has aggravated this tendency. 
 
Modern potato production 
 
The highland Andes contains the greatest genetic diversity among cultivated and wild 
potatoes (Solanum tuberosum L.) (Hawkes, 1978; Salaman, 1985; Harris, 1992). Scientists 
generally agree that the Lake Titicaca region along the border of Peru and Bolivia was the 
site of potato domestication nearly 8,000 years ago. Archaeological studies have found 
that diverse ancient Andean groups, including the Tiwanaco, Nazca, Mochica, and Inca, 
cultivated the crop. In his chronicle of 1538, the Spaniard, Pedro Cieza de León, reported 
that he found tubers called “papas” in the Cuzco Valle, Peru and later in Quito, Ecuador. 
When the Spanish arrived in the early 1500s, potato was cultivated throughout the 4,000 
km long range of the Andes, in what are now the territories of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Bolivia, and Chile.  
 
Of the approximately 2,000 known species of the Solanum genus, about 180 plants form 
tubers (Hawkes, 1978). Of these, only eight are cultivated as edible crops. There are about 
5,000 cultivars of potato in the world, of which today Andean farmers commonly grow 
about 500. In 1994, INIAP conducted a survey of cultivated potato in Ecuador and 
reported over 400 different types between the species andigena and phureja (Pumisacho and 
Sherwood, 2002). Nevertheless, 30 cultivars dominate the modern Ecuadorian landscape, 
of which the varieties Gabriela and Superchola occupy over half the land cultivated in the 
crop. 
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In the sixteenth century, the Spanish introduced the potato to Europe, where it was only 
cultivated as a curiosity for several centuries in small plots or for botanical purposes 
(Laufer, 1938). From Spain, the potato spread throughout the continent and the United 
Kingdom. Andean potatoes only grew well in a few locations in Europe where winters 
were mild, such as southern Ireland. Early in the seventeenth century, the crop was 
introduced to North America, most likely from England. Over time, as the potato adapted 
to the climate and farmers selected more precocious varieties, potato cultivation became 
economically viable in the northern temperate climate. In Europe, potato generally was 
first used for animal feed and was not commonly considered for human consumption. 
Only in the eighteenth century did Europeans and North Americans begin to consider the 
potato a source of low-cost human food, particularly during periods of scarcity due to 
failures of cereal crops and wars. Over time, however, the crop became a basic food 
source the world over.  
 
Today, the worldwide circulation of root and tuber crops generates about $41 billion each 
year, representing one-fourth of the combined value of the cereals wheat, rice and maize 
(Scott et al., 2000). Of the root and tuber crops, the potato has the highest economic value 
(about $16.5 billion/year). It ranks fifth in weight of production among the world's food 
crops. In terms of nutrition, the potato contributes about one-fifth as many calories as 
rice, wheat, and maize to the world diet. The countries with the most area under potato 
cultivation are: China (3.5 million ha), the Russian Federation (3.4 million ha), Ukraine 
(1.6 million ha), Poland (1.4 million ha), and India (1.1 million ha). In Latin America, 
despite being the crop's centre of origin, only about 1.1 million hectares are dedicated to 
the crop each year, of which Ecuador grows about 43,000 ha,1 which is down from about 
66,000 ha during the 1990s (Herrera, 1999; INEC, 2002). The countries with the greatest 
potato productivity are: The Netherlands (44 t/ha), US (39 t/ha), Belgium and 
Luxemburg (38 t/ha) and Canada (27 t/ha) (CIP, 1998; Scott et al., 2000). Of the Latin 
American countries, Argentina has the greatest productivity (22 t/ha), followed by Chile 
and Brazil (15 t/ha). In the Andes, farmers in Colombia and Venezuela grow about 16 
t/ha of potato. The lowest productivity can be found in Bolivia and Ecuador, which 
respectively produce on average six and nine t/ha. 
 
In the developing counties, total potato production has more than doubled since 1965, 
with most growth occurring in Asia and Africa (Scott et al., 2000). Through 2020, yearly 
potato production in developing countries is projected to grow at about 2.7 percent, 
which is greater than that expected for maize, wheat, or rice. The greatest growth likely 
will occur in Asia, followed by Africa and Latin America. In the last 30 years, Latin 
America has experienced an increase in potato productivity instead of an increase in area 
dedicated to the crop. The growth in overall regional production for this period was about 
two percent. Presently, the number of potato growers in Ecuador is about 42,000 
predominantly smallholder farmers (INEC, 2002). The country produces about 480,000 
tons of potato with a brute value of $60 million, maintaining the potato as an important 
source of food and income, especially for rural communities. Carchi is Ecuador's most 
productive province, producing about 40 percent of the country's potato harvest on only 
25 percent of the land dedicated the crop.  
                                                       
1 Based on SICA-MAG data for 2006, available at: www.sica.gov.ec (accessed 1 October 2008). 
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Consumption 
 
Cuando en la sopa no hay papas, es como si fuera agua, aunque tenga fréjol, arveja, col... 
(When in the soup there is no potato, it’s as if it were water, even if there are 
beans, peas, and cabbage…) – a popular saying in Carchi 
 
Andean cultures discovered roots and tubers as a valuable source of energy (Woolfe, 
1987). The nutritive quality and quantity of the potato varies by cultivar and cropping 
conditions. Water content may range from 63 and 87 percent, carbohydrates 13 and 30 
percent (including fibre content 0.17 and 3.48%), proteins 0.7 and 4.6 percent, fats 0.02 
and 0.96 percent, and ash 0.44 and 1.9 percent. Other basic nutrients include sugars, 
ascorbic acid and minor vitamins.  
 
While cereals and pulses are part of a large international trade market, only a small 
percentage of potato harvests is exported from countries. The high water content, 
bulkiness, and perishability of tubers complicate their transport. In the dry puna Andes to 
the South, pre-Incan cultures learned to freeze-dry potato as chuño that was transportable 
and capable of storage – qualities essential for surviving crops failures and war. 
Nevertheless, chuño could not be produced in the wet páramo environments of the 
northern Andes, greatly limiting the utility of the crop. As a result, pre-Colombian cultures 
of the northern Andes preferred maize (Landázuri, 1995). In that region, potato and other 
Andean roots and tubers were relegated to highland areas, where little else survived the 
severe conditions. 
 
For the people of modern-day Ecuador, potato has become a principal food source, with 
an annual per capita consumption of about 100 kg (Herrera et al., 1999). Ninety percent of 
potatoes in the northern Andes, where crops can be grown year round, are consumed 
immediately as fresh tubers. As a result, varieties are not adapted for storage, in contrast to 
the more temperate climates of Peru and Bolivia as well as Europe and North America. 
The food processing industry in Ecuador consumes about 50,000 t/yr or ten percent of 
the annual production. Since 1994, the consumption of fast food in Ecuador has increased 
sharply at an annual rate of about six percent. Restaurants in Quito and Guayaquil only 
consume about 16,000 t/yr, principally as French fries, but that number is growing. 
 
Potato-pasture system 
 
Upon arrival in 1997, my information on potato production in Carchi was based on two 
primary sources of data. Between 1990 and 1992, Crissman et al. (1998) studied 320 plots 
of 40 farmers in the San Gabriel area. This research contributed to a large number of 
economic and health publications, including: Antle, et al. (1994), Antle et al. (1998), 
Crissman, et al. (1994), Cole, et al. (1997a), Cole et al. (1997b), and Cole et al. (1998). 
Secondly, in 1998, Barrera, Norton, and Ortiz (1999) conducted a survey of 100 farmers 
between Tulcán, Huaca, Montúfar, and Espejo. This information concurs with findings 
based on the earlier datasets, except for increases in input prices and lower production per 
area, which apparently was due to an unusually dry year. Later, Yanggen et al. (2003) drew 
on these same two data sources for their description of the production system. I similarly 
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rely on these sources. For biophysical aspects of potato production, I draw heavily on the 
local studies summarised in Pumisacho and Sherwood (2002). 
 
Carchi has been described as a model of the spread of industrialized agricultural 
technologies in the Americas during the Green Revolution that began in the 1960s 
(Barsky, 1984). A combination of traditional sharecropping, land reform, market access 
and high value crops provided the basis for rural economic development. Furthermore, as 
a result of new revenues from the oil boom of the 1970s, the Ecuadorian government 
improved the transportation and communication infrastructure in Carchi. An emerging 
agricultural products industry was quick to capitalize on the availability of new markets. 
Today, a typical small farm in Carchi is owned by an individual family and consists of 
several separate, scattered plots with an average area of about six hectares.  
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, farming in Carchi evolved towards a 
market-oriented potato-pasture system based on a three to five year rotational system. 
One or two cycles of potato are followed by a combination of secondary crops, including 
wheat, maize, bean, favabean, barley, peas, oca or melloco, to take advantage of residual 
fertilizer from potato. Farmers follow this rotation with one or two years of “rest” in 
spontaneously occurring grassland for diary and meat cattle. Due to the intensiveness of 
the system, it depends on external inputs to maintain fertility and control pests. Between 
1954 and 1974 potato production increased by about 40 percent and worker productivity 
by 33 percent (Barsky, 1984). Until recently, the potato growing area in the province 
continued to swell, with yields rising from12 t/ha in 1974 to 21 t/ha in 1992, a remarkable 
three times the national average (Crissman et al., 1998b).  
 
Production costs 
 
During the early 1990s, farmers in Carchi invested on average about $1,500 per ha in 
potato production (Table 2.2) (Crissman et al., 1998b). About 25 percent of outlays went 
towards labour (valuing both family and paid labour as worker days). The average six-
month potato crop employed about 157 workdays/ha, with about 85 percent for men and 
the remainder for women. Labour came both from family and hired sources. Women 
were most involved in planting and harvest (Table 2.3). Rarely were they involved in crop 
management or the applying of agrochemicals. During the 1990s, farmers in Carchi 
cultivated about 15,000 ha/yr of potato, signifying about 2,355,000 workdays of 
employment for the province. About 32 percent of total investment was in fertilizers and 
pesticides. The remainder of variable costs went towards land preparation, harvest, and 
transport (12%). Twenty percent of outlays went towards fixed costs, such as land rent 
and interest on loans. 
 
Profitability of potato production was generally positive but highly variable. In Carchi, 
most potato was sold weekly in local markets of San Gabriel and Ibarra, depending on 
location of fields. Potato farmers found highly variable prices across varieties at harvest 
time. Price at harvest was important, since potatoes in Carchi are not bred for storage, nor 
are the conditions in the wet páramo Andes favourable for storage. Since Carchi is located 
near the equator and rainfall is evenly distributed, monthly price fluctuations were not 
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determined by season, but rather comparative prices with neighbouring Colombia and 
Peru as well as dumping of commodities by countries in North American and Europe. As 
a result of such factors, Crissman et al. (1998a) found that between 1990-1992 farmers lost 
money on about 43 percent of their potato crops. To confront high price variability in 
potato, farmers applied the strategy of "playing the lottery," which involved continual 
production while gambling for high prices at harvest to recover overall investment. In 
summary, potato production in Carchi was a highly risky enterprise. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Average production costs for one hectare of potato (USD) (1990-1992) 
(Crissman et al., 1998b)* 
 
Category Sample (n) Quantity Cost (US$) Percentage of total cost 
Variable costs     
Labour     
Family 320  288 18.7 
Contract 103  55 3.6 
Harvest 270  45 2.9 
Total labour  157 days 388 25.3 
Seed 320 1,716 kg 148 9.7 
Fertilizers   302 19.6 
Nitrogen, a.i. 320 138 kg   
Phosphorus, a.i. 320 327 kg   
Potassium, a.i. 317 163 kg   
Foliar 207  11 0.8 
Total fertilizers   313 20.4 
Pesticides     
Fungicides 320  128 8.3 
Foliar insecticides 314  26 1.7 
Soil insecticides 268  34 2.2 
Total pesticides   188 12.2 
Animal and mechanical 
traction 
153  17 1.2 
Back-pack sprayers 320  10 0.7 
Harvest  320  53 3.5 
Transport 319  105 6.9 
Total materials/services   185 12.2 
Total variable costs   1,222 79.8 
Fixed costs     
Interest   232 15.2 
Rent   77 5.0 
Total fixed costs   309 20.1 
Total costs   1,531 100 
* Note: Average harvest = 21.3 t/ha; gross income = $1,941; net income = $410/ha. Exchange rate 
increased from 890 Sucres/USD in 1991 to 1,700 Sucres/USD in 1992. The authors used 1,300 Sucres/USD 
for conversion; a.i. = active ingredient 
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Table 2.3 Workdays by gender and activity in field potato production (by hectare and 
potato cropping cycle) (1990-1992; n=320 plots) (Crissman et al., 1998b) 
 
Activity Men Women Total 
Soil preparation 17.1 0.1 17.2 
Planting 9.2 6.5 15.7 
Crop management (excluding pesticide applications) 47.9 2.9 50.8 
Pesticide applications 20.2 0.0 20.1 
Harvest (sorting, bagging) 38.3 14.5 52.8 
Total 132.7 24.0 156.7 
 
Soil and pest management 
 
Sixty percent of potato fields are prepared exclusively by tractor, and 25 percent are 
ploughed via a combination of oxen and by hand (Veen, 1999). The remaining 15 percent 
of fields are prepared exclusively by hand. Generally, landscape determines patterns, with 
farmers relying on mechanised tillage for fields of less than 35 percent slope. Chemical 
fertilisers have replaced traditional means of managing fertility, such as rotations and 
extended fallows (Crissman et al., 1998b; Barrera et al., 1999). Essentially, all potato 
growers in Carchi used chemical fertilizers, with an average application rate being 138 
kg/ha of Nitrogen (N), 327 Phosphorus (P), and 163 Potassium (K) (Table 2.2). The 
compound fertilizer 18-46-0 (18% N, 46% P, and 0% K), that responded to a 
phosphorous tie-up problem of black Andean soils, was the most common product 
applied. While still economically cost effective, according to aggregate soil analysis, 
fertilizer use was between 50 and 100 percent above recommended rates for potato 
(Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). 
 
Scientists have identified hundreds of insects and pathogens (biotic disease agents) that 
feed on potato (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). Some of these co-evolved with the 
crop. Because the potato typically is propagated a-sexually by means of tubers, it was 
relatively easy for pests to travel with the crop as it migrated from the Andes to Europe 
and the rest of the world. Other pests and diseases existed locally and adapted to the 
potato when it arrived as a new host plant. In Ecuador, a large number of insect and 
disease pests attack potato, but in Carchi most damage is caused by three: the disease late 
blight (caused by the fungal-like pathogen Phytophthora infestans), the Andean weevil 
(Premnotrypes vorax), and the recently introduced Guatemalan tuber moth (Tescia solinavora). 
Additionally, a complex of minor foliar pests feed on the crop, including leaf flea beetles 
(Epitrix spp.), aphids (Myzus persicae and Macrosiphun euphorbiae), thrips (Franliniella tuberosi), 
and leafminers (Liriomyza huibodrensis). 
 
An exotic pathogen from North America and Europe causes the devastating disease late 
blight. The pathogen was likely introduced to the Andes on seed tubers in the early 
twentieth century, most likely via Europe, after it had contributed to the Irish Potato 
Famine in the early 1840s (Andrivon, 1996). P. infestans is an oomycete, fungal-like 
organism that infects vascular tissues, producing blight symptoms (known in the Andes as 
lancha or rancha) in solanaceous crops (de Bary, 1876). Many plant pathologists consider 
late blight the most economically severe disease on edible crops the world over (Fry, 
1997). The pathogen can enter a field and devastate a potato crop in less than one week. 
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In Ecuador the disease proliferates at altitudes between 2,800 and 3,400 masl (Pumisacho 
and Sherwood, 2002). Studies have found that the pathogen can travel with the wind 
hundreds of kilometres, limiting the usefulness of rotation with non-hosts as a 
management strategy. In humid and cool conditions common to Carchi, spores germinate 
and hypha penetrate the lamina of leaves, reproducing both a-sexually and sexually in a 
matters of hours and destroying tissue. The pathogen interferes with photosynthesis, 
thereby decreasing plant growth and yields. Similarly, P. infestans also can directly infect 
fruits and tubers. Under the right conditions the oomycete can live and reproduce in the 
soil and infect tubers in the ground. For reasons not entirely understood, this means of 
infection is less common in the Northern Andes, perhaps due to biological or chemical 
antagonism of soils (Garzón-Villalba, 1998). As a result of favourable environmental 
conditions for late blight in the highlands and the difficulty of producing multiple gene 
resistance in potato, the pathogen commonly overcomes resistant varieties in less than five 
years. As a result, control strategies in Carchi largely have centred on the use of foliar 
fungicides targeting spore germination and hyphal penetration of leaves. 
 
The Andean weevil, locally known as gusano blanco or the white worm, is an endemic insect 
that co-evolved with potato (Gallegos et al., 1997). In the highland provinces of Ecuador 
its larval stage commonly affects between 20 and 50 percent of tubers, causing 
considerable economic loss for farmers. The small adult beetle survives above ground for 
about 270 days where it feeds on the leaves of potato and other solanaceous relatives, 
causing limited foliar damage. During this period females lay about 260 small white eggs, 
usually at the base of plants. After about 35 days the eggs hatch into small white larva that 
live in the soil for about 38 days, where they burrow into potato tubers and produce 
elongate galleries. The insect passes through pre-pupa (18 days) and pupa (26 days) stages 
in a small dirt cell in the soil and sometimes the potato tuber, before the adult emerges 
and escapes to the soil surface. Adult weevils have highly developed olfaction and may 
travel three to five kilometres in search of host plants. They can survive for three months 
without food. In Carchi, where potato production is continuous, the Andean weevil is 
omnipresent, and the different life cycle stages of the insect can be found in fields at any 
given time of the year (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). Traditionally, the Andean weevil 
was controlled empirically through multi-cropping and crop rotation. Certain cultural 
practices, such as prolonged rotations with non-host crops, companion planting with 
chocho, as well as the wachu rozado reduced tillage system, were antagonistic to the beetle. 
Intensive potato production increased the presence of potato as a host plant and has 
contributed to the proliferation of the pest in recent time. Since larva live in the soil, they 
are difficult to observe and control. Tillage can decrease populations, but it also 
synchronizes life cycles of surviving beetles with the crop. The beetle is small and dirt-like, 
making it difficult to perceive, and as a result, knowledge of the insect’s life cycle generally 
has not entered into rural knowledge systems. As a result, farmers have come to rely on 
soil drench and systemic insecticides that translocate in plants and poison larva at the 
moment they burrow into tubers. 
 
In 1983, the Guatemalan tuber moth or Tescia migrated into South America via a 
contaminated shipment of potato seed from Costa Rica to Venezuela. In 1985, it arrived 
in Colombia via similar means and, subsequently in 1996, reached Ecuador (Barragán et 
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al., 2000). Five years later the pest was found in potato fields and markets throughout 
Ecuador and northern Peru. The adult moth lays between six and 15 white eggs at the 
base of potato plants. Over a course of 12 to 15 days, eggs turn yellow and then purple 
before hatching (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). Larva develop in the soil over a period 
of 30 to 35 days, when they search for and infest tubers, leaving behind galleries. Typically 
larvae abandon the potato at maturity to form a cocoon in the soil, but it also may pupate 
in the potato itself or in sacks during transport and storage. After between 28 to 30 days a 
grey moth adult emerges, which lives for 18 to 22 days. During this period, females lay 
about 250 eggs. The adults feed on plant exudates, but they can survive without eating. 
Exotic to the Andes, the Guatemalan tuber moth does not have natural enemies in Carchi. 
Frequent rainfall effectively suppresses moth populations, but during a dry year the pest 
can recover to devastate crops. In 1998, field infestations in Carchi were so bad that many 
farmers chose not to harvest their potatoes, which contributed to further proliferation of 
the insect. Farmers have not yet developed cultural means of managing the pest, but 
rotations with non-host crops can starve out larva in the soil. Nevertheless, adults can 
easily travel the distances between potato fields in Carchi, so clean fields quickly become 
infested. Farmers commonly apply systemic soil as well as foliar insecticides for the 
control of Tescia, but these have little affect on the insect (Chamorro et al., 2004). 
 
The earlier mentioned complex of foliar pests does little economic damage to the potato 
crop in Carchi largely as a result of frequent rainfall, which controls adults as well as larva 
and nymphs on leaves (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). Even during dry periods the 
damage to leaves, while visibly impressive, rarely influences production. Nevertheless, 
over the years farmers have come to view any presence of insects on their crop as 
threatening, so local understanding of “good farming” has evolved to include regular 
applications of highly toxic foliar insecticides (Espinosa et al., 2003). 
 
Pesticide use 
 
Farmers in Carchi invest three times more money on pesticides in potato than they do on 
any other crop (Table 2.4) (Crissman et al., 1998b). When the products and labour are 
factored, pesticides represent about 33 percent of total production costs. In the early 
1990s farmers applied 38 different commercial fungicide formulations (Table 2.5). Barrera 
et al. (1999) found essentially the same patterns at the end of the decade. Farmers apply 24 
active ingredients of fungicides. The class of dithiocarbamate contact-type fungicides are 
the most popular, with mancozeb contributing more than 80 percent by weight of all 
fungicide active ingredients used. The dithiocarbamate family of fungicides has recently 
been under scrutiny in the Northern Andes due to suspected reproductive (Restrepo et al., 
1990) and mutagenic effects in human cells (Paz-y-Mino et al., 2002). Governments in 
Europe and the United States have raised similar concerns over these fungicides (USEPA, 
1992; Lander et al., 2000). In summary, 80 percent of the fungicides applied in Carchi 
contain a suspected cancer-causing agent. 
 
Farmers use three of the four main groups of insecticides in 28 different commercial 
products. Although organochlorine insecticides can be found in Ecuador, farmers in 
Carchi do not use them. The carbamate group is represented only by carbofuran, but this 
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is the single most heavily used insecticide - for control of the Andean weevil as well as for 
the Guatemalan tuber moth, though carbofuran does not control Tescia). Farmers 
exclusively apply a liquid formulation of carbofuran, which is restricted in North America 
and Europe due to the ease of absorption and the high acute toxicity of the pesticide. 
While the manufacturer recommends just one application of carbofuran for potato, many 
farmers apply more than ten applications. Another 18 different active ingredients from the 
organophosphate (OP) and pyrethroid groups are employed to control foliar pests, though 
only four are used on more than ten percent of plots. Here the OP methamidophos, also 
restricted in North America due to its high acute toxicity, is the clear favourite. 
Carbofuran and methamidophos, both classified by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) as highly toxic (1b) insecticides, respectively make up 47 percent and 43 percent 
of all insecticides used (by weight of active ingredient applied). In summary, 90 percent of 
the insecticides applied in Carchi are highly toxic.  
 
 
Table 2.4 Pesticide expenditures for different crops Carchi (US$/ha) (1990-1992; n=40 
farmers) (Crissman et al., 1998b) 
 
Crop Fungicide Insecticide  Total 
Potato 128 60 188 
Wheat 48 4 52 
Fava bean 33 19 52 
Barley 46 1 47 
Peas 23 10 33 
Maize and field bean  15 14 29 
Maize 12 14 26 
Mellocoa   b 10 10 
Ocaa   b  b  b
 
a Melloco and oca are Andean root crops 
b No pesticides were applied 
 
 
Most insecticides and fungicides come as liquids or wetable powders and are applied by 
mixing with water and using a backpack sprayer. Provided the costs associated with 
spraying, farmers usually combine several products together in mixtures known as 
cocktails, applying all on a single pass through the field. On average, each parcel receives 
6.7 applications with 2.5 insecticides and fungicides in each application (Crissman et al., 
1998b). On many occasions, they mix different commercial products containing the same 
active ingredient or different active ingredients intended for the same type of control. 
Women and very young children typically do not apply pesticides – among the 2,250 
applications that CIP documented in its 1990s' studies, women made only four. 
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Table 2.5 Pesticide use during a single potato cropping season (1990-1992; 320 plots) 
(Crissman et al., 1998b) 
 
Fungicides Amount applied (kg) No. of applications No. of plots treated 
Mancozeba 3,110.67 1,801 304 
Sulphur compounds 333.14 286 99 
Propineba 142.02 146 53 
Maneba 115.11 181 65 
Cymoxanilb 64.93 635 178 
Copper compounds 29.21 94 29 
Fentinacetate 11.34 86 36 
Ferbama 9.55 73 28 
Chlorotalonyl 6.75 6 6 
Fosetil–aluminum 4.74 11 6 
Metirama 3.92 7 6 
Oxicarboxinb 1.95 2 2 
Propiocanazolb 1.39 26 13 
Captan 1.16 7 5 
Methyl tiophanate 1.15 12 5 
PCNB 0.75 1 1 
Dinocap 0.59 5 3 
Tridemorfb 0.30 2 1 
Zineba 0.25 3 2 
Carbendazimb 0.25 1 1 
Carboxinb 0.15 1 1 
Ofuraceb 0.02 1 1 
Metalaxylb 0.00 1 1 
Insecticides Amount applied (kg) No. of applications No. of plots treated 
Carbofuran 224.77 687 262 
Methamidophosc 206.69 999 265 
Profenofosc 20.99 117 62 
Fonofosc 9.77 28 16 
Malathionc 9.72 14 9 
Dimetoatoc 5.40 19 11 
Lambda  0.78 148 64 
Cihalotrina 0.72 3 1 
Diazinonc 0.71 10 6 
Foratoc 0.49 4 1 
Methyl parathion 0.46 92 42 
Deltametrine 0.32 2 2 
Monocrotophosc 0.32 1 1 
Phosfamidon 0.31 7 4 
Cypermetrina 0.19 7 2 
Acephate 0.12 10 6 
Cyflutrin 0.08 1 1 
Formothion 0.08 1 1 
Fenitrothionc 0.05 3 2 
Alfametrina 206.69 999 265 
Methamidophosc 20.99 117 62 
a Dithiocarbamate fungicide; b Systemic fungicide; c Organophosphate insecticide 
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Ecuador's exchange rate policies during the 1980 and 1990s effectively subsidized the 
importation of pesticides, including the highly toxics carbofuran and methamidophos, by 
about 30 percent (Lee and Espinosa, 1998). Econometric evaluations of pesticide use in 
Carchi potato production found that from a financial perspective farmers used the 
products efficiently (Crissman et al., 1994). Four mathematical approaches were 
considered in estimating production elasticity of specific inputs, which showed the overall 
marginal productivity of pesticides to be about 12 percent (Table 2.6). Due to the 
virulence and aggressiveness of the late blight pathogen, plant pathologists consider the 
use of fungicides as essential for obtaining potato harvests, so the return of fungicides is 
consistent and high. Attempts during the 1990s by an environmental NGO to produce 
pesticide-free potatoes in Carchi failed and affirmed this point of view (Frolick et al., 
1999). In summary, the benefit to yields (and revenues) from using pesticides exceeds the 
additional costs of using them. 
 
Table 2.6 Elasticity estimates for pesticides used in potato production in Carchi (n=320 
plots) (Crissman et al., 1994) 
 
                                      Functional form* 
Input Cobb-Douglas  Quadratic Exponential Logarithmic 
Fungicides 0.0827 0.1148 0.0000 0.0000 
Foliar 
insecticides 
0.0217 0.0268 0.0017 0.0010 
Soil insecticides 0.0501 - 0.0038 0.0557 0.0595 
*Note: Exponential and logarithmic forms were specified with a reduction restriction as suggested by 
Lichtenberg y Zilberman.  
 
 
Environmental and health costs of modern agriculture 
 
While a conventional economic analysis of the employment of technologies in agricultural 
production in Carchi showed positive returns – i.e., the benefit of increasing productivity 
through fertilisers or mechanised tillage or reducing losses due to pests and diseases 
exceeded costs – that same use could cause adverse environmental and health effects. The 
previously mentioned elasticity studies on pesticides, for example, showed that pesticide 
use was efficient from a narrow farm production perspective. Nevertheless, that study 
examined pesticide use solely from the perspective of reducing crop losses. When adverse 
health and environmental effects are included in productivity analyses, results can be very 
different.  
 
The researchers developed an integrated assessment method to address this analytical 
problem called the Tradeoffs Analysis Model (ToA) (Antle et al., 1998; Stoorvogel et al., 
2003) (Box 2.1). Interest in developing the model and further understanding the true costs 
of modern agriculture led to further environmental and health investigations. The ensuing 
research primarily looked at different environmental concerns around human-induced soil 
degradation as well as health concerns associated with pesticide exposure. Outcomes 
contributed to integrated analysis of productivity, health, and environmental tradeoffs of 
different technological alternatives and policy recommendations. 
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Box 2.1 Tradeoffs analysis of sustainable agriculture and the environment in the Andes: A 
decision support system for policy makers 
 
Since 1996, CIP, in collaboration with INIAP, Montana State University (MSU), the 
Pontífica Universidad Católica de Ecuador (PUCE) and Wageningen University and Research 
Centre (WUR), among other organisations, have implemented a collaborative project to 
provide a decision support system for assessing tradeoffs between agricultural production 
and the environment for different economic, agricultural and environmental policies, and 
agricultural research. Through quantifying relationships between key economic and health 
or environmental indicators, the Tradeoffs Analysis Model (ToA) uses raw data and 
software to compare different technological alternatives, in search of potential positive 
sum or “win-win” scenarios.  
 
The diagram graphically explains the 
tradeoffs concept. Increasing from 
zero, the vertical axis registers levels of 
growing negative impact on the 
environment or health. The horizontal 
axis presents growing value of 
agricultural production. Changes in 
technology that increase production 
commonly lead to increased affects on 
the environment or health, as 
demonstrated by the climbing rate of 
the curves. Nevertheless, a shift to 
certain technology, for example from 
pesticides to IPM, can produce 
movement from T1 to T2, by decreasing 
negative environmental or health 
effects while maintaining production. 
The result is a win-win development. 
Details on ToA are available at the project website (www.tradeoffs.montana.edu) and the 
model website (www.tradeoffs.nl). 
 
In the Andes, the development and application of ToA has concentrated on pesticide and 
soil management technology. The combination of economics, soil science research, and 
crop and dairy modelling advances methodological development of a conceptual model 
that links economics and environmental research for the purpose of policy analysis and 
technology evaluation. A product development team aims to continually integrate 
developmental research, strategic research and outreach activities. The adaptation of the 
decision support system represents developmental research that has required the 
utilisation of existing secondary information from sources such as soil survey, land use 
survey, weather, farm production, and economic data. As the decision support system has 
developed, the initiative has encouraged outreach through the training of “change agents” 
from NGOs and local governments in transmitting results and providing feedback links 
with on-going policy dialogue. 
Modern Potato Production   37 
Soil degradation 
 
De Noni and Trujillo (1986) identified Carchi as a region of rapid soil decline. In their 
work on different aspects of soil modelling for the broader ToA effort, Kooistra and 
Meyles (1997) and van Soest (1998) from Wageningen University raised concerns over the 
soil erosion provoked by potato cultivation. These scientists were alarmed to see subsoil 
cangahua emerging at the top of hillsides after three decades of tractor use. Due to the high 
water holding capacity of black Andean soils, Kooistra and Meyles (1997) surmised that 
soil loss was primarily due to mechanized tillage on slopes and not run-off due to rainfall.  
 
Subsequent quantitative studies confirmed these observations. Veen (1999) examined on-
farm soil movement in the San Gabriel area and found that the primary factors behind soil 
degradation and production declines were: longer production history, intensification of 
production, the use of modern technologies, and tractor applications. Valverde et al. 
(2001) documented soil displacement produced by ploughs and disks in Carchi potato 
production. They found that mechanised tillage in a potato field commonly displaced 
between 50 and 100 t/ha of soil, with a displacement of greater than 80 t/ha common in 
slopes over 25 percent.  
 
A dominant pattern of market-oriented production and the positioning of potato as a cash 
crop led to an intensification of agriculture in Carchi. In practice, this signified a shift 
towards total tillage, mono-cropping, shortening of fallow periods, and agrochemical use. 
The CIP researchers surmised that this affected “soil health” – i.e., the capacity of a soil to 
function within ecosystem boundaries to sustain biological productivity, maintain 
environmental quality, and promote plant and animal health.2 Between 1999 and 2003, 
INIAP and CIP conducted a joint study in Carchi on the effects of potato farming on soil 
regenerative capacity through a project named EcoSuelos (in English, EcoSoils).3 While the 
researchers had a difficult time understanding the dynamics of soil ecology in such a short 
period of time, preliminary results pointed to worrisome trends in long-term soil health. 
Changes to soil micro-morphology, such as soil organic matter fractions, nutrient content, 
and water-holding capacity, were not observed. Nevertheless, the research identified a 
change in soil environmental conditions and ecology that appeared to work against long-
term crop health and overall sustainability of agriculture. Pathogenic nematode 
populations (Globodera or Meloidogyne spp.) were found to be relatively low, most likely due 
to heavy use of carbofuran (both an insecticide and nematicide). Using Rhizoctonia and 
Fusarium spp. as indicators, studies found that modern agriculture practices (i.e., total 
tillage, mono-cropping, shortening of fallow periods, and agrochemical uses) in potato 
production combined to contribute to the proliferation of soil pathogens. Further, they 
found that native mycorrhizae populations declined, decreasing the plants’ ability to 
absorb soil phosphorous, thereby potentially affecting root development and overall crop 
growth and production. While studies were not conclusive, it was suggested that beneficial 
                                                       
2 Harris and Bezdicek (1994) explain the difference between “soil quality” and “soil health.” Uphoff and 
Sherwood (2000) argued in favour of soil health in the context of regenerative agriculture, due to its 
conceptual emphasis on the dynamic qualities of soil and inclusion of socio-technical aspects of agriculture. 
3 “EcoSuelos: investigacion para un manejo mas productivo y sostenible de suelos andinos en la ecoregion 
centro-norte del Ecuador” was a collaborative INIAP-CIP project funded by MAG/PROMSA, IQ-CV-049. 
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entomopathogen populations had declined, contributing to the proliferation of a major 
pest: the Andean weevil. 
 
Box 2.2 Wachu rozado: a pre-Colombia reduced tillage potato system 
 
During a first trip to Carchi, Joel,4 the head of the INIAP-Carchi, took me on a drive in 
the project truck to visit some potato fields located on the hillsides above the town of San 
Gabriel. Along the way, I spotted what looked to be a farmer planting potatoes on a steep 
slope of pasture. I asked Joel to stop, and we entered the field to talk with the farmer. The 
farmer explained that he was planting in wachu rozado. The term was an odd mixture of the 
Kichwa word wachu, meaning furrow, and the Spanish rozar, to cut; literally, wachu rozado 
meant “cut furrow.” I came to learn that wachu rozado probably was a pre-Colombian 
tillage system for roots and tubers that appears to have developed in moist highland areas 
such as the páramo Andes.  
 
We conducted a brief follow-up study to better understand the system (Sherwoood, 1998). 
Wachu rozado involved cutting and folding over two parallel rows of sod towards one 
another. The potato crop was cultivated where the line of folded over sod flats met. 
Farmers claimed that wachu rozado was more productive than conventional tillage. They 
also said that it reduced soil erosion, and the crop had fewer problems with late blight. 
They claimed that the potatoes came out cleaner and with less damage due to the Andean 
weevil and potato scab. Despite the thousands of hectares of wachu rozado that remained 
on the surrounding hillsides of the region and the well-known problems of soil erosion, 
the national research service in Ecuador had overlooked the system.5  
 
Further research confirmed what farmers had been saying all along (INIAP-CIP, 2003). 
Economic studies demonstrated that wachu rozado was more cost-effective than hand 
tillage and it compared with conventional tractor tillage. It was also an important source of 
employment, demanding 25 more labour days/cropping season than conventional tillage. 
Soil displacement under wachu rozado was considerably less than under conventional tillage 
(about 15 vs. 40 t/ha). Additionally, wachu rozado produced “cleaner” potato tubers – dirt-
free and with less Rhizoctonia and Andean weevil damage. Apparently, the “heating up” of 
the sod mat in decomposition was antagonistic to soil pests. Research trials showed that 
under equal fertilization regimes wachu rozado out produced conventional tillage (24.13 
vs.19.52 t/ha), most likely due to increased mycorrhizae development and improved 
phosphorus uptake. Under wachu rozado, the potato crop grew on a high ridge and had 
better drainage than with conventional tillage, leading to lower relative humidity around 
the plant. As a result, comparative trials found less severity of late blight infection 
(AUDPC of 471.44 for wachu rozado vs. 629.55 conventional tillage). Wachu rozado proved 
to be both highly productive and resource conserving – a rare combination. Paredes (in 
process) provides further analysis of the survival of the wachu rozado system. 
 
                                                       
4 In this dissertation, I apply fictitious names to local actors to protect the reputation of individuals. 
5 This is in contrast to CORPOICA, the Colombian national research service. During the 1990s 
CORPOICA’s Nariño station had developed a research program on wachu rozado. Pedro Oyarzun, Trip report 
on visit to CORPOICA research station at Obonunco, Nariño, 17-20 March 2001. 
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The combined effects of massive soil erosion through mechanised, total tillage on hillsides 
and a decline in soil health led Pedro Oyarzun, a soil scientist and co-leader of INIAP’s 
National Potato Program to conclude, “Unquestionably, soil degradation [in Carchi] is the 
primary environmental concern of the province and a major threat to agricultural 
sustainability and livelihoods.”6 In contrast, research on the surviving pre-Colombian 
wachu rozado system suggests that traditional soil management was far more resource 
conserving (Box 2.2) 
 
Generation of pest problems 
 
Years ago, we did not need to apply pesticides, but people said that a man who 
lived close to this place started [to apply] first. It seems that the worms came from 
the products, because after that, the pests began to increase. As a result, it is no 
longer possible to produce without [pesticide] applications. – a smallholder 
farmer from Carchi 
 
Essentially every farmer with whom I have talked since arriving to Carchi has made the 
same general claim: pest problems are getting worse with time. When I first arrived they 
spoke of two major pest problems: the Andean weevil (Premnotrypes vorax) that could 
decrease yields by as much as 80 percent and late blight (caused by Phytophthora infestans) 
that could entirely decimate production (Crissman et al., 1998; Yanggen et al., 2003). By 
2000, they added a third major pest: the Guatemalan potato moth (Tescia solanivora), which 
has caused a large number of farmers in drier areas to abandon potato farming (Barragán 
et al., 2000). This modern proliferation of pests is no accident, but rather the direct result 
of changes to agroecologies associated with intensification of agriculture and the 
introduction of exotic organisms (Frolick et al., 2000; Dasgupta et al., 2002). 
 
As explained earlier, the Andean weevil is an endemic insect that co-evolved with potato 
(Gallegos et al., 1997). The intensification of potato production in time and space created 
a favourable niche for the proliferation of this insect to the point where it became a major 
pest. Meanwhile, late blight is caused by an exotic fungal-like organism that was 
introduced via seed shipments between Europe and the Andes in the early 1900s 
(Andrivon, 1996). Similarly, the exotic Guatemalan potato moth (Tescia solanivora) arrived 
in Carchi in 1996 via the introduction of seeds from Colombia and occasionally decimates 
crops, particular during dry years (Barragán et al., 2000). 
 
Further, the wide adoption of non-specific pesticides has disrupted natural mechanisms of 
control, thereby favouring the proliferation of insect pests and diseases as well as causing 
the emergence of a handful of secondary pests (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2003). For 
example, the leafminer fly (Lyriomisa quadrata), an endemic insect that was kept in check 
through naturally occurring parasitism, became a major pest in the mid-1990s, causing 
occasional yield losses of up to 40 percent and leading farmers to increase insecticide 
applications. As a result of the ecological disturbances of modern agriculture, Carchense 
farmers find themselves on a “pesticide treadmill,” as described by van den Bosch (1977). 
                                                       
6 Personal communication during INIAP/PNRT Yearly Evaluation and Planning Meeting, Ambuqui, 15 
October 2001. 
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Pesticides have not only become a necessary part of the production system, but each year 
farmers must make a larger number of applications to sustain production. 
 
Pesticide effects 
 
My husband usually does not take a shower after pesticide applications. I believe 
that he has lost his sense of smell, because he is not able to smell pesticide 
residues on his clothes or body anymore. Nonetheless, after applications I can 
smell a very strong pesticide smell coming off his body... and I have to sleep with 
this! – a mother from San Pedro de Piartal, quoted in Mera-Orcés (2000: 21) 
 
From previous activity in Central America and the Philippines (Cole et al., 1988 and Antle 
et al., 1995), the researchers were well aware that the effects of pesticides were not limited 
to the fields where they were applied. Pesticides were carried in the environment and 
reached homes and people, leading to potentially costly environmental and health 
consequences. 
 
Studies on the environmental effects of pesticides have drawn on a variety of indicators to 
assess the mobility of chemicals in the environment (Table 2.7). For example, 
methamidophos, cymoxanil and carbofuran are highly soluble in water, which can increase 
their mobility in the environment. The Koc indicator measures the affinity with which a 
chemical absorbs to soil carbon – the higher a Koc value, the stronger a chemical’s 
tendency to fix to soil. Carbofuran and methamidophos have relatively low Koc numbers, 
signifying that these products do not fix to soil carbon, and therefore they are highly 
mobile in the soil. A long half-life of a pesticide signifies that a chemical breaks down 
relatively slowly and thus is highly persistent in the environment, thereby prolonging 
potential harm. Mancozeb, maneb, carbofuran and fonophos each have long half-lives and 
are relatively persistent pesticides. 
 
Table 2.7 Selected properties of pesticides commonly used in potato production in Carchi 
(Stoorvogel et al., 2003) 
 
Pesticide Half 
life 
(days) 
Koc 
(mL/g) 
Water 
solubility 
(mg/L) 
Long-term 
human 
toxicity 
(mg/L) 
Long-term 
fish toxicity 
(mg/L) 
Short-term 
fish toxicity 
(mg/L) 
Carbofuran 50 22 351 40 18 387 
Cynoxanil 5 391 800 91 1.53 600 
Fonophos 40 870 17 10 3.5 3045 
Mancozeb 70 2000 6 6 3.17 6335 
Maneb 70 2000 6 6 0.0019 3.86 
Methamidophos 6 5 1,000,000 7 165 826 
Profenos 6 2000 28 0.35 2.9665 5933 
 
The research team surmised that carbofuran had significant environmental effects, so it 
became the focus of attention. Jaramillo (2000) and Jaramillo et al. (2001) presented the 
research on carbofuran leachate in soil, groundwater, and surface water in and around 
potato fields in Carchi. While the research validated the effectiveness of the Leaching 
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Estimation and Chemistry Model (LEACHM), it did not find exceedingly high rates of 
carbofuran in water sources. Carbofuran was found in soil leachate, groundwater, and 
surface water samples, but concentrations were at 0.4 ppb, well below the Maximum 
Contamination Level permitted by the US Environmental Protection Agency (40 ppb). In 
light of the high use of carbofuran in potato production, it was concluded that the low 
concentrations were due to the unusually high organic matter content of Carchi soils and 
their potential for rapidly degrading pesticides. 
 
Kosten (2001) studied the effects of carbofuran on three families of benthic aquatic 
macro-invertebrates in the field and in streams. While she detected carbofuran 
concentrations in all six water bodies studied, she did not find conclusive evidence of 
structural change in soil ecologies associated with carbofuran. This may have been due to 
previous species selection as a result of exposure to carbofuran, which could lead to 
resistance build-up. The study suggested that resistance might have been a factor, since 
immobilization of invertebrates by carbofuran in Carchi was 1,000 times that found in 
other studies. 
 
Most of the CIP-led research concentrated on pesticide management, exposure 
conditions, and ensuing health effects. Based on survey, observational and interview data, 
farmers generally purchased pesticides by commercial names (Espinosa et al., 2003). Only 
a small minority of farmers reported receiving information on pesticide hazards and safe 
practices from vendors. Pesticide storage was relatively brief (days to weeks) but occurred 
close to farmhouses because of fear of theft. Farmers usually mixed pesticides in large 
barrels without gloves, resulting in considerable dermal exposure (Merino and Cole, 2003). 
Smallholders and, on larger operations, day labourers applied pesticides using backpack 
sprayers on hilly terrain. Few used personal protective equipment for a variety of reasons, 
including social pressure (e.g., masculinity has become tied to the ability to withstand 
pesticide intoxications), as well as the limited availability and high cost of equipment. As a 
result, pesticide exposure conditions were high. During applications, most farmers wet 
their skin, especially the back (73% of respondents) and hands (87%) (Espinosa et al., 
2003). Field exposure trials using patch-monitoring techniques showed that considerable 
dermal deposition occurred on legs during foliage applications on mature crops (Cole et 
al., 1997b). 
 
Subsequent studies found that family members were chronically exposed to low quantities 
of pesticides in their homes and at work through a multitude of contamination pathways 
(Merino and Cole, 2003). Excess mixed product was applied to other tuber crops, thrown 
away with containers in the field, or applied around the house. Clothing worn during 
application was often stored and used repeatedly before washing. Contaminated clothing 
was usually washed in the same area as family clothing, though in a separate wash. Extent 
of personal hygiene varied but was usually insufficient to remove all active ingredients 
from both the hands of the applicator and the equipment. Separate locked storage 
facilities for application equipment and clothing were also uncommon. Swab methods 
found pesticide residues on a variety of household surfaces as well as on farm family 
clothing. 
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Active surveillance of hospital records revealed that pesticide poisonings in Carchi were 
among the highest recorded anywhere (Cole et al., 2000). While there were some suicides 
and accidental exposures, most poisonings were of pesticide applicators. Clinical studies 
found that both applicators and their family members were at risk. Exposure to fungicides 
caused diverse eye and skin disorders, including conjunctivitis and cutaneous and sub-
cutaneous effects on the neck, trunk, back, underarms, and genitalia (Cole et al., 1997a and 
b). Comparisons between urban control populations and farm families found that rural 
people suffered dermatitis (68% of the at-risk population and 55% of applicators, 
compared with 31% of the control population, p < 0.001), and pigmentation disorders 
(25% of the at-risk population and 10% of the control, p < 0.06). In the case of dermatitis 
(n=117), five percent tested positive for maneb in patch studies for contact allergies. In 
logistic regression analysis, the significant predictors of dermatitis (p < 0.1) included years 
using fungicides and deficient application practices. Chronic exposure, lack of personal 
protective equipment, and use of high concentrations of chemicals were associated with 
incidence of pathologies. Additionally, climatic conditions as well as living and work 
environments were mentioned as important contributors to disorders. The researchers 
concluded, “The findings point to fungicides as the most important contributor to the 
prevalence of dermatitis among the Ecuadorian farming population.” 
 
Other studies looked at neurobehavioral disorders caused by the most commonly used 
insecticides: highly toxic methamidophos and carbofuran. The health team applied a 
World Health Organisation (WHO) recommended battery of tests to determine the 
effects of exposure on peripheral and central nervous system functions (Cole et al., 1998; 
Cole et al., 1997a). The results showed high proportions of the at-risk population affected, 
including both farmers and their family members. Average performance scores for farm 
members were a standard deviation below the control sample. The researchers determined 
that 60 percent of rural people were affected and women, although not commonly active 
in field agriculture, were nearly as affected as fieldworkers. Alarmingly, both Mera-Orcés 
(2000) and Paredes (2001) reported that acute poisonings and deaths among infants and 
young children were common in rural communities, with cases identified in every 
community studied. 
 
In summary, the medical team concluded that chronic and acute exposure to pesticides 
resulted in considerable health impacts that ranged from sub-clinical neurotoxicity (Cole et 
al., 1997a, 1998), poisonings with and without treatment (Crissman et al., 1994), to 
hospitalizations and deaths (Cole et al., 2000). The human health consequences included 
poisonings (at a rate of 171/100,000 rural population), dermatitis (48% of applicators), 
pigmentation disorders (25% of applicators), and neurotoxicity (peripheral nerve damage, 
abnormal deep tendon reflexes and coordination difficulties). Mortality due to pesticide 
poisoning was among the highest reported anywhere in the world (21/100,000 rural 
population). Cole et al. (2002) summarised the pesticide health impacts as a classic 
epidemiological pyramid (Figure 2.7). 
 
Modern Potato Production   43 
 
Figure 2.7 Epidemiological pyramid of pesticide health impacts in Carchi (numbers per 
10,000 rural population) (Cole et al., 2002) 
 
Acute pesticide poisonings led to significant financial burden on individual families and 
the public health system (Cole et al., 2000). Median costs associated with pesticide 
poisonings were estimated as follows: public health care direct costs of $9.85/case, private 
health costs of $8.33/case, and lost time indirect costs for about six worker days of 
$8.33/agricultural worker. All of these were over five times the daily agricultural wage of 
about $1.50 at the time, in 1992. The researchers did not attempt to judge financial 
valuation of the deaths associated with pesticide poisonings nor the effects of pesticides 
on quality of life, both of which would substantially increase the estimates of overall 
economic burden of illness. 
 
Integrated tradeoffs analysis: in search of “win-win” scenarios 
 
Integrated production-health analysis by Antle et al. (1994) found that pesticide use led to 
serious health consequences that placed into question the economic value of present 
technology, particularly of highly toxic insecticides. Table 2.8 provides summary statistics 
on the potato production data. The essential role that pesticides played in crop production 
was indicated by the positive and significant coefficients on the fungicide, carbofuran, and 
foliar insecticide variables. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the neurobehavioral health 
variable was statistically significant at all conventional levels, and its negative sign indicated 
that farmers with higher neurobehavioral function obtained lower cost of production per 
hectare and thus higher productivity. The magnitude of the coefficient indicated that the 
elasticity of cost with regard to health was about -0.15, which was comparable to estimates 
obtained by Antle and Pingali (1995) with rice growers in the Philippines. This signified 
that the total quantity of carbofuran applied during the season had a negative effect on 
neurobehavioral performance. Through modelling, Antle et al. (1998) showed that the use 
of highly toxic insecticides adversely affected farmer decision-making capacity to a level 
that would justify worker disability payments in other countries. 
 
Through applications of ToA, the researchers explored a number of potentially positive 
sum (win-win) policy alternatives. These included a combination of taxes or subsidies on 
pesticides, price increases or declines in potatoes, technology changes with IPM (in the 
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form of insect traps for the Andean weevil, as explained in Pumisacho and Sherwood, 
2001:134-5), and the use of personal protective equipment (Antle et al., 1998; Crissman et 
al., 2003). The results were examined in terms of farm income, leaching of pesticides to 
groundwater and health risks from pesticide exposure. Normally, changes in a particular 
policy or technology generates tradeoffs – as certain factors improve, other factors may 
weaken. The analysis of pesticide taxes and potato price changes produced such a result. 
As taxes decreased and potato prices increased, farmers planted more of their farm with 
potatoes and tended to use more pesticide per hectare. Thus a scenario of pesticide 
subsidies and potato price increases produced growth in income and increases in 
groundwater contamination and health risks from pesticide exposure.  
 
Table 2.8 Summary statistics for Carchi potato production data (1990-1992 database; 
n=219 plots) (Antle et al., 1998)* 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Total variable cost (US$/ha) 14.16 0.35 
Expected yield (kg/ha) 9.87 0.14 
Area (ha) -0.96 0.85 
Mean neurobehavioral score -1.53 0.94 
Fertilizer quantity (kg/ha) 6.31 0.40 
Land preparation labour (days/ha) 2.37 0.90 
Crop management labour (days/ha) 3.90 0.37 
Fungicide quantity 11.90 1.43 
Carbofuran quantity (kg/ha) -0.04 1.12 
Foliage pest insecticide quantity 10.42 2.24 
Fertilizer price 6.45 0.18 
Land preparation wage 7.66 0.31 
Crop management wage 7.80 0.27 
Fungicide price -0.97 0.67 
Carborfuran price 9.71 0.30 
Foliage pest insecticide price -1.22 1.22 
*Note: All variables are in natural logarithms except the mean neurobehavioral score. Fertilizer in total N, P, 
K applied. Fungicide and foliage pest insecticide quantities and prices were quality adjusted using the hedonic 
procedures described in Antle et al. (1994).  
 
When health was included in the cost function, a tax levied on carbofuran alone resulted 
in a negative relationship between the tax rate and average cost. The positive effect of a 
higher pesticide price would be more than offset by the cost-reducing effect of improved 
health. The clear policy implication was that reducing carbofuran use could be a win-win 
proposition. Through modelling, the researchers showed that when exposure to 
carbofuran was reduced, farmers became healthier and more productive. This was because 
the productivity gains from improved health outweighed the negative productivity effects 
of reduced pesticide use. The authors concluded, however, that a policy to reduce all 
pesticide use would be less efficient and would result in a tradeoff between health and 
productivity. 
 
Figure 2.8 summarises the result of the ToA scenario comparing the base technology 
(carbofuran) with IPM in the form of insect traps for the management of the Andean 
weevil. The vertical axis utilizes carbofuran leaching as a proxy indicator for health risk, as 
measured in increments of measurement for neurobehavioral standard performance 
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(MNBS). The graph shows that through adopting the use of insect traps and substantially 
decreasing use of carbofuran from three to one well-placed application, farmers could 
effectively control the Andean weevil while decreasing burden to health and without 
negative consequences to production – a win-win scenario. Further modelling of other 
scenarios showed that a combination of IPM and protective clothing could produce even 
more optimal results (Figure 2.9).  
 
 
Figure 2.8 ToA outcome comparing two scenarios: base technology versus IPM traps for 
Andean weevil management (health risk indicator is measurements of neurobehavioral 
standard performance (MNBS) associated with carbofuran exposure and value of 
production is net return (x $1,000/ha)) (Antle et al., 1998; Crissman et al., 2003) 
 
 
Figure 2.9 ToA outcome comparing different technological scenarios: from base to IPM 
and Personal Protective Equipment (health risk indicator is measurement of 
neurobehavioral standard performance (MNBS) and net returns ($/ha)) (Antle et al., 1998; 
Crissman et al., 2003) 
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As a result of these findings, the policy recommendations became measures to decrease 
the use of highly toxic pesticides (through targeted taxes, tighter regulations, or removal 
from their market), SUP education, and IPM (Antle et al., 1998; Cole et al. 2002; Yanggen 
et al., 2003). According to Yanggen et al. (2003:195), the investigations on pesticides in 
Carchi produced two fundamental conclusions: 1) the problems that pesticides cause in 
health are severe, and they affect an important percentage of the population, and 2) 
solutions exist that are economically viable and that can substantially improve the health 
of farmers and protect the environment. The answer was a function of reorganisation 
around best practice. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Provided its natural endowments, generally educated population, infrastructure and 
market access, Carchi is potentially one of the most productive agricultural regions of the 
Andes. Potato farming there has evolved to become a major source of livelihoods, 
dominating the modern landscape. Through widespread adoption of mechanized tillage 
and agrochemicals, as well as organisation around commercial markets as a means of 
financing technologies, potato farming intensified. Provided the resource base and the 
industriousness of its people, average production in Carchi during the 1990s reached over 
20 t/ha -- about three times the national average. On less than a quarter of the country’s 
land area dedicated to the crop, during the 1990s the province came to produce nearly 40 
percent of the national potato harvest.  
 
The modern technologies on which farmers came to rely enabled substantial production 
increases, but they also created pathologies. The multidisciplinary economic, health, and 
environmental research revealed that modern potato farming did not just produce a lot of 
potato, it also produced a number of harmful consequences, many of which were hidden 
from the public eye. Tractors and total tillage displaced between 50 and 100 t/ha during 
the season. Farmers lost money on over 40 percent of their potato crops. Additionally, 
exposure to pesticides caused a number of health problems. Nearly half of applicators 
suffered from skin and eye disorders, such as dermatitis and conjunctivitis. Most 
worrisome, over two-thirds of the rural population – including men, women, and children 
– suffered neurological damage to degrees that affected the productivity of their farms. As 
a result of modern agriculture, Carchi was in the throes of a serious public health 
epidemic. 
 
Fortunately, alternatives existed. Through integrated economic-environment-health 
simulation modelling, Antle et al. (1998b) identified rigorously tested best practice for 
achieving positive sum policy recommendations. The authors demonstrated that 
combinations of taxes on the most toxic pesticides, pesticide safety education, and 
promotion of IPM could curb harmful human health and environmental consequences 
without negatively affecting productivity. My colleagues and I thought that change was 
primarily a function of educating farmers and policy makers on best practice. Or was it? 
Chapter 3 
 
History of Agrarian Development in Carchi: 
Spanish Arrival, Hacienda System, and Agrarian Reform 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Beginning with a general description of land use and agrarian society prior to Spanish 
arrival, this chapter provides a chronology of major historical events leading up to the rise 
and fall of the hacienda system in Carchi and ensuing agrarian reform. It was beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to produce a critical analysis of heterogeneous outcomes, such as 
the unfolding of differential relationships as a result of particular events. Although painted 
in broad strokes, a look back is useful for understanding how traditional society became 
uprooted from local context and how thousands of years of relatively stable agricultural 
development became disrupted. The chapter aims to set the stage of contemporary 
ecosystem decline on which the master discourse of agricultural modernisation came to be 
performed. 
 
A number of early Spaniards documented the Incan advance into the Northern Andes in 
the sixteenth century, including Cieza de León, Cabello de Balboa, Fernández de Oviedo, 
Sarmiento de Gamboa, Garcilaso de la Vega, Alonso de Borregán, and Gerónimo Aguilar. 
The Ecuadorian Historical Archive and the Central Bank store these documents, often in 
original form. Combined with scant archaeology of the ancient cultures of northern 
Ecuador, this material provided the evidence for the findings asserted in the historical 
literature on pre-Colombian Carchi and reported here.  
 
In addition to a consultation of the available historical literature, I drew on semi-
structured interviews with contemporary hacendados (or hacienda owners) as well as their 
personal libraries and papers. I am particularly grateful to Juan Carlos Landázuri, who was 
generous in letting me use his hacienda, La Bretania in San Gabriel, as a research base 
during 2002-04. Landázuri introduced me to the “Grupo de Discusión,” a collective of nine 
hacendados who convened for purposes of cross-learning and technical exchange until 2003, 
when extortions and kidnappings by irregular armies from nearby Colombia compelled 
many of them to abandon Carchi. 
 
Pre-Colombian Carchi 
 
Tawantinsuyo, the name of the territory administered by the Incas in the fifteenth century, 
came to span much of the Andes of present-day Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. Although the 
Incas, under the rule of Túpac Yupanqui in the mid to late fifteenth century and later his 
son Huayna Capac in the early sixteenth century, only came to politically control present-
day Ecuador less than 50 years prior to the Spanish arrival, the region quickly established 
strong cultural and economic ties with Incan society. By the mid-sixteenth century, the 
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area north of Quito, including the Province of Imbabura, were under initial processes of 
consolidation, which included the continuation of the Incan trail and military fortresses 
(tambos) as well as the placement of mitmaq (or mitimae),1 and state displacement of  ethnic 
groups as a strategy of social control and cultural domination. At that time, the Incan 
influence further north – over the area of present-day Carchi – was limited to sporadic 
trade and military expeditions. 
 
As a result, the people of northernmost Ecuador were culturally aligned with the pre-
Hispanic groups of Colombia, especially the Capulí and Cuasmal groups that coexisted in 
the inter-Andean Valley spanning between the Coanque (today, Chota) River in present-
day Carchi to the Guáytara River of the Department of Nariño, Colombia, a total area of 
about 435 km2 (Landázuri, 1995). Named the Pasto ("Pasture") territory by the Spanish, 
most likely due to the lush green environment of the North, the Capulí and Cuasmal 
controlled the area from about 1250-1525. Landázuri explains that today anthropologists 
commonly refer to both of these groups collectively as “the Pastos.” 
 
Land management 
 
Geography, especially altitude, is a major social determinant in the highland Andes. In 
northern climates, mountain cultures tend to be highly mobile as per seasonal cycles and 
climate (Grötzback, 1988). While Troll (1968) explained the geographical division between 
the southern puna or dry Andes and the northern páramo or wet Andes, Murra (1972) 
established a theory of vertical control, which explained agricultural and agrarian 
differentiation along altitudinal belts. In pre-Hispanic time, single ethnic groups of the 
Andes tended to organize themselves to take advantage of ecological niches of distinct 
altitudes. Lauer (1993) applied it to the Puna Andes and Salomon (1980) and López-
Sandoval (2004) applied the theory to the northern Páramo Andes. Soloman (1980) 
described the phenomenon of “micro-verticality” in the páramo Andes due to the extreme 
ecological differences in relatively small areas. Micro-verticality explained how different 
ethnic groups emerged to exploit niches in a communal territory that crossed distinct 
ecological zones. Micro-verticality allowed people to farm different climatic regimes and 
return home in a single day. In support of this theory, no nomadic pastoral groups have 
been found in the páramo belt of northern Ecuador, Colombia or Venezuela prior to the 
Incan and Spanish arrival. 
 
The inter-Andean valley in the Northern Andes runs north and south and lies at between 
1,500 and 2,500 meters. Its surrounding hillsides climb to about 3,500-4,500 meters on 
both the eastern and western ridges. Lying on the equator with fairly evenly distributed 
sunlight throughout the year, temperature changes are not seasonal, but rather diurnal, 
with highs and lows determined by altitude. Altitude variability leads to ecological niches, 
and social organization historically has been influenced by the unique micro-vertical 
features that determine plant growth and, with the advent of managed ecologies and 
agriculture, livelihood opportunities.  
 
                                                       
1 Mitimaq or mitimae is the Kichwa term for forced labour parties, usually translocated across geographies. 
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At the time of the Spanish arrival, coca and maize were the most important crops of the 
lower and middle elevations (1,500-2,000 m), with coca leaves in high demand throughout 
the region. Andean roots and tubers (potato, mashua, and olluco) and quinoa were 
cultivated in highland valleys of altitudes (2,000-2,500 m) (Table 3.1). Farmers managed 
soil fertility through intercropping, crop rotations, and fallow periods. This included the 
utilisation of legumes, such as Lupinus mutabulis (known in Kichwa as chocho or tarwi) as 
well as different field beans (Phaselous spp.), in intercropping and rotational systems. 
Farmers applied manures and other organic amendments at planting. They produced roots 
and tubers through a reduced tillage regime called wachu rozado, which involved cutting and 
folding over two parallel rows of sod towards one another and planting tubers in the 
middle of the decaying sod (see Box 2.2).  
 
Table 3.1 Principle crops of the Pastos (Paz Ponce de León (1528) in Landázuri (1995)) 
 
Common name  
(Cuasmal, Kichwa, or Spanish) 
English name Latin name 
Highlands (2700-3000 masl) 
Papa Potato Solanum tubersosum 
Quinua Quinoa Chenopodium quinoa 
Chocho Lupine Lupinus mutabilis 
Oca Oka Oxalis tuberosa 
Mayua o mashua  Tropeolum tuberosum 
Olluco  Ullucus tuberosus 
   
Medium zones (2000-2600) 
Tomate de arbol Tree tomato Cyphomancra betacea 
Mora Raspberry Robus spp. 
Maíz Maize or corn Zea mays 
Paico  Chenopodium ambrosicides 
Auyama  Lucubita palmata 
Capuli  Prunus salidifolia 
Frijol o poroto Common fieldbean Phaseolus vulgaris 
   
Lowland areas (1500-2000) 
Piña Pineapple Ananas comosus 
Aguacate Avocado Persea spp. 
Yuca Casava Manihot escuelenta crantz 
Frijol o poroto Common fieldbean Phaseolus vulgaris 
Algodón Cotton Gossypium spp. 
Ají Pepper (spicy) Capsicum sp. 
Coca Coca Erythroxylon sp. 
 
Domesticated animals were limited to guinea pigs and pigs. In contrast to the Puna Andes 
of the South, llama as a pack animal and source of manure was not present in the North 
due to the animal's limited adaptability to the wet highlands. The majority of meat and 
animal products came from hunting wild animals. Remains of small rounded settlements 
(bohios) in the highland areas (circa 3,500 m) suggest that hunting activities occasionally 
took people to the highland areas. Farming was limited to subsistence needs, and as a 
result, large areas of forest remained intact. 
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At the end of the eighteenth century, when French scientists arrived in the area to 
measure the meridian arcs and the German explorer, Alejandro von Humbolt, was 
realising his studies that would lead to the founding of the field of geography, dense 
humid highland forests covered the inter-Andean valley of the Pasto territory. This was in 
sharp contrast to the non-Pasto areas to the South that had been heavily deforested for 
centuries. The vast majority of Ecuador’s northernmost highland forests fell victim to 
colonization during the 19th and 20th centuries. Nevertheless, today the western flank of 
Carchi represents one of the country’s largest conservation sites: the El Angel Ecological 
Reserve that spans several thousand hectares. On the eastern side, the inter-Andean slope 
boasts an extensive 40,000 hectare stretch of forest that biologists consider one of the few 
remaining examples of pristine inter-Andean vegetation (Palacios and Tipaz, 1996). 
 
Social organisation, technology, and economy 
 
The tribute documents belonging to Spanish subjects in the mid-sixteenth century and the 
archaeological explorations reported by Uribe and Cabrera (1977) provide some evidence 
of social differentiation during the Pasto civilization. Drawing on these sources, Landázuri 
(1995) concluded that the social organization resembled the casicazgo feudal-like structure 
found in indigenous cultures of Southern Ecuador. The system was led by a relatively 
wealthy curaca or priest, followed by direct family lineage and then by more numerous and 
poorer agrarian subjects, who commonly paid tribute in the form of crop surpluses in 
exchange for land rights. Archaeologists found Pasto settlements distributed among 
locations of fertile soil and following rivers on the inter-Andean valley floor. The largest 
settlements had up to 12,000 inhabitants. In Carchi, these were: Tulcán, Guaca (today, 
Huaca), Tuza (San Gabriel), and Mira. These locations are conserved in modern-day 
gerrymandering, with each representing a principal county seat of the Province's modern-
day political structure. The people who inhabit the four communities studied in this thesis 
most likely belonged to the Guaca (Mariscal Sucre and Piartal) and Tuza groups (Cuba and 
La Libertad), though more recent settlers continuously migrate from earlier Pasto areas of 
present-day Colombia.  
 
People inhabited single room, rounded bohio structures made of local materials, usually 
structured of wood, woven with horizontal strips of cane grass mixed with mud, and roofs 
of highland bunch grass, known as bahareque (Oña and Muñoz, 2000). Uribe and Cabrera 
(1977) studied burial sites in Pupiales, Colombia that consisted of three concentric areas 
containing patterned series of tunnels. They found higher castes buried in deeper tunnels 
penetrating to depths of up to 40 m located in the centre and tunnels of lesser depths in 
the areas radiating outwards. Ceramics found in such burial sites dating back to the early 
periods of the Pasto civilization were of high quality, demonstrating sophisticated 
geometric patterns and applying cire perdu technology,2 gold inlays, as well as conch shells 
from the coast. 
 
It is believed that pre-Incan groups such as the Pastos cultivated plots of about 1,500 m2, 
which were large enough for subsistence production and meeting curaca tribute payments 
                                                       
2 A bronze casting following the method of heating wax to let it run away out of casts and then using molten 
bronze to fill the space. 
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(Rostworowsky, 2001). Hand tools likely included a version of the Incan chacqui taclla, a 
foot-driven wooden shovel used for turning over soil, and a large wooden mallet used to 
break up grass clods (Landázuri, 1995). Early farmers used a dibble stick for planting 
maize. There is no evidence of field irrigation structures in medium to high elevations, 
where the climate is generally humid and rainfall well distributed. Maize production took 
place at lower elevations (1,500 to 2,500 masl) and generally near rivers, where farmers 
likely applied gravity-fed irrigation. Knapp (1992) identified a pre-Hispanic irrigation canal 
at Pimanpiro (Chapi) in the Chota Valley of unknown origin that was likely constructed by 
early Pasto groups. Crop health likely was managed empirically through crop rotations, 
intra- and inter-specific plant biodiversity, mounding and reduced tillage systems, as well 
as fallow periods of at least five years (Thurston, 1992; Landázuri, 1995; INIAP-CIP, 
2003). The lack of storage capacity of potato and limited area appropriate for maize 
cultivation affected Pasto capability of surviving catastrophes, due either to natural 
disasters or war (Landázuri, 1995). Poor storage capacity also may have constrained 
capacity for wealth accumulation and redistribution in the region. 
 
As evidenced by the absence of irrigation infrastructure and constructed roads, labour was 
characteristically non-collective. It is believed that the Pasto civilization had a degree of 
labour differentiation. This included a degree of unbalanced reciprocity that demanded 
political administration controlled by the curaca. Commoner households were dedicated to 
general agriculture for sustenance and tribute. Specialization was limited to textiles. Due to 
the absence of a labour force, particularly during harvest periods, the curaca's were resistant 
to subject mobility (Grijalva, 1937). Uribe and Cabrera (1977) found remains of cotton 
textiles in tombs, which may suggest an advanced artisan tradition. Nevertheless, while 
such textiles were valued during tribute payment, small quantities suggest that industry was 
limited to home enterprises organized for subsistence use rather than for trade outside the 
territory. 
 
Salomon (1980) argues that barter exchange existed, especially for storable maize, coca, 
and cotton. Reciprocity was achieved through labour, cultivated products, textiles, and 
land access rights. Landázuri (1995) proposed three forms of trade: balanced exchange of 
goods and labour between households, within multiple households of family lineage, and 
unbalanced trade between curaca and subject in the form of labour and good in exchange 
for access to land, as per the subsistence needs of the curaca. It is assumed that this 
relationship led to political stratifications, defined by family lineage and articulated 
through access to privileged goods, especially coca leaves, maize, and gold. Households 
had direct access to basic subsistence crops – potato and maize – while trade enclaves 
composed of multi-ethnic groups controlled the exchange of prestige commodities – coca, 
cotton, salt, and metals – that were centred in the Chota and Guáytara valleys. While these 
were distributed within the Pasto civilization, the majority was exchanged with groups 
from the Amazon basin and the Southern highlands in exchange for exotic goods, such as 
fruits, textiles, and metal products. The curaca controlled mindales (merchants) who 
administered exchange agreements and received special status within the political structure 
of the territory that limited their service to tribute payments, but did not include 
subjection for agricultural production. 
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Landázuri (1995) applied the methodology of Polanyi et al. (1976) regarding material 
reciprocity, geographic distribution, and market commerce as central factors of social 
organization. Drawing on existing historical records, he concluded that ecological and 
economic potential determined social differentiation. Coca was the most prestigious and 
profitable crop of the period and was grown by relatively well-off farmers of Andean 
lowland areas, followed by maize that grew at medium altitudes, and then tubers grown by 
small populations of farmers relegated to the highlands, which were vulnerable to frost 
and hail. In contrast to the Puno Andes to the south, the Páramo Andes had higher 
temperatures and humidity and thus it was not possible to convert potato to storable 
freeze-dried chuño, useful for surviving dry spells, travel, and war. As a result, in the 
Northern Andes maize had a comparative advantage. Nevertheless, because of the limited 
dry ecological zones appropriate for its cultivation, access to areas adequate for maize 
cultivation was valued and controlled. In contrast, areas appropriate for potato cultivation 
were more abundant and less restricted. Landázuri concludes that it is likely that social 
differentiation for the agrarian class was expressed in entitlements, especially access to 
land for coca and maize and mobility for crop production. 
 
Depopulation 
 
While it is believed that the Incan ruler Tupac Yupanqui reached Pasto territory between 
about 1450 and 1480, excursions at that time were not violent but limited to trade 
interests. The Incan ruler Huayna Cápac reigned over Tawantinsuyo from 1480 to 1525. 
He entered Pasto territory during his final military campaign, after conquering the 
Caranquis and Cayambis in a series of violent battles that ended at the site of what became 
known as Yahuarcocha (Kichwa for “Lagoon of Blood”), just south of present-day Ibarra 
(Ramón, 1987). Huayna Cápac and his army then continued north with little resistance 
from the Pasto to the Angasmayo River, located deep in Pasto territory in present-day 
Colombia, where they established defensive military enclaves. The lack of a Pasto military 
suggests that the diverse groups were relatively autonomous and not politically aligned to a 
larger confederation (Landázuri, 1995; Rostworowski, 2001). The Angasmayo River 
represented the northernmost reach of Tawantinsuyo. Afterward, Huayna Cápac turned 
his troops to the Pacific and headed south along the coast to the Gulf of Guayaquil before 
returning to Tomebamba in the Sierra where he succumbed to a disease (most likely 
smallpox) in 1534. It is believed that Pasto territory was under Incan rule for about ten 
years, probably from the period of 1525-1534. Nevertheless, the absence of social 
structures and the survival of the Pasto language through the arrival of the Spanish 
suggests that Incan cultural and political domination only reached initial stages. The chief 
motivation of incursions appears to have been control over the coca and salt production 
of the Chota Valley. Populations of Pastos (mitimae) were taken to the Lake Titicaca region 
of the Southern Andes, but there is no evidence of forced labour parties that were 
brought to the Pasto region of the North. 
 
Evidence of effects of the Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century and early processes 
of colonization on indigenous populations in the Northern Andes is scarcely documented. 
Diverse authors show that depopulation was a major feature of the period. Between 1525 
and 1595, the population of the savannah of Bogotá (excluding the city of Bogotá), north 
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of the Pasto Territory, decreased was from 140,000 people to 62,791 (a decline of about 
2.2:1) (Villamarin and Villamarin 1975). In the Central Andes, south of the Pasto area, the 
population declined from about 4,641,200 to 1,349,190, a proportion of 3.4:1 (Smith, 1970 
and Cook, 1981). Larrain (1980) estimates that when the Spanish arrived in the Pasto 
territory in 1534, the population of the area was about 240,000, spread among 25 major 
settlements. By the end of the sixteenth century, that population was less than 60,000, a 
proportion of 4.0:1. In terms of depopulation, the Pasto Territory may have been the 
most affected region of the Andes. According to Larrain, the primary causes were two 
fold: wars with conquistadors and forced extraction of populations as labourers and slaves 
to faraway lands.  
 
Spanish settlement and the e ncom ienda 
 
The indigenous diaspora [in Carchi] created conditions for an easy amalgamation 
between indigenous and whites that would open the way for a mestizo amenable to the 
cultural whims of the colonists. – Miño (1985: 99) 
 
Following the death of Huayna Cápac, the death of his son Huascar to Atahualpa in the 
Incan Battle of Cuzco, and the capture and execution of Atahualpa in Cajamarca in 1533, 
the Spanish had effectively conquered the Incan Empire that spanned from northern 
Chile through southernmost Colombia. The Spanish Crown increasingly claimed 
ownership of all natural resources and people in the region, and initially it distributed 
governance rights to conquistadors. The early colonization process in the Americas 
centred on the assignation of land concessions and the native people who lived on it, a 
policy known as the encomienda (Newson, 1992). The majority of conquistadores and 
colonists wanted to acquire wealth and return to Spain with improved finances and higher 
social status. While the concessions in the Northern Andes were large, the difficult 
climactic conditions and relatively low value of highland crops at the time made 
agriculture a difficult means of fast wealth. Furthermore, agriculture required investments 
in time and resources that were beyond the immediate plans of the visitors. In the 
sixteenth century, the chief means of wealth were slaves and minerals, especially gold and 
silver. The population of Carchi was relatively small and distant from the Caribbean, 
Central American, and South American trade centres. No gold or silver deposits were 
found in Northern Ecuador, so the area largely was overlooked. Meanwhile, the discovery 
of deposits in Peru and Bolivia led to tremendous mineral exploitation activity that would 
carry on for centuries. It was not until the value of slaves and minerals dropped at the end 
of the sixteenth century, that the Spanish began to show interest in agriculture as a means 
of accumulation.  
 
The enconmienda policy was first implemented during the re-conquest of Spain against the 
Mores. Its introduction to the Americas was modified to avoid problems that were found 
on the Iberian Peninsula, particularly with regard to land titling. As a result, the policy 
applied in the Americas no longer included absolute entitlement to land (Chamberlain 
1936; Newson, 1992). As practiced in the Andes, the encomienda involved the award of a 
number of native peoples to an individual in exchange for their protection and conversion 
to Catholicism. In return, the encomendado could charge tribute and demand labour services 
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of subjects. Initially, territorial governors had the authority to assign encomiendas with the 
approval of the Crown. Following the New Laws of 1542, entitlements were conferred to 
the local governing unit of royal subjects, known as the Real Audiencia. In the case of 
Northern Ecuador, the Real Audiencia de Quito exercised this authority.  
 
The first encomiendas were awarded for life to outstanding conquistadors. Thereafter, the 
governing officials tended to award them to family and friends. Colonists complained to 
the Spanish Crown that they were not included in awards, and as a result, the New Laws 
of 1542 excluded church and government officials from receiving encomiendas. 
Entitlements were highly unstable due to endless concessions, annulations, confiscations, 
and reassignments. The Crown was hesitant to relinquish control over land, but due to 
pressure from the new landholders in the Americas, it eventually agreed that concessions 
could be passed down for two generations. The New Laws also gave the Crown the right 
to recover expired encomiendas and to terminate future awards.  
 
Due to the progressive decline of indigenous populations throughout the Americas, the 
Church pressured the Crown to adopt more humane laws. Furthermore, following initial 
mineral exploitation and the transition to agrarian economies, a labour shortage became a 
concern. As part of the New Laws, the Crown began to make provisions for the 
abolishment of slavery and distribution of limited land entitlements to indigenous people 
for subsistence agriculture. In practice, conquistadors distributed land first, and then local 
rulers or cabildos distributed the remainder among the indigenous. Nevertheless, Newson 
(1992) raises doubts over whether the laws were obeyed. The encomienda and the practice 
of forced personal services continued, if informally, until their abolition in 1812.  
 
Newson (1992) explains that the repartimiento was a series of laws that attempted to create 
more flexible labour markets. In part, this legislation was demanded by those who did not 
benefit from the encomienda but who had labour needs. The policy involved forced labour 
that was paid a fixed price upon completion of a contract. By design, the encomendado or 
the Crown could not oblige participants to pay tribute. The employer agreed to provide a 
stipulated financial compensation, adequate food, and guarantee humane work conditions 
and treatment of subjects. Commonly, the contract lasted two or three weeks. The law 
stipulated that labourers could not be employed at great distances from their communities 
(maximum of ten leagues) and that indigenous could not do certain dangerous jobs (such 
as mining, a provision that was later lifted due to labour shortages). The Real Audienca 
governed over these contracts, with an assigned judge deciding upon the distribution of 
the indigenous labour force. Once the stipulated period of work was completed, subjects 
were free to return to their community and were replaced by a new group of labourers, 
usually from the same community. In practice, employers violated many of these 
stipulations. For example, payment was often in-kind and food and living conditions were 
inadequate. Further, assigned tasks commonly were impossible to complete, which was 
used to justify incomplete compensation. 
 
In addition to the alteration of indigenous economies due to depopulation and the 
redistribution of land, Newson (1992) found that the arrival of the Spanish affected 
patterns of survival in other ways. For example, land concessions excluded indigenous 
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people from farming and hunting activities. Forced labour and tribute payments reduced 
time available for independent productive activities. While falling populations decreased 
food demand, they weakened social organizations and disassembled collective labour 
needed for critical moments during the cropping cycle, such as land preparation and 
harvest. Labour demands forced people to abandon their communities for extensive 
periods of time, leading to crop failures and seed losses. The imposition of new crops 
further interrupted seed availability and disrupted traditional markets. A large portion of 
harvests was paid as tribute. For example, maize farmers commonly handed over between 
25 to 50 percent of their harvest to encomendados or local governors. Indigenous people also 
had to pay for increasing costs of the Church associated with building structures, paying 
clerics, and conducting religious ceremonies.  
 
The Spanish saw that once native caciques accepted external authority and converted to 
Catholicism, the rest of the community followed. As a result, the cooption of local leaders 
became a political strategy throughout the Americas. Caciques were given privileges, such 
as exemption from tribute payments and routine labour. They sometimes were allowed to 
carry arms, mount horses, and own slaves. Their offspring gained access to Spanish 
schools. In this way, they became political intermediaries between the encomendados or 
colonial authorities and the commoners. 
 
The Spanish made strategic efforts to destroy the religious symbols of indigenous 
populations. They built churches on top of temples and replaced idols with symbols of the 
crucifix and the Virgin Mary. Family structures were decimated through death during 
conquest battles, forced labour and migration of members, disease, and starvation. 
Furthermore, many officials, priests, and encomenderos had forced sexual relations with 
indigenous women and appropriated them for personal services, such as domestic labour. 
This led to a large number of orphans (Benzoni, 1967). 
 
While miscegenation occurred during the sixteenth century, its contribution to indigenous 
depopulation was only significant in later generations. Newsome (1992) explains that 
miscegenation was a function of the degree of interaction with other races and was 
encouraged by male dominance in European and African cultures. It was most common 
in communities where indigenous were forced to work as domestic servants for whites, 
such as in mining towns and under the hacienda system of agricultural development, 
where men of mixed blood were hired as administrators over local indigenous 
populations. Knapp (1991) compared the 1780 and 1950 censuses and found that the 
national population increased from 412,000 to 3,154,000, an annual growth rate of 1.20 
percent. The highlands grew more slowly than the lowlands, with only Carchi and the 
southernmost provinces of Loja and Azuay growing at comparable rates. During the same 
period, the indigenous populations, i.e., those classified as indigenous under the colonial 
tribute system, grew from 265,000 to 444,000 people, an annual rate of 0.30 percent. 
According to Knapp, this rate was not due to emigration or mortality, but rather 
acculturation – i.e., the process of miscegenation to mixed ladino (Spanish-indigenous) 
culture. Rates of acculturation in the highlands generally were less than one percent. In 
contrast, that of Carchi was over two percent. 
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While the colonists depended on local crops for sustenance, they began to introduce 
higher value cash crops, such as sugarcane, tobacco, and wheat (Triticum aestivum) for 
export to Europe. It has been estimated that in the seventeenth century, one ton of sugar 
cost the lives of two slaves (Hobhouse, 1987). By 1700, the ratio had dropped to one ton 
of sugar equalling one life. By the end of the eighteenth century, two tons of sugar cost 
one life. Hobhouse estimates that between 1690 and 1790, Europe imported 12 million 
tons of sugar, at a total cost of about 12 million lives. Sugarcane was introduced to the 
Chota Valley at the beginning of the seventeenth century and became the major export 
crop. Wheat and barley were grown at median altitudes. Cattle were introduced to lower 
elevations of the coast, where grass was too tall for sheep. Cattle, horses, and sheep were 
introduced to the Páramo Andes of Venezuela, Colombia, and Northern Ecuador 
(Monasterio, 1980; Llano, 1990). 
 
Spanish activities affected indigenous communities through demands on land, labour, and 
production. While mines and forced migration led to depopulation, locally the Spanish 
began to place greater pressure on land access as well as available labour to work on 
expanding agricultural enterprises. While tribute payments contributed to poverty, other 
non-official obligations, such as forced purchases, increased this burden. The heightened 
demands on production and labour combined with decreased access to natural resources 
reduced the viability of native communities, obligating people to look for salaried 
employment. In the new social and economic environment, the indigenous communities 
generally lost access to natural resources and their racial and cultural identity began to 
steadily decline. 
 
Hacienda system 
 
The hacendado generally is humane and compassionate, he exercises over his 
workers a paternal authority that, distant from carrying the rigours of slavery, can 
be considered as beneficent tutelage for a race that little by little is entering the 
road to a civilized life. – Luis Felipe Borja, documented in Huasipungo, by Jorge 
Icaza, 1934. 
 
Of all the Spanish activities, agriculture was what had perhaps the greatest impact 
over the lives of the indigenous. – Linda Newsome, The Cost of the Conquest (1992: 
201) 
 
According to Guerrero (1975), the hacienda system was the result of three interconnected 
events: the expropriation of community land by conquistadors and the Crown during the 
17th and 18th centuries, retention of populations on hacienda land, and continued 
subjection of farmers to the payment of tribute from caciques to the crown and finally to 
the hacienda. By the end of the seventeenth century, agriculture became the source of 
economic development in Ecuador and the hacienda system the principle means of 
agricultural production. As a consequence, Ecuadorian society came to revolve around the 
hacienda.  
 
History of Agrarian Development 57 
Remaining vestiges of pre-Colombian Andean cultures, particularly traditional social 
structure and “ecological verticality,” would end with the hacienda period. The hacienda 
system evolved in response to growing domestic and regional markets as well as the 
distant markets of Spain, as with the case of wheat and sugar. The type of agriculture and 
its demands on indigenous land and labour depended on the local environment and the 
productivity of land. Diverse researchers have argued that the Spanish were interested in 
agriculture due to the high cost of living and the absence of opportunities to earn money 
in cities and towns (Newson, 1992; Borah, 1951). Sometimes, it was in search of mere self-
sufficiency, particularly in response to declining indigenous populations and food 
productivity. In the seventeenth century this occurred as a result of an economic 
depression in the Americas associated with the decline of the mining industry and trade 
with Spain. The exhaustion of mines and ensuing food demands in Europe resulted in the 
expansion of area under cultivation in the Americas and demands for labour, heightening 
pressures on native peoples. 
 
A requisite for agricultural production was land, which could be obtained in diverse ways. 
The most common, particularly following the conquest, was to forcibly capture land from 
native populations. Secondly, Spaniards could purchase land from a community and 
present a request on their behalf for legalized ownership. Indigenous people often did this 
to encomiendos as a means of liberating themselves from tribute debt. Prospective 
landowners also could declare an area abandoned and request a concession. With the 
decrease in indigenous populations, it became increasingly difficult to maintain land in 
cultivation. As such, fallowed land was prone to concessions. Officially, communities were 
to be consulted, but in practice concessions commonly occurred in silence. In 1591, the 
Crown ordered that all land obtained illegally be returned to the Crown, but at the same 
time, it declared that all illegal land could be legalized through the payment of a 
commission. In practice, this policy formalized the illegal purchase of land, and it raised 
money for the Crown. Further, cattle or sheep ranching on underutilized land was a 
favourite tactic of Spanish settlers for obtaining access and control over new territory. 
With the economic growth brought on by the conquest of the Americas, such processes 
accelerated during the seventeenth century. As miscegenated populations increased, they 
began to enter into conflict with native-borne Spaniards over land use and ownership.  
 
In the eighteenth century, the Spanish Crown took measures to support agricultural 
development and promote exportation of essential food and cash crops to Europe. This 
included exclusions from taxes and quotas for priority crops, such as indigo dyes, cotton, 
cacao, sugar, and coffee. Import taxes on processing equipment for sugar and coffee were 
abolished. Sheep and cattle production were advantageous due to their low labour costs 
and the ability to exploit natural grasses. Nevertheless, a poor transportation system and 
isolation made export of animal products impractical and limited to a secondary 
enterprise. The European textile crisis at the beginning of the eighteenth century caused a 
crash in sheep production in Ecuador, which led haciendas throughout the country to 
shift production towards extensive grain production for export, especially wheat, barley, 
and maize. The extensive nature of grain production increased the demand for labour, 
which was compensated for by “passing rights” (i.e., permission to cross through hacienda 
territory) as well as by access to land, water, and firewood. By the beginning of the 
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twentieth century, the haciendas of Ecuador eventually produced over 80 commodities for 
export (Hurtado, 1977). 
 
The hacienda would come to mean individual ownership of land on which resided a stable 
servant population, whose labour was exchanged for in-kind payment, often through land 
rent. There was a direct relationship between the landowner (in Spanish, the patrón) and 
the hacienda. The patrón’s personality often shaped the nature of the hacienda as a social 
and productive enterprise. Land was cultivated with limited technology and a limited 
portion of capital generated from production was reinvested in the enterprise, with the 
rest consumed by the landholder and his family. Generally, the patrón extracted surpluses 
for personal profit or investment in emerging business opportunities elsewhere, such as 
industry, finance, and urban speculation. The hacienda became the dominant form of 
social organization in rural areas under what became known as the “minifundio-latifundio” 
model (Tannebaum, 1965; Barahona, 1970; Guerrero, 1975). 
 
A stable labour force lived on the property as wasipungeros,3 complemented by a paid part-
time work force during periods of high labour demand, such as at planting and harvest. 
Payment continued to be in-kind through passing rights, access to land, water, and wood 
in the case of wasipungeros as well as a portion of the harvest in the case of part-time 
labourers. Landowners provided primary-level formal education as well as religious 
indoctrination. Generally, labour was not indebted to the landowner, but workers 
preferred to stay on the hacienda due to the absence of opportunities elsewhere. Labour 
was collective and distributed by simple, non-technical tasks. Men worked in the fields. A 
small number of women worked as domestic servants. Kids usually did menial jobs 
around the house, but also contributed to planting and herding animals. The hacendado 
commonly resided at the property or lived in a nearby city and delegated administration of 
the productive enterprise to a mayordomo who supervised labour and coordinated on-farm 
activities.  
 
Due to the relatively large labour force (in comparison with earlier periods), technological 
development was not a priority. Technology was limited to animal drawn traction, hand 
implements, such as shovels and hoes, and local varieties. An increasing proportion of 
farmland was dedicated to pasture for animals, especially cattle for dairy and meat. The 
majority of crops was sold domestically and met domestic consumption and extractive 
needs.  
 
The system of wasipungo land rent to large landholders continued through the 
independence movements and the creation of the Republic of Ecuador in 1830. In 1831, 
the first President, Juan José Flores, created the Ministry of Hacienda and passed a law 
formalizing the “sistema de concertaje,” which, similar to the wasipungo, tied indigenous labour 
to the haciendas through debt and jail sentences. In practice, this indefinitely perpetuated 
the encomienda system. The legislature produced diverse laws to establish indigenous rights, 
especially a law in 1865 that would award indigenous communes collective usufruct rights 
                                                       
3 Wasipungero is the Kichwa term generally used to refer to the indentured servants of the hacienda system. In 
exchange for labour, the wasipungero commonly was provided a small plot of land and resided in a settlement 
known as the wasipungo. 
History of Agrarian Development 59 
to land. In practice, however, the system of concertaje remained unaltered (Jaramillo-
Alvarado, 1983). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the hacienda conserved many 
of its traditional qualities. In 1913, the Archbishop of Quito, Monsignor Polit wrote, “The 
concertaje exists always with the character of a sentence of life in prison in the latifundios and 
when a peasant resists its servitude, be it in the city or in the towns, the official complicity 
leaves open the jail for entombing the Indian” (Saénz, 1933: 107, cited in Barksy, 1988). 
 
According to Jaramillo-Alvarado (1983), the liberal revolution of 1895 and ensuing 
political movements to abolish the concertaje system gained force into the twentieth century. 
Following the American emancipation of slaves in the mid-1860s and the Mexican 
Revolution that began in 1910, public opinion in Ecuador began to shift against the 
exploitation of native peoples. Despite strong opposition by large landowners, in 1918, the 
liberal President, Alfredo Baquerizo Moreno, passed a law through Congress abolishing 
the concertaje system. 
 
Growth of towns and cities in Europe as well as Colombia and Ecuador during the period 
between 1880 and 1930 created new demands for agricultural goods. Haciendas in Carchi 
showed a marked expansion in export activity to Europe – especially cattle hides and 
grains – as well as diversified production for local markets, including wood, wheat, barley, 
potato, animals (sheep, cattle, and horses) and lesser products to Colombia. According to 
Orellana (1928; cited in Barsky, 1984: 50), in 1926, the province’s exports exceeded its 
imports by a factor of 70 (Sucre 1,801,418 for exports versus Sucre 26,017 for imports). 
The hacienda increasingly became a commercial enterprise, producing new tendencies 
towards production intensification and profit maximization. Over time, this would change 
the management of capital and technology, as well as the relationship between landowner 
and labour.  
 
Market-oriented haciendas invested in machinery (primarily tractors and ploughs) and 
later, agrochemical inputs (first synthetic fertilizers, followed by pesticides) and improved 
plant varieties. Additionally, they began to transition towards specialised salaried labour. 
“One good paid worker could do the job of five wasipungeros in minga.”4 The global 
financial crisis of 1929 and ensuing events left these haciendas heavily indebted to 
creditors. In the 1930s and 1940s Ecuadorian companies, especially from the beer 
industry, protested against the export of wheat and barley to their competitors in 
Colombia, leading to a government policy prohibiting the export of these products and 
contraband. The devaluation of the Colombian peso in the 1950s combined with 
Ecuadorian subsidies for commodity imports severely hurt grain producers. As a result, 
many haciendas went into economic decline during this period, forcing hacendados to seek 
financial opportunities elsewhere and become absentee landlords. In the North, many 
haciendas began to abandon intensive production for export and to concentrate on the 
more simplified potato-pasture system that dominates the Carchi landscape today. 
 
Given the financial difficulties of agriculture, many hacendados turned to business and 
industry for wealth. Their families moved to the city. While the hacendado commonly 
travelled to the hacienda to supervise activity, his wife and children generally stayed in the 
                                                       
4 Conversation with Juan Carlos y Diego Landázuri, 10 December 2003. 
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city. During this period, on-farm investments were limited, while off-farm investments 
made many hacendados wealthy. In some cases, the traditional hacendado altogether lost 
interest in agriculture as a business, and investors arrived to purchase properties. Many 
absentee and ex-hacendados became business and political leaders, forming a powerful elite 
throughout Ecuador (Tannebaum, 1965).  
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, haciendas diverged between two 
principal economic survival strategies: 1) the traditional, labour-intensive and low profit 
enterprise that conserved social characteristics of the past, and 2) a new, more intensified 
form of the hacienda as a moneymaking enterprise. This latter strategy involved 
mechanization of tillage, the introduction of new varieties and agrochemicals, improved 
pastures, and infrastructure improvements, introducing more production oriented 
management. These enterprises tended to increase the capitalisation of the hacienda, 
turning it into an agribusiness. New administrative mechanisms were apparent in the 
technical training of mayordomos, the increased attention paid to bookkeeping, and the 
expansion of area under production. They strategically made permanent capital 
investments that replaced variable capital – e.g., the wasipungeros and other forms of 
informal labour. The hacienda as an agribusiness increasingly replaced in-kind payments 
with labour for salaries, which permitted greater control and demand over activities. 
Labourers began to work fixed hours from Monday through Saturday. 
 
By 1950, population growth in the wasipungo sector as well as in the outskirts of towns led 
to a growing labour force and unemployment. Youths born on the wasipungo began to feel 
that land and natural resources belonged to them. These tendencies produced growing 
social malcontent. Meanwhile, market integration led to a situation where it was 
increasingly less convenient for hacendados to share products with wasipungos. In Carchi as 
well as in Pichincha, changing economies towards milk production, requiring about one-
tenth the labour of agriculture, aggravated the labour crisis. As a result, it was increasingly 
convenient to find ways of breaking ties with the wasipungos. This created a class of 
unemployed and landless former wasipungeros and the need to attend to their concerns.  
 
Urban growth, the collapse of the cacao industry, and low food production affected 
foreign exchange earnings and created domestic food shortages. As a consequence, 
governments throughout Latin America began to develop policies centring on two 
interactive agricultural development strategies: resolution of the agrarian situation, 
especially inequitable land distribution, and improved production through technology 
development. It became important for hacendados to resolve matters in the face of growing 
organizational strength of peasant movements that were beginning to endanger the 
interests of large landholders, particularly their control over large tracts of land and natural 
resources. As a consequence, during the 1950s Ecuador saw numerous cases of voluntary 
handover of marginal land from both private and public haciendas.  
 
Barsky (1978) and Barsky and Cosse (1981) described a great deal of social differentiation 
between the wealthy rural elite in Northern Ecuador. Tensions emerged between 
traditional hacendados and a newer class of market-oriented landholders that emerged with 
the growth of the “technification” and commercial development of the dairy industry. 
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Based on historical factors of establishment and development, farmer access to resources, 
and retribution systems, Barahona (1970) identified two basic types of haciendas during 
this period: 1) the traditional hacienda in disintegration – either through absentee 
landlordism or public haciendas under social conflict with farmers, and 2) the modern 
hacienda – either in process of diversifying production and formalizing employment 
arrangements or an emergent industrial era hacienda fully capitalized and organized under 
business principles.  
 
As a result of his study on the diverse political responses of the large landowners (or 
terratenientes as they are called in Spanish) to agrarian reform, Barsky (1988: 390) concluded: 
 
The original sin [of the terratenientes], the wasipungo system and other forms of 
subjection of labour, whose social consequences have been the backwardness and 
misery of vast sectors of rural society, and at the same time the accumulation of 
wealth of the hacendados, is present. That which for many years had been seen with 
indifference by a good part of society, today is the target of open criticism by 
influential communication media that collects a growing national sentiment as 
well as the currents of reform pushed from the United States. 
 
By the mid-1950s most large landholders came to view agrarian reform as inevitable and 
were obliged to adopt strategies of transition towards eliminating a precarista class. The 
precaristas were from the informal labour sector, commonly made up of landless labourers 
who were paid in specie and were outside the modern currency economy. The large 
landholders commonly faced two options: sell their land at strong market value or fight to 
save the farm. In Ecuador, this second strategy did not involve confronting social groups, 
but rather, the full subjection of their haciendas and themselves to processes of 
“modernisation.” Meanwhile, competing hacendado interests prepared for a prolonged 
public debate over agrarian reform.  
 
Agrarian reform  
 
The proposals to end the hacienda system differed considerably across Latin America. In 
Peru, policies emphasized breaking up the monopoly of landholdings. Elsewhere, policies 
centred on opening up new territory for agricultural colonisation. Agrarian reform policies 
generally were aimed at transforming the latifundio system into multiple, independent agri-
businesses employing new relations of production, modern technologies, and forms of 
market integration. The outcomes varied according to the unique political environment of 
each setting. In Mexico and Bolivia, for example, large landholders commonly kept 
control over the most fertile valleys and relegated the different forms of ex-wasipungeros 
and campesinos to less fertile, surrounding mountainsides. The process in Ecuador shared 
this quality to a degree, but it was influenced by the country’s unique political context. 
 
In Ecuador, a series of laws that appeared during the mid-1930s on communes, 
communities, and cooperatives (Ley de Organización y Régimen de las Comunidades and Estatuto 
Jurídico de la Comunidades Campesinas in 1937) and the Worker’s Code5 marked a shift in 
                                                       
5  Código de Trabajo, 1938 
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agrarian policy in favour of fundamental social reform (Costales and Costales, 1971; 
Hurtado, 1977; and Barsky, 1988). Following decades of growing national and 
international pressure to address the “indigenous problem,” in part in response to the 
success of the Cuban peasantry revolution of 1959, on 31 January 1960, President Velasco 
Ibarra issued an Executive Decree creating the National Commission on Agrarian 
Reform, charged with leading public debates and policy formulation.  
 
Barsky (1980) identified two obstacles of the policy negotiation process in Ecuador: the 
notorious fragmentation of indigenous and campesino movements, particularly those from 
private haciendas, and the weak, newly emerging urban-based industrial class with its own 
unique concerns and priorities. While hacienda owners increasingly appreciated the need 
to handover areas of land, they also sought to eliminate access to land, pastures, water, 
and fuel wood. Four competing factions emerged among the large landholders (Barsky 
1980: 140-141): 
 
1. Industrialised and capital-intensive agriculture sector: This grouping was 
composed of large landholders who had “modernised” – i.e., intensified 
production through large investments in technology, such as mechanization of 
tillage and milking, as well as the drainage and irrigation systems used in dairy 
farming. Galo Plaza was the leader of this group. He sought to end the precarious 
wasipungo system that threatened lesser capital-intensive haciendas. He promoted 
agrarian colonization of unused land, particularly in the Amazon basin, and 
industrialization as a means to employment.  
2. Moderately intensified agriculture sector: This sector was composed of large 
landholders who had made fewer capital investments. Farm improvements were 
achieved through less expensive technologies, such as genetic improvement of 
herds, improved pasture management, and a lesser degree of mechanization. This 
group represented the more feasible model of development for most large 
landholders as it did not require a continual flow of capital. Prior to the agrarian 
reform law, many of this group already had begun voluntary transfer of land to 
wasipungeros. 
3. Vulnerable large landholders: This group was made up of diverse actors, most of 
who controlled large, but resource limited tracts of land. Other members were 
from the second grouping, but who had rejected agrarian reform. This faction 
was generally represented by the Agricultural Bureau and was led by its President 
Marco Tulio González. Due to limited resources of these enterprises, large 
landholdings were essential for maintaining profit margins. While they generally 
accepted the need for formalizing labour relationships, they were less willing to 
give up land. 
4. Resistant landholders: A fourth sector was composed of landholders whose 
productive strategy was dependent on cheap labour and dominant control over 
the wasipungeros. This group opposed any policy that would decrease landholdings 
or formalize labour relationships. Members were from haciendas in the South of 
the country. Haciendas from the Centre and North generally had accepted the 
need for fundamental agrarian change and generally did not belong to this group. 
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The text of Costales and Costales (1971) provides a detailed account of ensuing 
deliberations and political confrontations that transpired during the years prior to agrarian 
reform. The authors argue it was not a single modernizing sector or an external 
technocratic intervention enabled by a dictatorship and its military that made possible 
agrarian reform in Ecuador. Rather, it was the result of a confluence of interests, including 
those of the Catholic leadership, urban-based landholders, as well as agribusiness sectors. 
Diverse church and government bureaucrats, particularly from the National Geological 
and Anthropological Institute, fulfilled important mediation roles and brought about the 
consolidation of an imperfect policy that attempted to accommodate highly irreconcilable 
interests. 
 
At a decisive moment, Pope John XXIII challenged the Catholic Church in Ecuador to 
take a stronger stance in favour of agrarian reform. In a 1963 letter to the government and 
people of Ecuador,6 the Church called for “the promulgation of a law of agrarian reform, 
that will provide the bases for an adequate solution,” and conciliation of the competing 
factions of its diverse constituency – military, terratenientes, campesinos, and the broader 
public, all of which shared a single religion. The Pope argued, “It is our fervent desire that 
this Catholic nation lives its faith in the practice of justice,” and “The Church has become 
proletarizado,” allegedly so should the rest of Ecuador. Growing public opinion and 
political parties organized around this opinion, and eventually, the resistant terratenientes 
came to the conclusion that agrarian reform was inevitable. The political stage was set for 
change. On 22 September 1964, the military dictatorship issued Supreme Decree No. 1480 
stating:7 
 
The Government of Ecuador, with the expedition of the present Law of Agrarian 
Reform and Colonisation indicates a change of historic transition in the economic 
and social structure of Ecuador. Given the importance of agriculture for the 
economy and life of the entire Ecuadorian society, the vices of agrarian structure 
have become reflected in the social institutions of the country, in which they have 
promoted less just treatment in the relations between the men that take part in 
the process of agricultural production. The modifications established the legal 
bases of said structure. Thus, began the Agrarian Reform, and the Government 
placed the first stone for building a more harmonious, just, and dynamic Ecuador. 
 
A multifaceted piece of legislation that reflected the social complexities of the time, in 
practice, the Law of Agrarian Reform and Colonization pursued three central objectives: 
1) the abolishment of precarista or “pre-capitalistic” forms of labour and creation of a new 
working class or proletariat; 2) “national integration” through allowing peasant farmers, 
especially ex-wasipungeros, access to land, credit, education, and technology, and 3) greater 
agricultural production through market integration and agricultural intensification. 
 
The implementation of the policy was highly controversial and contested. The Instituto 
Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC), the agency charged with 
administration, faced tremendous challenges from the resistant terratenientes as well as from 
                                                       
6 “Carta Pastoral del Episcopado Ecuatoriano to the people of Ecuador over the agrarian problem,” 23 April 1963. 
7  The decree later would be published in the Congressional Registry No 297 on 23 July 1964. 
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farmer groups that usually were not very united. According to Cosse (1980: 414), “… the 
traditional sector of the terratenientes had done everything possible to first block, then slow, 
and finally, eliminate the agrarian policy of the military government, first in 1963-1966 and 
later in 1972-75 in alliance with fractions from other dominant classes.” By no means was 
land distribution in Ecuador fully implemented. 
 
By the end of agrarian reform in 1979, the Ministry of Agriculture concluded that IERAC 
managed to distribute just 33 percent of the territory slated for redistribution, reaching 
just 29 percent of intended rural beneficiaries.8 Even when farmers acquired land, other 
challenges prevented them from improving their well-being. According to Costales and 
Costales (1971: 129), “Today the wasipungero, in many haciendas, is exposed to conditions 
worse than before. In many cases, the provision of land to the wasipungos became a 
negative.” Resentful as a result of being the target of public hostilities, many previously 
sympathetic hacendados began to deny campesinos access to other resources needed for 
production, such as seeds, water, and tools. Chiriboga (1982: 104) concluded, “Agrarian 
reform [in Ecuador] has just produced a light expansion in the number of properties. The 
reasons for the increase in minifundios lie in the weak application of the Agrarian Reform 
Law, which as implemented, impeded access to land and productive resources for the 
great majority of campesino families.” In contrast to the results elsewhere, agrarian reform 
in Carchi largely met the policy’s objectives. 
 
Abolishment of the precaristas9 
 
With three articles, the Law abolished the precaristas:10 
 
Article 51. The precarista is understood as the campesino who works for his own 
benefit on land owned by others and who pays for its use in money, products, 
work, or other services. 
Article 52. Informal exploitations are prohibited. 
Article 117. The retribution for agricultural work will be made in cash currency. It 
is prohibited to pay in kind and to provide labourers, as total or partial payment 
for its work, access rights to land or the use of water. 
 
While in practice it would prove difficult to implement, the legal precedent for liberating 
the wasipungeros and their communities was unmistakably established. Barsky (1988) 
explains that Carchi experienced uncommon patterns of cooperation with agrarian reform. 
The North was the region with greatest communication infrastructure and market access 
for milk and beef cattle production, where labour easily could be replaced by machinery or 
temporary work. As a result, the demands for labour were not as great as in other parts of 
the country. According to de Janvry and Glikman (1991: 120): 
 
                                                       
8 “Evaluación de la Reforma Agraria: conclusions y recomendaciones.” Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia, 
Quito, Ecuador. Cited in C. Verduga (1980: 452). 
9 “Precarista” or informal labourer; also known as an indentured servant or slave. In Ecuador, it took diverse 
forms, including the wasipungero, the yanapero, and arrimaje (see annex for definitions). 
10  Law of Agrarian Reform and Colonisation, 1964 
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Agricultural activities in the Sierra have demonstrated a particular incapacity of 
retaining a labour force principally as a result of modernisation and the growth of 
cattle and milk farming. The production of milk in the Sierra has displaced with 
pastures an important part of the production of wheat, potato, maize, and barley, 
as a result aggravating problems of unemployment. 
 
By holding on to choice fertile valleys, terratenientes in Carchi were able to meet their 
pasture needs, while selling the more difficult and less fertile hillsides to campesino groups, 
which provided additional currency to finance additional capital investments. Further, 
milk and dairy production for the cities provided a cash flow uncommon to haciendas 
elsewhere. Land transfer combined with a shift towards regular cash payment for labour 
allowed terratenientes to free themselves of social problems that had become associated with 
having wasipungos on their property and providing them access to their natural resources. 
 
Miño (1985: 20) pointed out that one of the particularities of agrarian reform in Carchi 
was, “… the regional terrateniente, as a consequence of the popular land occupation 
movements, tended to move to other provinces, and as a result the regional control of 
terratenientes disappeared from the rural scene.... Agrarian reform produced a des-
articulation of a previous dominant player in the society.” For the ex-wasipungeros and other 
campesino groups, the relative absence of terratenientes represented a unique opportunity for 
their future involvement in Carchi society. 
 
Land redistribution 
 
A separate article addressed land redistribution as well as access to productive resources, 
credit, education, and technology: 
 
Article 1. The Agrarian Reform constitutes a process of gradual change of the 
agrarian structure and its economic, cultural, social, and political aspects, through 
planned operations of afectación [see below for explanation] and redistribution of 
land, as well as credit resources, education, and technology, for advancing the 
following objectives: national integration, transformation of the life conditions of 
campesinos, redistribution of agricultural income, and organization of a new social 
system of market-oriented enterprises. 
 
Agrarian reform did not represent a land give away. IERAC facilitated the sale of land to 
the wasipungeros and other emergent farmer groups. Land could be obtained through two 
chief means: afectación (essentially, public seizure) or colonisation. According to the Article 
38, afectación was “the absolute or partial elimination of ownership rights over rural 
properties that do not fulfil their social function. Afectación aims to correct the defects of 
the current structure of land tenure and land use.” Non-fulfilment of “social function” 
primarily referred to land that was idle or underutilised, as well as situations where 
landowners did not respect the Worker’s Code. In the Sierra, only properties larger than 
800 hectares were vulnerable. Colonisation chiefly took place in the lowlands of the Coast 
and especially the Amazon. It required relocation of families and entire communities. 
From the beginning, a goal was “to put to work land that was idle, abandoned, and land of 
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the State,” as a means of relieving the “overcrowded” Sierra and “to civilise” the wild 
Amazon, thereby bringing it into State patrimony.11 
 
In practice, land redistribution to groups commonly meant sale of fragile highland areas of 
questionably productive potential, thereby handing the ex-wasipungeros debt as well as a 
legacy of poverty. Joined by independent farmers, they became a growing class of 
marginalized rural poor – the minifundistas or campesinos. As a result of its limited resource 
base, this growing sector was not well positioned to accumulate wealth through market 
integration. In contrast, land redistribution in Carchi handed an emergent class of 
campesinos far more favourable conditions. 
 
Based on the census data of 1964 and 1974, IERAC handed over a total of 2,280,000 
hectares of territory in Ecuador, about 500,000 hectares of which came from haciendas. In 
1954 1,400 families (0.4% of all farms) owned farms larger than 500 hectares, which 
represented about 45 percent of all cultivated land in the country. Meanwhile, about 90 
percent of farm families cultivated small farms (areas of less than 20 hectares). By 1974, 
the number of landholdings over 500 hectares had dropped to just over 100 families, with 
about 500,000 hectares being distributed in the favour of smaller holders. Jordan (1988) 
explains that this was not only the result of agrarian reform but also inter-family divisions 
through inheritance and sales.  
 
The three northern provinces of Carchi, Pichincha, and Imbabura were the greatest 
beneficiaries of land reform. Carchi led the way, with 92 percent of campesino groups 
receiving about 41 percent of all arable land, followed by Pichincha (30% receiving 27% 
of land) and Imbabura (24% receiving 24%). Costales and Costales (1971) points out that 
the land handed over generally was of poor quality with limited or no access to water, 
except in the North where there was a greater abundance of fertile soils. Between 1964 
and 1971, about 50 new farmer organizations were formed in Carchi for the purposes of 
land acquisition. Groups were made up of different kinds of farmers, including ex-
wasipungeros and migrants from Colombia and elsewhere. Generally, campesino groups in the 
highlands were sold the least productive land at prices higher than market value (Costales 
and Costales, 1971:132). In Carchi, however, groups negotiated prices closer to market 
value. According to the 1956 census, 0.14 percent of all landholdings in Carchi controlled 
63.1 percent of the provincial area, and 125 farms controlled 117,000 hectares, with the 
nine largest farms averaging 5,911 hectares each.12 Barsky and Llovet (1982) assessed 
inequality of land acquisition through comparing Gini coefficients between 1954 and 
1974.13 While the average change throughout the Sierra was an improvement of -0.332, in 
Carchi the coefficient dropped the most of any other province, from 0.8612 in 1954 to 
0.7860 in 1974 – a change of -0.752. Overall, 91 percent of land distributions in the Sierra 
ended up as properties between ten and 100 hectares in size (Table 3.2). In Carchi that 
figure was 56 percent. About 40 percent of all land distributions in the province were of 
                                                       
11 Abel Gilbert, Vice-President of the Plaza Administration, upon proposing the National Institute for 
Agrarian Reform in 1959, in Costales and Costales (1974: 69). 
12 National Agriculture Census, 1954, cited in Barsky, 1984: 50. 
13 The Gini coefficient measures the inequality of income distribution within a country. It varies from zero, 
which indicates perfect equality, with every household earning exactly the same, to one, which implies absolute 
inequality, with a single household earning a country's entire income. 
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less than ten hectares. More than any other province of the highlands, agrarian reform 
converted landownership in Carchi from large holder to smallholder farms. 
 
Table 3.2 Distribution of land (by number of parcels and area) in Carchi compared to the 
rest of the Ecuadorian highlands before and after agrarian reform (Barsky and Llovet, 
1982) 
 
 Change in number of parcels between  
1954 and 1974 (%) 
Change in area of parcels between  
1954 and 1974 (%) 
Size (ha) Highland provinces Carchi Highland provinces Carchi 
0.1-1 +35.5 +65.3 +22.7 +13.3 
1-5 +7.7 +34.6 +4.9 +23.6 
5-10 +29.5 +37.9 +26.2 +31.6 
10-20 +72.8 +48.8 +69.8 +48.8 
20-50 +88.4 +38.2 +91.9 +33.3 
50-100 +67.3 +17.6 +68.2 +20.9 
100-500 +23.9 +21.1 -7.1 +14.2 
500-1,000 -5.4 -44.0 -9.9 -47.6 
1,000-2,500 -19.9 -65.0 -17.0 -52.7 
> 2,500 -37.7 -66.0 -46.6 -71.6 
 
Market integration and agricultural intensification 
 
Tied to land tenure was agricultural intensification. MAG and the Banco de Fomento 
provided loans in the form of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. To payoff debts, groups 
immediately had to produce for the market and earn currency. For most, it was the first 
time they had a direct relationship with commercial markets.  
 
Potato quickly became the cash crop of Carchi. In 1974, it represented about 70 percent 
of the gross internal product of the province,14 the vast majority of which was for export 
to Colombia and elsewhere in Ecuador. During this period, between 61 and 67 percent of 
farms became economically specialized in potato production. The mono-crop of potato 
created a new paid labour market in the province, often filled by a landless peasantry that 
lived on the margins of towns and had not benefited from agrarian reform. 
 
The 1970s became a decade of oil exploitation in Ecuador that would become the central 
preoccupation of the government to this day. Oil financed the “professionalisation” of the 
military, national infrastructure (roads and electricity), as well as national debt. As a result, 
the agriculture sector became much less important as a growth strategy. Additionally, 
because the benefits of agriculture were widely distributed, it was far easier to concentrate 
the wealth from oil for both public and private purposes. A final surge in agrarian reform 
occurred during the first half of the 1970s, largely for the politically expedient purpose of 
quieting the rural masses. The farmer movements that had organized for land acquisition 
did not normally have the capacity to address the subsequent individual and collective 
needs of farmers – namely intensification of agriculture and the penetration of markets. 
As a result, many cooperatives disbanded and divided land that earlier had been won 
under agrarian reform. 
                                                       
14 National Agriculture Census, 1974. 
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During this period, the remaining large landowners and private business interests – many 
of them former hacendados – organized a counter movement culminating in the 1979 Law 
of Fomento y Desarrollo Agropecuaria,15 which created the legal framework for ending further 
land redistributions and criminalising informal farming as well as land invasions. With the 
arrival of this law, the period of agrarian reform ended. More than elsewhere, agrarian 
reform in Carchi effectively converted the large properties and reorganised agrarian 
society around commercial markets, leaving behind an unusually solid foundation for 
smallholder-based agricultural development. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Who knows what genes supported what characteristics. The truth is that the 
strong mix of blood between natives and Spanish [in Carchi] seems to have been 
one of the most compatible in our country. As a result, the social structure of 
Carchi has been much less stratified and racist than in the rest of the country. – 
Mariana Landázuri C. (2003) 
 
Many people of Carchi little understand its history. As Mariana Landázuri wrote, present-
day Carchi is made up of relatively well-off smallholder, mestizo growers. The province 
does not suffer from racial tensions between native highland peoples and the “more 
civilized” Spanish-speaking populations. How did Carchi’s apparent serenity come to be? 
 
The agriculture of the highland Pasto culture of the Northern Andes evolved to exploit 
environmental niches distributed across ecological floors. Without idealising what 
traditional society may have been, this “micro-vertical” organisation led to relatively stable 
food production that supported substantial populations, roughly equivalent to that of 
modern time. The brief arrival of the Incas in the early 1500s and immediately followed by 
the Spanish sparked a violent uprooting of traditional society, a processes of socio-
environmental dis-embedding that would carry on into the twenty-first century. 
 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Spanish Crown, conquistadors, the 
Catholic Church, and other externally based regimes reorganized traditional society 
around distant interests. The Pasto resisted assimilation and may have been the last 
highland culture in Ecuador to loose its native language. Nevertheless, as a result of labour 
camps, forced migration, and to a lesser extent disease, the present-day region of Carchi 
was de-populated by about three-fourths. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Pasto 
language and remaining vestiges of its culture had been supplanted and disappeared. 
 
Most conquistadores came to the Americas to extract wealth and return to their 
motherland with improved social standing. The most expedient way to achieve that was 
through minerals, and the Crown awarded highly regarded subjects control over silver and 
gold mines. The remainder were relegated to agriculture and were provided territory and 
control over its denizens under a policy called the encomienda. This arrangement eventually 
evolved into a feudal-like hacienda system, which in the eighteenth century, came to reign 
                                                       
15 In this context, fomento means the promotion or intensification of agriculture, signifying both crops and 
animal production. 
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over the majority of the highlands. While some products were exported to Europe, 
originally the hacienda concentrated on local production.  
 
Lacking mineral prospects, Carchi society became organized around agriculture, and its 
remaining population became indentured servants or wasipungos under a handful of large 
haciendas. With the decline of the mining industry and food shortages in Europe during 
the later half of the nineteenth century, the hacienda in Carchi increasingly became an 
export-oriented enterprise, thereby providing surpluses and wealth for the hacendados. This 
tendency continued over the ensuing 150 years, complemented by the growth of domestic 
markets in what became the Republics of Ecuador and neighbouring Colombia.  
 
By the mid-twentieth century, growing public concern over the “indigenous problem,” 
diversely understood as a human rights issue as well as the “impractically” of a mass 
population of destitute rural poor, followed by a series of international events, including 
the independence movements in Africa and the Cuban Revolution, shifted public opinion 
away from the hacienda system and towards social reform. Further, growing food 
demands in cities and a stagnant national economy created the conditions for the 
“capitalisation” of haciendas and more equitable land redistribution, which culminated in 
the 1964 Law of Agrarian Reform. 
 
The social roots of present-day Carchi are largely hidden from view. With the decline of 
the hacienda system nearly five hundred years after the Spanish arrival, traditional Andean 
society underwent tremendous change. The system of vertical farming was supplanted by 
extensive, horizontally oriented agriculture vulnerable to the climatic extremes of highland 
mountain environments as well as pest and diseases. While overall agrarian reform was 
only partially implemented – by most estimates about 30 percent in terms of land 
redistribution to ex-wasipungeros, it effectively ended informal precarista labour. Agrarian 
reform in Carchi uniquely led to a fundamental redistribution of land towards an emergent 
class of smallholder farmers or campesinos. Chapter 4 examines the ensuing developments 
of agricultural modernisation in four communities. 
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 Chapter 4 
 
Agricultural Modernisation in Four Communities 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Growing protests over the exploitation of indigenous peoples during the twentieth century 
culminated in the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law. The ensuing period would usher in to rural 
life the agriculture expert, industrial era technology, and the commercial market. With its 
ample resources, communication infrastructure, mestizo population1 as well as its access to 
markets in Ecuador and Colombia, at the beginning of the 1970s Carchi was particularly 
well poised for agricultural modernisation and development. Nevertheless, experience 
elsewhere would raise doubts over such optimism. 
 
Based on research in the American Midwest, Cochrane (1958) coined the metaphor of the 
“agricultural treadmill” to describe the self-defeating process of innovation and debt 
associated with modern agriculture, especially when a large number of farmers produce the 
same undifferentiated commodity. Under such conditions, no individual can influence 
prices (i.e., farmers are “price takers”), so competitiveness depends on improved 
productivity through on-farm innovations that increase production per area or decrease 
costs. Cochrane found that when an individual farmer innovates, others quickly follow 
course and over time average productivity rises, production levels increase to the point 
where market supply becomes saturated, and commodity prices drop. Under such 
conditions, Cochrane argued, the “early adopters” gain a windfall profit, but later adopters 
are compelled by price squeeze to also follow suit. Thus diffusion becomes market 
propelled. Those who cannot keep up eventually drop out and their resources are taken up 
by the stayers. Ultimately, the agricultural treadmill leads to scale enlargement, as a 
relatively small number of individuals who have unique access to assets and capabilities for 
innovation squeeze out the less fortunate and efficient majority.  
 
Leeuwis (2004: 41) explains why governments tend to favour the treadmill: 
 
While farmers are often unhappy about such a “rat-race,” governments tend to like 
it because “treadmill” processes tend to be accompanied by: (a) lower prices of 
agricultural products for consumers; (b) increased competitiveness of agriculture in 
comparison with other countries; and (c) release of labour for non-agricultural 
work. 
 
Meanwhile, agriculture support institutions built around external knowledge and 
technology, such as public extension agents, agrochemical dealers, credit banks, and 
                                                       
1 As summarised in Chapter 4, the depopulation of Carchi during the 16th and 17th Centuries followed by 
processes of re-population with mixed-raced Spanish speaking mestizos signified for some that the North no 
longer had to deal with the “indigenous problem” of the Southern highlands.  
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marketing structures, emerge to feed and drive technology development (Röling and 
Jiggins, 1998). Over time, these actors organize into a politically influential network that 
promotes the sale of products and services, thereby becoming an indispensable 
complement to the treadmill.  
 
The large number of relatively small family farms that emerged from agrarian reform in 
Carchi created the conditions that allowed treadmill processes to take place, while ensuing 
modernisation policies encouraged integration in commercial markets. Due to the 
environmental limitations of the highlands, farmers came to rely on a single commodity – 
potato. Supply provided by many smallholders meant that no individual could drive prices, 
so essentially, all potato farmers in Carchi received the same price for their harvest. As 
individual farmers adopted technologies to improve their efficiency of production and 
technologies diffused, Carchense farmers became increasingly exposed to price squeeze, scale 
enlargement, and external competition. 
 
In light of the experience of four rural villages, this chapter pursues a single line of 
questioning: what influence did agricultural modernisation have on smallholder agriculture 
in Carchi, and how have developments affected rural people and their communities? I draw 
on multiple methods – farmer self-registries, national census data, semi-structured 
interviews, participant observation, situational analysis, and consultative workshops – to 
examine major developments and trends since agrarian reform at the four locations. To 
explore potential influences of expert knowledge and technologies in the macro-context of 
agricultural modernisation through treadmill processes, I concentrate on the evolving use 
of technology in potato production, especially the management of varieties, tillage, soil 
fertility, and pests associated with market integration. I go on to present how the 
communities summarised their history of social formations and transformations since 
agrarian reform, before making judgements on the outcomes of modernisation, in terms of 
agricultural sustainability and social consequences. I now begin with an introduction to the 
Ecuadorian rendition of agrarian reform and the arrival of technical assistance. 
 
“Constructive justice” of agrarian reform 
 
The agrarian reform process in Ecuador emerged as a result of what Barsky (1988: 390) 
described as the “original sins” of human exploitation and cruelty inherent to the encomienda 
and concertaje policies that were institutionalised through the hacienda system. The Law of 
Agrarian Reform of 1964 proposed to: “correct antiquated social relations” through “social 
justice,” “equality of opportunities,” “healthy living conditions,” “production,” 
“productivity,” “adequate pay,” and “integrated society.” In practice, however, agrarian 
reform took on different meanings. 
 
For the US government, agrarian reform became “land reform,” a policy designed to quell 
increasingly hostile rural populations in Latin America. It was part of a geopolitical project 
to eliminate communism from the Western Hemisphere, as a result of growing social 
movements in Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, 
and elsewhere. Following the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the Kennedy Administration 
championed land reform in the region, and tied it to what became the “Alliance for 
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Progress” initiative.2 Less publicly, the policy included clandestine support of tyrannous 
dictators and militaries throughout Latin America and assassinations of tens of thousands 
of students, politicians, and political leaders.3 “Liquidation of the precaristas”4 was a means 
of diffusing the rise of controlling “ultra-nationalism,” the “virus of communism,” and 
setting the groundwork for US-based regional security. 
 
Unified around common concerns over urban growth, interests in inexpensive food for the 
cities, and agriculture as a means of capturing foreign currency, disparate parties in Ecuador 
found consensus around agrarian reform as a means of “economic development” and 
“modernisation.” According to Costales and Costales (1971: 174), once the agenda of 
“liquidating the old precarista problem” for economic growth was agreed upon as the way 
forward, the problem became what to do with a massive population of ex-wasipungeros5 who 
“did not have the most basic and rudimentary concept of land property rights” and who 
had “scarce or no preparation for receiving land.” Further, it was argued, “In no case was 
there the social maturity or the previous preparation to constitute themselves as agents of 
change,” so progress would depend on external intervention. The answers were built into 
the proposal for “agricultural modernisation.” 
 
Galo Plaza, owner of the large Zuleta hacienda in northern Ecuador and President of 
Ecuador between 1948 and 1952, became an outspoken proponent of the movement to 
modernise the haciendas and agriculture in general. Barsky (1988) explains how Plaza’s 
proposals won public favour during the formulation of the agrarian reform policy and its 
early implementation. The analysis summarises what came to be the consensus on poverty 
and how it should be addressed (Box 4.1). For Galo Plaza, agrarian reform provided the 
means of eliminating “inefficient” haciendas that “perpetuated the precaristas.” Rather than 
place the future of food production in the hands of the ex-wasipungeros, he argued for 
leaving the fertile highland valleys to the “modernised haciendas,” what he described as 
“agribusinesses.” 
 
Citing the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), and the US government, Plaza argued that it went without 
question that medium and large agribusinesses were the most capable of bringing 
knowledge and technology to bear on the pressing problem that he framed as “efficient 
food production.” He contended that the ex-wasipungeros should be converted to a paid 
work force or proletariat to support agribusinesses as well as new urban-based industries in 
food processing, textiles, and small manufacturing sectors. Implicit in his message was that 
there was not enough room for smallholder farmers in the highly valuable fertile valleys of 
the highlands, so the activity of the ex-wasipungeros should be limited to subsistence farming 
                                                       
2 John F. Kennedy first publicly proposed the Alliance for Progress development program during a speech on 
13 March 1961. On 15-17 August 1961 the US government led a call for “regional land reform” and 
“integration of rural people into modern society” at a meeting organized by the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council of the Organization of American States, which subsequently would became known as the “Carta 
de Punta del Este,” for the location of the meeting at Punto del Este, Uruguay. 
3 Noam Chomsky (1992) includes a critical analysis on US foreign policy in Latin America during this period. 
4 As explained in Chapter 3, precaristas were the ‘precarious workers’ or informal rural sector that lied outside of 
the market economy. 
5 As explained in Chapter 3, wasipungeros were indentured servants of the hacienda system. 
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of less productive areas or unused regions of the Amazon through processes of re-
colonisation. Galo’s son, Leonidas Plaza, was more explicit:6 
 
In synthesis, liberated agrarian property in our country should be: 1) land of the 
Indian in the high Sierra combined with individual plots of communal pasture 
land; 2) promotion of internal colonisation, [as response to the] traditional panacea 
for the problem of men without land and land without men; 3) free competition of 
different systems of medium and large agri-businesses – individual, cooperative, 
and collective; 4) punishment of the vestiges of the latifundio, [i.e.,] of the 
unproductive ownership of land by progressive imposition. Agrarian policy could 
not be more practical and just, a product based on constructive justice. 
 
Closely tied with the agrarian reform policies, the Ecuadorian government adopted new 
language. For example, in the documents of the Ministry of Agriculture the finca or granja 
(farm) became the “Unidad de Producción Agropecuaria” (UPA) (literally, the Agricultural 
Production Unit), and the hacienda (plantation) became the “medium to large enterprise.” 
The UPA was: “all the land that is dedicated, either partially or in entirety, to agriculture 
and animal production and that is worked, directed, or administered as a technical or 
economical unit, directly by a person (the producer) or with the help of other people, 
without consideration to ownership, legal condition, size, or location. The UPA can be 
composed of one of various lots or parcels of land.”7 The campesino or hacendado became the 
small or large holder “producer,” signifying “the legal or natural person who had 
responsibility for managing the UPA, to which corresponds technical initiatives and that 
owns full economic responsibility of the said property or as shared with others (e.g., 
through sharecropping).” The government officially converted agrarian reform from a 
policy based on social to economic ideals. Land reform as a means to  “empowerment” and 
“social justice” became a means to “rural development” in the name of “increased 
production,” “efficiency,” and “productivity.” 
 
Through consensus around urban-based priorities of ample, cheap food as well as geo-
political interests of anti-communism, the “constructive justice” resolved the controversy 
over agrarian reform. Hacendados would come to own less land, but they strategically would 
hold on to the richest resource base of the valleys, forests, and water. That, combined with 
control over labour and markets, enabled them to conserve their economic capacity and 
social position. Many would get involved in industry, especially the agrochemical and food 
processing industry, and politics. As Ecuador shifted from military dictatorships to 
democracy, the earlier class of hacendados would become congressmen, ministers, and 
presidents. The new concern became implementation of the modernisation project. 
 
Who would decide on matters of efficiency and productivity? How would new knowledge 
and technology arrive to agriculture? The answer became the nascent rural development 
industry led by a new class of agricultural experts made up of researchers, técnicos, and 
salesmen. 
                                                       
6 El Comercio newspaper, 17 September 1961, as quoted in Barsky (1988:94). 
7 ‘Basic concepts and definitions’, National Agriculture Census, 1974. 
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Box 4.1 A summary of Galo Plaza’s proposal of land reform as agricultural modernisation 
(as described in Barsky, 1988: 90-94) 
 
• Colonisation of barren or uncultivated lands – based on the implicit understanding that 
the highlands were not large enough to employ the existing rural population 
• Colonisation of under-used or inefficiently exploited land – the traditional, inefficient 
hacienda will no longer continue 
• Strengthening of efficient haciendas or agribusiness – increasing efficiency (usually, 
production by area) became a central focus of the government and an overriding 
justification for its policies. 
• Land transfer to wasipungos – land reform must end “outdated” social relations and 
generate an agricultural working class available for the development of agribusinesses. 
While Plaza was committed to ending the precaristas, in practice, this meant closing the 
inefficient traditional haciendas that accumulated wealth through extracting rent for 
land and water access. 
• Elimination of the minifundio8 – Through processes of colonization in other regions 
outside the highlands and ending processes of subdivisions, the administration 
proposed that farmers who lived on land of limited size or questionable arability must 
migrate either to new areas of colonization (primarily the Amazon) or to urban areas. 
• Development of urban-based industry – Foreseeing the growth of urban areas, the 
administration proposed urban development as a means of absorbing the displaced 
working class. Particularly, it proposed the growth of food processing, textile, and 
small manufacturing industries. 
 
Arrival of technical assistance 
 
Global tendencies 
 
Similar to other parts of Latin America, during the mid-twentieth century, Ecuador was 
introduced to an emerging regime of thought around notions of poverty and development 
(Escobar, 1995; McMichael et al., 2000). The US land grant system beginning in the 1860s, 
the independence movement of India in the 1930s followed by ensuing de-colonization 
processes led by the League of Nations in Asia and Africa, the New Deal Policies in the 
United States during the 1940s, and post World War II reconstruction efforts in Europe 
and Japan opened the way for the role of outsiders, especially technical experts and 
“technology transfer,” in “community development.”  
 
The advent of technical assistance in the Americas was closely tied with geopolitics. Just 
prior to World War II, the US became worried about Nazi infiltration of Argentina, Brazil, 
and Mexico, so it began to explore cooperative agriculture programs as a means to 
strengthening political ties with those countries (Flora and Flora, 1989). The US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) established experiment stations throughout Latin 
America and Nelson Rockefeller supported professionals from the USDA and land grant 
colleges to conduct agricultural development work. In the 1940s Colombia requested US 
support to “relieve the general state of social and economic crisis in Colombian 
                                                       
8 As explained in Chapter 3, a minifundio was a small landholding permitting a family-level subsistence economy. 
   Learning from Carchi  76 
agriculture” (Cronshaw, 1982: 99). A particular concern was the opposition of large 
landholders to its 1936 land reform policy and the absence of an agricultural middle class 
(Smith, 1947).  
 
According to Ruttan (1989: 173), “Lagging agricultural development was interpreted 
primarily as the failure to make effective use of available technology.” At the end of World 
War II, the United Nations created the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for the 
purpose of becoming a “global ministry of food and agriculture.” The FAO mandate 
included the provision of technical assistance to countries, support to education, the 
collection of statistics on land use and production, and the publication of technical 
materials. By 1950, the United Nations had established development programs in over 60 
countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as smaller initiatives that were 
supported by missionary organizations and private organizations such as the Ford, Kellogg, 
and Rockefeller Foundations. By the next decade, however, the emphasis on “technology 
transfer” shifted, as agricultural research became central to global agricultural development 
strategies. 
 
In 1941, the Rockefeller Foundation had begun to support technology assistance and 
transfer programs in Mexico, based on the land grant extension model (Mosher, 1957). 
Eventually, this led to the experience with plant breeding in maize and wheat, leading to 
the creation of the International Rice Research Institute (IIRR) in the Philippines in 1960 
and the International Center for the Improvement of Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT) in 
Mexico in 1966, the first two centres of what would become the Consultative Group of 
International Agriculture Research Centers or CGIAR (Ruttan, 1989). By 1980, 12 
international agriculture research institutes would be created, including the Lima, Peru-
based International Potato Center (CIP) in 1971. The global ministry of agriculture had 
been complemented by a global agriculture research service. 
 
Entry into Ecuador 
 
In 1956, the UN initiated the Andean Mission in Ecuador – the first international 
development project of its kind in the country (Barsky, 1988). It proposed infrastructure 
development and “campesino integration” with Ecuador society through agricultural 
intensification and market integration in six provinces of the Sierra: Imbabura, Tungurahua, 
Chimborazo, Cañar, Azuay, and Loja. Though individual haciendas had regularly brought 
in technical expertise from Europe and the United States since the late 1800s, the Andean 
Mission represented the formal arrival of the technical expert and the project on the behalf 
of rural communities. Additionally, the Cuban Revolution in 1959 marked a period of 
intensive social and political agitation throughout Latin America among both rural and 
urban poor, especially students and intellectuals. In Ecuador, these international events 
combined with deepening protests and violence in rural areas led to policy discussions over 
agrarian reform, which were high profile and captured public attention. Two years later the 
US arrived with the aforementioned Alliance for Progress program.  
 
In 1961, Ecuador’s military government created the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones 
Agropecuarias (INIAP) for the purpose of “elevat[ing] the productivity of human and natural 
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resources through the generation and adoption of technologies of easy diffusion and 
application…”9 INIAP was charged with two specific objectives: 1) to investigate, develop 
and apply scientific knowledge and technology for the exploitation, utilisation, and 
conservation of the natural resources in the agriculture sector, and 2) to contribute to 
increased production, productivity, and the qualitative improvement of agricultural 
products, through the generation, adaptation, validation, and transfer of technology. In 
1964, the government created the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia (MAG) charged with 
“promot[ing] and diffus[ing] the results of research and experiments produced by INIAP 
and other public and private industries.”10 
 
Initially MAG was provided considerable resources, and its administration and operations 
were centralized in Quito (Barsky and Cosse, 1981). Through the processes of 
“government modernisation,” based on ideals of market liberalisation, the progressive 
privatisation of natural resource ownership, and the elimination of public services, MAG 
was weakened considerably. In the course of time, the Ministry underwent a major 
restructuring to “decentralise” decision-making and operations to the provinces. The Law 
of Agricultural Promotion and Development (1979) and the Law of Agrarian Development 
(1989) shifted MAG from a primary provider of technical services to a more passive role 
organised around the production of capacity-building plans, the “arbitration” of training 
responsibilities, the “coordination” and “normalisation” of the agriculture sector, which 
included the regulation of private property rights, “fair and open competition,” free 
importation of inputs, improved seeds, animals, plants, and machinery, “unfair 
competition” from foreign countries, “administrative skill-building,” and credit for 
agribusinesses.11  
 
Similarly during the 1980s and 1990s government restructuring weakened INIAP. While 
the rhetoric of agricultural research survived, INIAP became the Instituto Nacional Autónomo 
de Investigaciones Agropecuarias, shifting it from a public-run research organization to a 
“decentralised, private entity with a joint social and public mandate with economic, 
administrative, financial, and technical autonomy...” In the process, the semi-private 
Institute gained control over its infrastructure, including four major research stations and 
three sub-stations, and a special public budget for “advancing scientific research, 
generating, validating, and diffusing technology in the agriculture sector.” Despite its new 
status as an autonomous entity, through the 1990s to date salaries and the vast majority of 
INIAP’s operational budget continued to come from public sources, though during that 
period its budget decreased markedly. 
 
Carchi: model of modern agriculture 
 
The national agricultural research institutes in Latin American generally followed the US 
land grant model of technological development, particularly through intensification of 
                                                       
9 Supplement, Official Government Registry Number 315, 16 April 2004. 
10 Reglamento Orgánico Funcional del MAG. During the shift towards oil exploitation in 1970, the military 
government combined the MAG and the Ministry of Industry into the Ministry of Production. In 1973, MAG 
was re-established as an autonomous ministry. 
11 Supplement, Official Government Registry Number 315, 16 April 2004. 
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production through market integration, mechanisation, and the use of agrochemicals (Flora 
and Flora, 1989). Beginning in the mid-1950s, this included the “green revolution,” the 
development and application of genetic technology to alter the growth and productivity of 
crops and animals. This period also saw the institutionalisation of waged labour, including 
paid teams of specialized migrant labour, known as cuadrillas or “squadrons.” Carchi 
expressed these patterns of development more clearly than the rest of Ecuador and, as a 
result, the province has been described as a model of agricultural modernisation.  
 
According to Barsky and Cosse (1981), unique conditions in Latin America interfered with 
externally-led policy and technology development processes in Ecuador. At the Spanish 
arrival, agrarian societies were restructured around the interests of extractive enterprises 
oriented around export markets. Following the 1930s, this arrangement was transformed by 
a new industrial era of order organized around diverse articulations of import substitution. 
These phenomena were accompanied by emergent conflicts and contradictions between 
more recent industrial and earlier agrarian order, sustained by the monopolization of 
resources and control over surpluses of production and the realization of emergent 
industrial social forms as the principal means to wealth accumulation. In practice, these 
conflicts expressed themselves as political in-fighting among divergent interests that 
effectively divided the State between internal social structures and modern industrial 
perspectives, often supported by international politics and industry. This inevitably led to 
structural "incoherencies" that influenced policies and generated political battles, 
antagonism, isolation, and ultimately, disputes for control over the State and its projects. 
While this phenomenon was generally true for the Ecuadorian highlands, Carchi was 
another story. 
 
Rural communities of Northern Ecuador were transformed to what Barsky (1984) 
described a "bimodal system" dominated by two principal actors: large farmers who had 
undergone processes of technification and capitalization, and smallholders, likewise 
transformed by a degree of technification but lacking land or capital resources, who 
achieved only limited accumulation from within this context. Following agrarian reform, 
Carchense agriculture underwent profound technological change that at first fuelled sharp 
increases in potato production and productivity. These developments occurred 
concurrently with the conformation of new State apparatus as a result of the 
problematisation of the agrarian and agricultural concerns and its orientation towards 
modernisation through common patterns of technology development and diffusion. More 
than anywhere else in Ecuador, farmers in Carchi widely accepted the recommendations of 
the emerging network of agricultural experts and support agencies. Within five years of 
agrarian reform, essentially all farmers began to organise their production around 
commercial markets and externally based technology. They adopted mechanized tillage, 
synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, and new potato varieties, as well took on debt.  
 
Agrarian developments in four villages 
 
To understand rural transformations in Carchi since the hacienda period, I conducted in-
depth case studies in three villages: San Pedro de Piartal (Piartal), Santa Martha de Cuba 
(Cuba), and San Francisco de Libertad (La Libertad). Since 1998, these had been the 
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locations of multiple CIP and INIAP studies, including those of the EcoSalud project to be 
discussed in Chapter 5. All three locations had been part of the described economic and 
health research, and self-selected groups of farmers took part in Farmer Field Schools. Due 
to a long history with farmers in these villages, the Carchi Research Team and I were 
provided broad access to individuals and their families that were generous in working with 
us to shed light on the local experience with agrarian reform. In addition, Myriam Paredes 
(in process) and I added a fourth community, Mariscal Sucre (Mariscal), due to its unique 
settlement history and recent involvement in development and conservation activities, 
including the Farmer Field Schools. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Map of case study sites 
 
While farmers generally agreed upon certain dramatic moments of change, as Paredes 
(2001) reminds us, in Carchi there existed substantial variation in how individuals, families, 
and communities responded to emerging events. In her research on both commodity and 
non-commodity circuits, Paredes identified four farming strategies that dominated the 
mediation of modern social fabric in Carchi, with groupings described locally as: riesgosos, 
intermedios, pragmaticos, and jornaleros. These divergent “farming styles” illustrate degrees of 
autonomy, but also the varying effects that commoditized forms may or may not have had 
on particular values and relations, depending on the specificities of local circumstance and 
what became central to providing value to goods and relationships. Diverse family-level 
phenomena are the focus of Paredes (in process). This chapter limits analysis to global 
socio-technical phenomena. 
 
During the period of 2003 to 2004, Paredes and I employed a farmer from each of the four 
communities who implemented weekly registries of agricultural activities throughout the 
potato-growing season. Three of the recorders were FFS graduates with whom we shared a 
long history of interaction. These people had strong knowledge of agroecology and 
especially Integrated Pest Management and were part of broad social networks with people 
both inside and outside the FFS movement. The fourth person was a female leader from 
Mariscal who had worked closely as an extensionist with the Jatun Sacha Foundation, a 
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conservation organization, and more recently with EcoPar, an environmental consulting 
firm.12 She was highly experienced with community forestry and had a broad social 
network of people both inside and outside the conservation activities. The farm registries 
were digitalized into a database (referred to here as “Paredes and Sherwood database, 
2004”). The plots were selected based on two criteria: 1) willingness to participate in weekly 
recording of production activities throughout the growing season and 2) social diversity, as 
per the farming styles determined in the social heterogeneity study of Paredes (2001). To 
assure a robust sample size for standard statistical analysis, we sought at least ten percent of 
the farm household population in each community. In the end, a total of 94 fields from 92 
farmers were documented (at least 10% in each community and over 12% of the overall 
population). Paredes (in process) provides further details on the size and social 
heterogeneity of the sample selection. This database complements the earlier CIP and 
INIAP studies and gives insight into changes since “dollarisation.”13  
 
My mixed role as intervener-researcher in Carchi raised objectivity concerns, posing 
methodological challenges. This included both my ability to dispassionately listen to 
informants and interpret experience as well as to receive unbiased information from others. 
Additionally, over the years I expressed my perspective in publications, public events, and 
the media, and many farmers, public officials, and industry representatives were aware of 
my positions.  As a result, people tended to tell me what they thought I wanted to hear. 
Paredes faced similar challenges. Consequently, it was difficult for her and I to obtain 
objective information during interviews. 
 
To overcome this obstacle, Paredes and I employed a team of four Ecuadorian técnicos – an 
agronomist, forester, economist, and sociologist, who conducted interactive research on 
political history, social developments, farming changes, and market integration across the 
four sites between January 2003 and August 2004. We added additional people when 
research demands were high, for example during planting periods. We trained the team in 
quantitative and qualitative research techniques, as per the demands of specific inquiries. 
Throughout that period we held regular bi-weekly meetings to discuss findings and revise 
on-going studies. The team and I taped and transcribed interviews of individuals and group 
discussions, and we took copious notes during field visits. Unless otherwise stated, the 
quotations reported here are from that material. The research team collected secondary 
data, it conducted interviews with farmers, agrochemical salesmen, industry representatives, 
public officials, and technical specialists, made homes visits, and held meetings with focal 
groups to discuss and review findings. Individual members generated raw data (e.g., notes, 
interview recordings, and surveys) and produced technical reports on topics of particular 
interest (e.g., the arrival of the tractor and agrochemicals or the loss of local potato 
varieties). This material was presented to other team members and discussed as a means of 
further cross-checking findings. The research concluded with a series of workshops both in 
                                                       
12 Jatun Sacha Foundation established and set up the Guandera Reserve in 1991 and had a long history of 
working with Mariscal Sucre on the conservation of the remaining track of forest. EcoPar was a three-year 
IDRC-funded project to address concerns over the sustainable management of biodiversity of the eastern 
Andean flank. Over the years, we had developed close relationships with project leaders from both 
organizations and often shared human and material resources to advance tasks of mutual interests. 
13 Dollarisation was the name commonly given to the Ecuadorian currency conversion from the Sucre to the 
US Dollar in March 2000. I will further discuss this policy and its effects later on in this chapter. 
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and among communities from May to July 2004 to review findings and to synthesize 
conclusions across studies. 
 
I go on to summarize how farmers in each of the four research sites described major 
events of agrarian development following land acquisition. I then examine the evolution of 
technology and social transformations in recent time. 
 
Post hacienda land redistribution and settlement 
 
El Vínculo Hacienda originally extended the length of the eastern Andean ridge from the 
Chota Valley north to present-day Huaca, an area of tens of thousands of hectares. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century it was owned by Ignacio Fernández Salvador. Upon his 
death, the hacienda was divided among family members into three smaller haciendas: Mata 
Redonda, El Salado, and Indujel. By mid-century, the parish of Mariscal Sucre and the 
town of San Pedro de Piartal would emerge from these haciendas. The generally drier and 
less fertile western flank of the Andes contained a larger number of smaller haciendas, 
where wasipungeros generally were mistreated, in part so that the administrators could meet 
profit margins. Relatively violent processes of land reform in the early 1970s of two such 
haciendas – El Quatis and La Rinconada – would lead to the settlement of the towns of 
Santa Martha de Cuba and San Francisco de Libertad. In continuation, I present how 
groups of farmers in each community accounted their general modern history – i.e., since 
obtaining land, becoming active in the market, and ensuing technological and economic 
development. In addition to following this structure, the cases are presented as per the 
particular emphases that emerged during interviews. 
 
Mariscal Sucre: “groundbreaker in colonisation” 
 
The agrarian reform [of the 1960s] did not affect the people of Mariscal because 
there were no [traditional] haciendas in Mariscal when the laws came into effect. – 
elderly farmer from Mariscal Sucre 
 
The village of Mariscal Sucre was a groundbreaker in colonisation. Some thirty years prior 
to land reform, a collection of smallholder farmers purchased the land that would become 
the present-day community. Large landholders of the region did not escape the great 
economic depression of the 1930s. More dependent on foreign exchange than Ecuador, 
Colombia was hardest hit by the Great Depression and suffered relative devaluation of the 
Peso. During this period, numerous Colombians migrated across the border and into 
Carchi in search of land and opportunity. In 1932, Clodomiro Aguilar led 11 farmers from 
the nearby Carchense town of Huaca to purchase 800 hectares of essentially abandoned 
steep forested land through an independent arrangement with the hacienda owner, Ricardo 
Fernández Salvador. This area became the “People's Agricultural Colony of Huaca” and 
later the Parish of Mariscal Sucre. The land was mortgaged to a national bank, and the 
purchasers took over that debt, paying three payments each of 63.11 Sucres (S).14 The 
families distributed land via a lottery system, with lower lying forests designated for 
agriculture.  
                                                       
14 The value of the Sucre in 1932 was Sucres 5.48:1US Dollar. 
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The wasipungeros of El Salado generally liked Ricardo Fernandez Salvador. According to the 
child of one of Mariscal’s founders, “I remember Don Ricardo, who like most from the 
city was a tall man. No, he was extremely tall, but for some reason he could not walk. The 
workers’ children used to volunteer to help him. Two by two, we’d spend a day under Don 
Ricardo’s shoulders, helping him to get about.” In addition to the 800 hectares of land sold, 
Ricardo Fernández Salvador donated 16 hectares at a lower margin of the colony for the 
construction of a town centre, where in 1936, the colonists responded by building a public 
primary school and, in 1940, a church.  
 
The modern town centre of Mariscal Sucre was located about half way up the eastern ridge 
at 2,900 meters above sea level (masl) and had a population of about 2,500 people, who 
were distributed among six neighbourhoods and five smaller settlements. Over 90 percent 
of the town's denizens were Catholic. The chief economic means came from farming the 
potato-pasture system. The parish included the private Guandera Reserve, the largest track 
of remaining inter-Andean mountain forest. Today, the El Salado Hacienda continues to 
cover about 300 hectares and is run by the previous owner’s son, Pedro Fernandez 
Salvador, who was one of the country's largest potato producers and who owned a herd of 
nearly one thousand meat and dairy cattle. 
 
Initial settlement activities centred on “taming” the dense mountain environment. This 
involved felling trees and burning logs for sale as carbón15 in the nearby markets of San 
Gabriel and Tulcán, where it was subsequently redistributed for a profit to larger markets in 
the cities of Ipiales, Colombia and Ibarra and Quito, Ecuador. A dense, wet montane forest 
covered the hillsides. According to an elderly man who helped clear the land, “I remember 
when we arrived and looked up at the inhospitable forest. The first thing we had to do was 
throw the mountain onto the ground. We cut down and burned the trees, and then burned 
them again, before we could actually see the ground. Only then could we think about 
planting.”  
 
"In order to survive, we had to dedicate ourselves to carbón production. There was no other 
means of income. In exchange [for carbón], we paid off our land debt and brought rice from 
Julio Andrade and San Gabriel." 
 
In those days, Mariscal was not connected to the Pan-American Highway, so charcoal had 
to be carried down the mountainside on horseback. Charcoal extraction was an important 
source of income for decades. By the end of the 1960s, however, the forest resource finally 
depleted to the point where charcoal increasingly was no longer a viable means of income 
for all but a small minority of the population.  
 
"The forest ran out by 1970. Each family had its block of forest that ran out, and [as a 
result] had to turn toward something else." Nevertheless, a small number of families 
continue to rely on charcoal production and commonly employ teams of labourers from 
                                                       
15 Carbón or 'charcoal' refers to the partially burnt carbon mass leftover after the oxidation of wood and other 
organic material that people from Carchi commonly used as an energy source for cooking and heating prior to 
the arrival of electricity and natural gas in the 1970s. 
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Colombia to fell the remaining outcroppings of forest hanging stubbornly to the steep 
mountainsides. 
 
The people we interviewed recalled that, previously, the sale of five to six mules (200 
pound loads each) of charcoal would meet a family's financial needs for a year. Following 
deforestation, land slowly became converted to subsistence agriculture. Initially, families 
sold charcoal and purchased grains from the drier region of La Paz. Due to the harsh cold 
and wet climate of the time, cultivated crops were limited to Andean tubers, oca, melloco 
and mashua that were planted among the tree stumps and underbrush with a shovel-like 
tool. Families usually reared guinea pigs in homes, and free ranged a gaggle of chickens. 
Typically, each family reared a pig for consumption during holidays, such as Christmas, 
Holy Week, and the town's patron saint day. As the forest disappeared and the weather 
dried, soils drained to the point where farmers could plant potato, quinoa, maize, fava 
bean, and lupine.  
 
In the 1960s, a wave of new colonists, primarily of Colombian origin, arrived to exploit 
carbón. Many early colonists sold land and migrated to urban centres, especially Ibarra. This 
caused conflict with the founder, Clodomiro Aguilar, who found his leadership challenged. 
In light of the emerging land reform policies, Clodomiro left Mariscal and organized a new 
group of colonists to seize land in nearby Monte Olivo and later Santa Martha de Cuba. 
The town's people built a new and larger Catholic church. At the end of the 1960s, 
Ecuador decided to begin to exploit its oil reserves, of which a portion of profits was 
“planted” or invested in development, which included rural infrastructure development.  
 
In 1970, under a cost-sharing arrangement through mingas (a Kichwa word for communal 
labour), the government financed a potable water project in Mariscal. In 1975, Mariscal 
purchased a small diesel electrical generator that provided electricity to a handful of stores 
and houses located at the community’s centre. That year, a family bought a small black and 
white television, which became very popular. Through mingas and local government 
donations, the town constructed a water drainage and sewage system that connected 
houses in the urban centre. In 1979, the community and the Ministry of Education built a 
public high school. Electricity was installed in the early years of the 1990s. While a single 
telephone line reached the community in 1985, it was not until 1992 that a central network 
was established and individual houses received telephone service. In the mid-1990s, the 
non-governmental organization Jatún Sacha purchased a large section of surviving forest 
and páramo and established the private Guandera Biological Reserve.  
 
Over the years, the Church congregation had been haunted by the theft of a number of 
religious artefacts, beginning in 1950 with the theft of the Rosary Virgin from the parish 
centre of Huaca. In 1980, the Virgin of San Vincent and the Jesus child were stolen from 
the church in Mariscal, which interrupted many traditions, including the “Castle of Fruit” 
that involved the construction of large structures ornately decorated and filled with fruits 
during the town's patron saint day. In the late 1980s, the congregation collected donations 
and commissioned a replica of the Rosary Virgin, but tragically, that statue also disappeared 
in 1993. According to many townsfolk, since that period Mariscal had given in to 
“modernity.” Fireworks replaced the “Castle of Fruit” tradition, and rather than celebrate 
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together during festivals, neighbourhoods began to compete with one another. In reference 
to these developments, one elderly woman declared, "The meaning of faith has changed." 
 
San Pedro de Piartal: “no longer dirty carboneros” 
 
San Pedro, a town lying on the edge of the Parish of Piartal, is situated at about 2,800 masl 
on the eastern flank of the Andes, just south of Mariscal Sucre. The area largely was part of 
the 4,000 hectare Indujel Hacienda, which was a subdivision of the larger El Vínculo 
Hacienda. Indujel chiefly produced potato, wheat, and barley on the lowlands. The area 
that would become San Pedro was part of a forested mountainside, thought too steep and 
dense for agriculture. The rainfall gradient decreases as one travels south along the eastern 
Andean ridge, so while Mariscal received greater amounts of rainfall (about 1,050 vs. 950 
mm/year), Piartal’s climate remained relatively wet throughout the year. 
 
In 1942, the El Salado Hacienda sold 1,200 ha of prime land for S219,00016 to a group of 
45 relatively wealthy individuals from San Gabriel as well as several groups of smallholders 
who bought into the purchase with the help of a state-owned bank.17 Meanwhile, in 1945, 
Luis del Campo Fernandez Salvador took over the Indujel Hacienda and began a slow 
process of modernisation through mechanized tillage, the introduction of agrochemicals, 
improved pastures, and new races of cattle.18 The people we interviewed claimed that 
Indujel workers suffered poor treatment from its Colombian caretaker. According to one 
respondent: 
 
The caretaker marched about with dogs and large juetes, and when workers did not 
hurry up, they whipped them. Sometimes they sicked the dogs and people were 
bitten. That was a time of slavery, [a time of] true poverty. Now people say that we 
are bad off, but they’re wrong. Poverty was in that time because the people, our 
parents, were peasant workers. Children stayed home in the house and cried, 
because there was no one to give them attention or give them food. 
 
The El Salado sale and continued mistreatment raised expectations among the wasipungeros 
of the Indujel Hacienda. Nevertheless, it was not until 1964, under mounting pressure from 
the Agrarian Reform Law, that Luis del Campo relinquished control. An elderly woman 
explained: 
 
Our grand illusion was to own something, to advance, to have a place for your 
children to live and work without having to pay rent. As a consequence, several of 
our leaders met, and a group of people came out of hiding and they met right there 
[pointing] at the land divide. There is where it all began. They told the different 
families to take possession of a selected plot of land. Beneath that tree that you see 
there, my family built a little hut, bringing with us a load of páramo grass [for the 
roof]. They carried my mother and me in a hammock. I had just been born three 
                                                       
16 The value of the Sucre in 1942 was about S.14.20:1USD. 
17 Revista Los Arayanes, No. 5. September 2003. 
18 Revista Los Arayanes, No. 2., September 1996 
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days earlier. Folks told my father that he was crazy, that they were going to kill his 
mujer. 
 
Another woman recalled, "There was a meeting in San Gabriel during which the leaders 
asked us, how are we going to be slaves to the patrones? They said that now there is a law, 
and they proposed that we create a union to reclaim the land that we work for nothing. 
Over 200 people signed an agreement. We set a date and during the night moved together 
and sat on the land." 
 
In 1964, Luis del Campo entitled plots of land as retirement for his most faithful workers, 
and he sold a single concession of land to about 250 ex-wasipungeros who had formally 
organized themselves with state-sponsored financial support and legal representation. 
Eighty percent of the ex-workers were of Colombian origin. As in Mariscal, the colonists 
distributed land among its members through a lottery. The average price was about S100 
per hectare,19 and plots were commonly distributed in lots of ten hectares. Today, the 
Fernandez Salvador family continues to operate the Indujel Hacienda that covers an area of 
about 300 ha. 
 
An elderly man told me that there was a saying in Carchi, "When a child is born, the forest 
shakes in fear." As the most accessible forested areas near Mariscal became depleted, the 
charcoaleros migrated south towards present-day Piartal. In 1946, the road reached San 
Pedro, providing easy access to the forest. This activity heightened following the 
colonization of the Indujel, with carbón sold principally in San Gabriel. Interviewees claimed 
that the activity was not highly regarded and that townsfolk degradingly referred to the 
people from Piartal as the "dirty charcoaleros.”  Between 1970 and 1975, the farmers of 
Piartal actively began to market potatoes in San Gabriel and Ibarra. Nevertheless, bartering 
practices continued until the 1980s, with guinea pig, bread, and potatoes exchanged for 
wheat. While entirely Catholic at the moment of settlement, over the years, Piartal had 
become increasingly divided between Catholic and Evangelical faiths. When we visited in 
2004, about 25 percent of families claimed allegiance to the latter. 
 
Santa Martha de Cuba: “inspired by the Cuban revolution” 
 
Recently, Santa Martha de Cuba changed its name to Cuba. Different from Mariscal and 
Piartal, the remaining communities of Cuba and San Francisco de Libertad were established 
during the agrarian reform period, but through far more conflictive processes of forced 
land acquisition, followed by violence on the part of the hacienda owner and, in the case of 
Cuba, the military. The area of present-day Cuba was part of the Quatis Hacienda owned 
by Army Commander Guerrón. Unlike El Salado, Guerrón did not intensively manage 
Quatis nor did he seek to increase production through the use of modern technology. The 
hacienda was situated at the foot of the western Andean ridge that had been deforested 
long ago. As a result, the land was significantly drier than that of the eastern ridge. 
Additionally, the hacienda was located at lower elevation and on more even terrain than 
that of the other case study sites. In 1970, the workers and volunteers from neighbouring 
                                                       
19 The value of the Sucre in 1964 was about S.18.00:1USD 
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villages seized land that would become present-day Cuba. The village, located at about 
2,800 masl, in 2004 was composed of about 250 households.  
 
When I asked about life on the hacienda, a man responded, “We had to be responsible 
before the patrón; day and night we had to do what the Patron said.” In the late 1960s, the 
Quatis hacienda was in general neglect. The cattle herd was poorly bred and managed, 
pastures were overgrown and underutilized. Infrastructure was in disrepair. Originally, 
Commander Guerrón wanted to independently sell the land to the wasipungeros, but he 
refused after they failed to organize themselves into a viable cooperative and raise sufficient 
funds.  
 
As with Mariscal Sucre in the 1930s, Clodomiro Aguilar played a role in the settlement of 
Cuba forty years later. In 1970, following the leadership of Galo Sierra, an organiser from 
IERAC, Aguilar helped to establish the "Cooperativa La Calera.” That year, nearly 70 
wasipungeros combined with several dozen people (oportunistas or opportunists) from the 
villages of Monte Olivo, Huaca, and San Gabriel invaded a large section of the hacienda. 
Guerrón protested and sent in armed soldiers to throw off the settlers. After bloody 
confrontations and deaths on both sides, the government intervened. The land was 
adjudicated to IERAC and sold to the settlers. As elsewhere, following land acquisition the 
settlers distributed the land among the group under a lottery arrangement. 
  
Many of the initial settlers of Cuba were opportunists. One of the original settlers told me, 
"The first inhabitants sold their land and went to live in Ibarra, San Gabriel, and Huaca. 
This opened the way for other people – campesinos – who had always been there and really 
needed land, to purchase it and begin to earn a living." 
 
The first settlers in Cuba looked to the little remaining forest for immediate income needed 
to pay off the government loan and to plant the new economic crop: potato. According to 
a founding member, "In order to cover the costs of our first potato crops, we let people 
cut down forest. The wood was turned into carbón and sold in Tulcán." By the end of the 
1970s, deforestation and charcoal production opened the way for widespread potato 
production. 
 
Like farmers elsewhere, the people of Cuba quickly learned to use agrochemicals. 
“Mancozeb enabled us to control late blight. Carbofuran enabled us to control the gusano 
blanco [the “white worm” or Andean weevil]. These are no longer problems for real potato 
farmers. The only pest that has been able to take us by surprise is the Guatemalan potato 
moth.” The soils were relatively poor in Cuba, so fertilizers were particularly important. As 
conditions with their government loans, farmers adopted new varieties, fertilizers, and 
pesticides. First, these arrived through the Ministry of Agriculture, and later, they 
purchased them from the new agrochemical stores in nearby San Gabriel. Several farmers 
told us about 4-H volunteers from the US who arrived in the 1970s to teach them how to 
use fertilizers and how to breed animals. The Guatemalan potato moth arrived in the late 
1990s. During dry years, such as 1998, it completely devastated crops. “We did not even 
bother to harvest. We hoped the worms would die of empacho [bloat] in the ground.” 
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In the late 1990s, a handful of farmers began to reorganize production around broccoli 
under contract for export companies such as AgroFrio. Beginning in 2000, purchasers 
started to refuse harvests, usually making questionable claims that the crop did not meet 
quality standards. As a result, farmers sold harvests in Ibarra at a significantly lower price 
than that agreed under contract. Combined with inflation associated with the introduction 
of the dollar, this led to bankruptcy for many. Such losses and unfair treatment became 
public, and farmers increasingly lost interest in contract production with companies. Many 
farmers turned to milk production. “When we see no way out, we stop spending money, 
which means we cannot plant potatoes. Our cows keep us alive. When a farmer sells his 
cows, you know he is no longer alive.” Since dollarisation, many people in Cuba sold off 
their land and animals and migrated to Tulcán, Ibarra, and Quito.  
 
San Francisco de Libertad:” freed from slavery” 
 
Previously known as Aliso, in 1696, the settlement of the modern-day Parish of La 
Libertad included about 40 indigenous families (Miño, 1985). By that time, the Spanish 
controlled all the land. The community of San Francisco is a caserio (or neighbourhood) of 
La Libertad, which is located a few kilometres above the town of El Angel, the county seat 
of Espejo. San Francisco de Libertad is situated in the uppermost reaches of the páramo of 
the western Andean ridge between 2,900-3,600 masl. The zone is wet (1,100 m/yr of 
rainfall) and cold (average yearly temperature of 10 °C). Similar to elsewhere in highland 
Carchi, the soils are deep, black Andean formed on top of cangahua (cemented volcanic ash) 
subsoil. 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, a handful of haciendas essentially covered the 
cultivable regions of La Libertad and El Angel (Miño, 1985). Two of these controlled the 
vast majority of area: La Rinconadita and La Riconada. The European textile crisis at the 
end of the eighteenth century greatly weakened these haciendas, which were largely 
dependent on the international wool market. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
traditional families dating back to the Spanish arrival would lose control over these 
haciendas, and they would be bought out by new business people who earned their wealth 
in nearby cities and through controlling transport of the growing trade between Ecuador 
and Colombia at the end of the nineteenth century.  
 
In a business venture with Rafael Tamayo, Francisco Galárraga, an aggressive salesman 
who owned mule teams that ran products between Ecuador and Colombia, purchased the 
Rinconadita Hacienda from Emilia Fierro in 1893 that was valued at about S13,000 (Miño, 
1985). Six years later, in 1899, the same group purchased the Rinconada, the second largest 
hacienda in Carchi (after the Vínculo in San Gabriel) for about 50,000 Sucres. The value of 
these haciendas in Espejo skyrocketed during the early part of the twentieth century, in 
large part due to the growing traffic of commercial goods between Ecuador and Colombia 
but also do to their expansion. Both of these haciendas increased their territory during the 
early 1900s through buying out traditional hacendados and claiming unused regions of 
páramo. Expansion enabled them to increase earnings through renting land to other 
hacendados as well as charging wasipungeros for crossing rights (i.e., the privilege of travelling 
through the hacienda), wood, water, as well as land for planting crops and foraging animals. 
   Learning from Carchi  88 
By 1920, the Riconadita land was valued at S50,000 and the cattle S15,756.20 At this time, 
the Rinconada Hacienda was valued at S175,000 and carried 3,500 head of cattle valued at 
S63,552. The Tamayo brothers were known as progressive hacendados and early adopters of 
new technology. They were the first to import Holstein from France, which subsequently 
were crossed with cattle from neighbouring haciendas. 
 
In 1945, the Cooperativa de Crédito, Producción y Consumo “Eugenio Espejo” and the Junta 
Central de Asistencia Pública managed to obtain a land access and production contract with 
the nearby Pucará Hacienda. The following year, landless members of the cooperative and 
from surrounding areas occupied the hacienda, which led to an open conflict with the 
hacendado and contributed to similar uprisings in other parts of the highlands. A decade 
later, in 1956, President Ponce Enríquez initiated a process of land distribution of the 
Pucará Hacienda, which some would describe as a predecessor of the 1964 Law of 
Agrarian Reform (Barsky, 1984). 
 
When I consulted people of La Libertad about their history of land settlement, the first 
response was: “There was no liberty during the haciendas. We had to work all the time, 
even when we were sick.” Nearly everyone worked in the Riconadita Hacienda. The peones 
(peasants or wasipungos) lived on the hacienda and were given access to land and in-kind 
payment through harvests. Ganadores were landless people who lived off of the hacienda 
and worked in exchange for pay. In 1970, the pay for adult male labourers was two reales 
per day. Women and children were expected to work for free. The children threshed and 
washed wheat and barley. Older people dug and maintained irrigation ditches. Women 
cooked for the mingas and milked cows. The wasipungeros received a yearly ration of food as 
payment for labour. For example, in the 1970s, they received seven quintales (one hundred 
pound sacks) of wheat, seven quintales of barley and two quintales of fava bean. The value of 
this food was discounted from their salaries. 
 
In the late 1960s, a company arrived in La Libertad to exploit the wild plants pyrethrum 
and guanto for the production of botanical soaps, medicines and pesticides. Milton Vaca, 
from the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (FENOC), led the creation of the 
“1° de Mayo” syndicate. When the company went bankrupt and closed down in 1972, Vaca 
reorganized it into the “Asociación 23 de Julio” that quickly grew to about 180 farmers, made 
up of wasipungeros, local landless, and migrants from Colombia. In late 1972, the Association 
invaded hacienda land in and around La Libertad. This led to violent repression that 
resulted in multiple deaths and the imprisonment of its leaders. The government, in 
particular IERAC, stepped in to mediate. Due to the political environment at the time, the 
hacendados were worried about further land invasions, so they decided to sell land, especially 
the less fertile degraded areas as well as the páramo. In 1975, the Association became 
legalised as a cooperative, and the land sale went through. By 1977, the government 
awarded the cooperative legal control over the land title. At that point, the Cooperative 
decided to divide up the property among its members through a lottery. Due to 
refinancing, the members did not pay off the original debt until 1999. 
 
                                                       
20 The value of the Sucre in 1920 was about S2.54:USD. 
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The wasipungeros and labourers from La Libertad generally were poorer just prior to land 
reform than those from the other case study sites. During the hacienda period, they lived 
isolated on the hillsides of the hacienda. Native forests and bush lands surrounded their 
communities, and water springs were ubiquitous. Nevertheless, the wasipungeros did not 
have rights to land, trees, or water. It was prohibited to pass through haciendas without 
paying a fee, which meant one had to walk around extensive areas – often thousands of 
acres, thereby greatly inhibiting circulation. During the 1950s and 1960s, the population 
grew and exceeded employment opportunities on the haciendas. People began to migrate 
in search of work. Up through the mid-1970s, houses continued to be made of traditional 
bahareque (dried mud and grass), and people slept on animal hides on the floor. Most people 
walked barefoot, but many men wore alpargatas (sandals made of rope) followed by quelales 
(sandals with rubber soles). 
 
Following the break-up of the haciendas, the people of La Libertad began to work their 
own land. Relatively isolated from Colombia by the páramo, people tended to employ local 
labour through families or landless labourers living in and around El Angel and La 
Libertad. Sharecropping was even more common than in the other case study sites, with 
one partner contributing the land and the other labour and inputs. 
 
When I asked what was traditionally grown, an elderly farmer responded, “On the 
wasipungo, we grew more or less the same crops as the hacienda: favabean, wheat, barley, 
potatoes, melloco, and oca. We planted potato in small plots using wachu rozado. Only the 
hacienda had a tractor. We kept our own varieties, some of which were purple and black 
and not liked by the mayordomo. We ate everything we grew, so we did not care.”  
 
The haciendas became modernised prior to land reform. The Riconadita used tractors, 
fertilisers, and pesticides. The haciendas also introduced the back-pack sprayer. With 
market integration, the emergent class of smallholder farmers began to earn money, which 
they invested in fertilizers to improve production. MAG introduced the compound 
fertilisers 10-30-10, 8-20-20, and 15-15-15 as well as a number of pesticides. Manzate (a 
mancozeb-based product) was the first fungicide to appear and was used for late blight in 
potato. The first insecticides to arrive were DDT and parathion, which were used for 
everything – from treating tubers to foliar pests to controlling lice on chickens and 
children. The insecticide Monitor (methamidophos) followed. People were unanimous that 
the 1970s brought prosperity to La Libertad. “Life was sad and hard. Later, people began 
to live well, now that they have opportunities.” 
 
In 1980, a road was built that linked San Francisco to La Libertad and El Angel, which 
provided access to the city of Ibarra. During the 1980s people stopped growing barley in 
response to low prices. Similarly, farmers stopped cultivating lupine and fava bean. Families 
managed a similar crop rotation: two years of consecutive potato followed by five years of 
pasture as a fallow. Sometimes farmers would grow three cycles of potato or they would 
shorten fallow periods, but the Andean weevil populations would become so bad that not 
even carbofuran would control it. As a result of a shift from farming for community 
consumption to supplying markets in Ibarra and Quito that demanded Superchola, in 1993, 
the community lost the local potato variety Morasurco. 
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By the mid-1990s, potato production began to fail. This situation was particularly 
problematic in La Libertad where the altitude and cold weather made potato the only viable 
alternative. One farmer explained, “The soils became tired, and we no longer could 
produce as before. Earlier, we would get 30:1. Now, we are lucky to get 10:1.”21 The 1996 
El Niño brought two seasons of drought, followed by heavy rains in the North and 
multiple years of late blight problems and low market prices due to high production 
elsewhere and imports from Colombia and Peru. People increasingly turned to milk 
production, but the prices were not sufficiently high to cover living costs. With 
dollarisation, input prices doubled and tripled, fuelling a financial crisis and forcing many to 
sell their animals and land to pay off debts. As a result, many people became jornaleros for 
the larger landowners or they migrated to cities – commonly Ibarra or Quito – in search of 
menial labour. Often, children who had left for the city to study did not return to their 
villages. Following graduation, they commonly sought urban-based work and sent home 
remittances for their families. In numerous cases, young people who did not find 
opportunity joined the guerrillas (revolutionary groups) in Colombia. Dollarisation left the 
community of La Libertad in shambles. 
 
Summary of the four case study sites 
 
Each of the four case study sites was unique in geographical setting and history (Table 4.1). 
The founders of Mariscal Sucre and San Pedro de Piartal were pioneers of land reform, 
organising to peacefully purchase land from haciendas in the 1930s and 1940s, respectively. 
Those from Mariscal generally had been treated well under the hacienda system, while 
those from Piartal had received cruel treatment. Both communities were located on the 
steep eastern flank of the inter-Andean valley, with relatively fertile hillsides of deep black 
Andean soils, ample sources of water and large areas of native highland forests. From the 
beginning, their goal was individual land acquisition. The groups converted trees to 
charcoal to pay off land and transition to family agriculture as a means of livelihoods. 
Initially, each community developed relatively diverse cropping systems based on rotations 
of Andean roots and tubers with grains and pulses, which over time became converted to 
the intensive potato-pasture system.  
 
The founders of Santa Martha de Cuba and San Francisco de Libertad were primarily 
hacienda workers who suffered cruel treatment and gained access to land through relatively 
violent means during the period of agrarian reform in the early 1970s. These communities 
were situated on the western flank of the inter-Andean valley, a region that was relatively 
dry and degraded at the time of purchase, especially the area of Cuba. Nevertheless, San 
Francisco was located high in the páramo. While the conditions there were cold and moist, 
the farmers of San Francisco benefited from ample soil and water resources. As per the 
agrarian policies of the time, both groups were obligated to obtain land through communal 
arrangement, and upon land acquisition, they were handed loans in the form of seed and 
agrochemicals. As a result, the groups immediately converted land to potato production 
                                                       
21 The ratio refers to potatoes harvested to potatoes planted. Since farmers plant about 30 quintals per hectare, 
30:1 signifies about 900,000 lbs of potatoes at harvest or 41 t/ha. By 2000, farmers regularly harvested 10:1 or 
14 t/ha. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of case study sites 
 
Characteristic Mariscal Sucre San Pedro de 
Piartal 
Santa Martha de 
Cuba 
San Francisco de 
Libertad 
Descriptive motto Groundbreaker of 
land reform 
No longer “dirty 
charcoaleros” 
Inspired by the 
Cuban Revolution 
“Freed from 
slavery” 
Geographical 
aspect and 
characteristics at 
acquisition 
Eastern flank, 
2,800-3,400 m, 
sloped to steep 
terrain; heavily 
forested 
Eastern flank, 
2,900-3,400 m; 
sloped to steep 
terrain; heavily 
forested 
Western flank, 
2,800-3,200 m; flat 
to sloping terrain; 
deforested 
Western flank, 
2,900-3,600 m; 
sloped to steep 
terrain; montaine 
environs 
Natural resource 
base (soil, water 
and forests) 
High Medium Low High 
Climate (avg. 
rainfall and 
temp.)* 
1,050 mm/yr 
11.5 °C 
950 mm/yr 
11.5 °C 
800 mm/yr 
12.5 °C 
1,200 mm/yr 
10 °C 
Hacienda origin 
and relationship 
Originally El 
Vínculo and then 
El Salado; 
eventually modern 
hacienda; good 
relations. 
Originally El 
Vínculo and then 
El Salado, Indujel; 
modern hacienda; 
workers suffered 
harsh treatment. 
El Quatis, 
traditional and 
poorly managed 
hacienda by 
absentee Patrón; 
workers suffered 
harsh treatment. 
La Riconadita and 
Rinconada; 
modern haciendas; 
workers suffered 
harsh treatment. 
Land acquisition 
and distribution 
1932, 11 families 
from Huaca and 
organized by local 
leader; peacefully 
purchase 800 ha 
through assuming 
hacienda debt; land 
distributed by 
lottery. 
• 1942, 45 outsiders 
peacefully 
purchased land 
from El Salado 
• 1960, 250 
additional workers 
purchase land from 
Indujel under land 
reform; later lottery 
distribution. 
1971, inspired by 
Cuban revolution, 
103 workers and 
others organized by 
outsider; aggressive 
seizure and 
purchase of land; 
communal 
management; later, 
lottery distribution 
(1975). 
1972, 180 workers 
organized and 
aggressively seized 
land; managed 
communally; later 
lottery 
distribution; 80 
families sold land 
entitlements 
(1975). 
Economic 
development 
Charcoal 
exploitation (1930s-
1960s); slow 
conversion to 
potato-pasture 
(1960-today) 
 
Charcoal 
exploitation; large 
scale (’45-80); slow 
conversion to 
potato production 
(‘70-75) 
Immediate 
conversion to 
potato production 
and rapid 
technification 
(1975) 
Subsistence 
production; 
landless labourers; 
conversion to 
potato and grain 
production 
following land 
settlement 
Principal markets San Gabriel and 
Tulcán 
San Gabriel and 
Ibarra 
San Gabriel and 
Tulcán 
El Angel, Ibarra 
and San Gabriel 
Population (2003) 200 households 120 households 250 households 180 households 
Cropping 
development 
(from traditional 
to market 
integration) 
From Andean roots 
and tubers, pulses 
and quinoa to 
potato, pasture for 
market 
From Andean roots 
and tubers, lupine, 
maize, and quinoa 
to potato, pasture 
From pasture to 
potato-pasture 
From Andean 
roots and tubers, 
pulses, maize and 
quinoa to potato, 
pasture and grains 
* INAMHI data 
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to generate income for the banks. Upon paying off debts, both quickly distributed land by 
lottery for individual ownership. In Cuba, about half of the founders sold their land 
entitlements and moved to urban areas. In Cuba, farmers had little option but to continue 
to rely on the potato-pasture system for livelihoods. Meanwhile, those in San Francisco 
also cultivated Andean grains and pulses. Overtime, however, the communities of Cuba 
and San Francisco – not unlike Mariscal and Piartal – came to concentrate on 
intensification of potato production as their chief economic means of livelihood. 
 
Post hacienda land distribution and settlement was accompanied by different social trends 
in communities. The people of Mariscal – the “groundbreaker of land reform” – invested 
heavily in developing the community’s infrastructure, including a cobblestone road, central 
park, potable water and electricity, church and public garden. On the opposite extreme was 
Cuba, which despite its location near the valley floor and closeness to the Pan-American 
Highway, at the turn of the twenty-first century still had dirt roads that became impassable 
during the rainy season, no central park, and less than adequate public services. While older 
people spoke nostalgically about land acquisition, youth generally did not have a clear 
understanding of histories. Despite substantially different histories, all locations talked 
about a common global trend. Land acquisition led to periods of opportunity and 
prosperity, when sadness and hardship became replaced by opportunity in the form of 
work and accumulation. 
 
Nevertheless, this prosperity did not last. In recent time, communities experienced resource 
degradation (e.g., the “tiring” of soils and the “drying up” of streams), growing pest 
problems, rising input costs, price declines for their products, and new hardship. Different 
forms of social “decay” and “disintegration” accompanied this. When talking about recent 
trends, people mentioned: loss of community solidarity, conflicts over faith, abandonment 
of agriculture, sale of land, and emigration to urban centres. At all locations, people 
described unimaginable hopes and dreams associated with land acquisition during the 
second half of the twentieth century, followed by disappointment and concern for the 
future at the turn of the century. 
 
Agricultural transformations and the performance of modernisation 
 
To understand modern technical change in Carchi, I focused on the use of technology in 
potato production since land reform to provide an overview of major trends in cropping 
systems, varieties, pesticides, fertilisers, and tillage. I also examined economic performance 
of modern potato production. Information was gathered from secondary sources 
(MAG/INEC Agriculture Census of 2004, INIAP UVTT-Carchi, Crissman et al., 1998; 
Yanggen et al., 2003; Herrera et al., 1999; Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002), surveys 
conducted by Paredes and Sherwood during the 2003-2004 cropping season, as well as 
semi-structured interviews. The 2003-2004 research team subsequently held focal group 
sessions with the 92 database participants from La Libertad (n=16), Piartal (n=34), Cuba 
(n=19), and Mariscal (n=25) to review, validate, and adjust global trends. Results from this 
research activity are subsequently cited as “Carchi Research Team, 2004.” 
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Cropping systems 
 
The hacienda and wasipungos of Carchi typically cultivated small plots of mixed crops 
containing Andean roots and tubers, fava bean, maize, quinoa, barley, and wheat. As 
wasipungeros moved onto their own land they carried with them seeds from the hacienda and 
began to plant around houses as well as freshly deforested areas. The research team found 
that in Mariscal, where farmers arrived some thirty-five years prior to commercial market 
integration, patterned cropping systems emerged that resembled traditional multi-cropping 
and rotations known elsewhere in the páramo Andes (Pumisacho and Sherwood, 2002). 
 
In the 1950s, the town people of Mariscal introduced meat cattle from the El Salado 
hacienda to feed on outcroppings in cleared forest and areas under fallow. By the end of 
the decade, farmers reared about 100 head of cattle. They managed soil fertility empirically 
through multi-cropping and rotations with legumes, followed by recuperative periods of 
five to eight years. Guinea pig and cattle manure were applied to crops at planting. 
Sometimes farmers prepared botanical pesticides based on species such as jun-jun (Pispura 
spp.) for control of insect pests. Mixtures were carried in buckets and applied by hand. 
Nearby Piartal followed similar patterns, while the settlers of Cuba and La Libertad 
essentially arrived in the fervour of agricultural modernisation and as a result, immediately 
adopted industrialised production. 
 
In the 1970s, potato became the first commercial crop of the agrarian reform beneficiaries 
throughout the four locations. By the end of the decade, potato monocultures quickly 
dominated the landscape. Agrochemical use expanded year by year through the end of the 
1990s, when farmers began to leave land to pasture for dual milk-meat cattle due to the 
combined forces of production declines, climbing input prices, and falling market prices 
for potato. While pesticides generally enabled farmers to compensate for the intensification 
of potato production, the mid-1990s arrival of the Guatemalan tuber moth (Tecia solanivora) 
in an infested batch of seed from Colombia decimated potato production in Cuba, which 
led to a wide-scale abandonment of the crop.22  
 
Between the mid-1970s and the end of the 1990s, the total area of Carchi dedicated to 
potato production increased from about 3,000 to 16,000 hectares.23 This was followed by a 
sharp decline beginning in 1999, largely explained by increased input costs associated with 
dollarisation (An, 2004). The drastic decline in Cuba also was associated with three years of 
severe droughts that began with the El Niño in 1996 accompanied by the arrival and 
proliferation of the Guatemalan potato moth. The most recent 2004 census showed that 
only 6,179 hectares in Carchi were planted under potato. Since 1996, area planted to potato 
in the four research sites decreased dramatically, by about 60 percent (Figure 4.2). Only in 
La Libertad did farmers continue to maintain previous patterns of potato production, 
largely because of the town’s altitude and climate that greatly limited alternatives. 
 
The research team found that by 2004, farmers began to invest in improved pastures, for 
example through the introduction of rye grass mixtures as well as legumes, especially exotic 
                                                       
22 Personal communication with Fernando Chamorro, INIAP-UVTT Carchi. December, 2001. 
23 INEC Census, 2004. 
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clovers. Families increasingly lived off of milk production that was sold for between $0.09 
to $0.11 per litre (in 2007, the government increased this to $0.25/lt) to local distributors 
and processing factories, as well as the sale of beef cattle. Nevertheless, An (2004) found 
that dairy production was not an economic substitute for potato but rather a complement. 
In 2004, we found that many farmers had explored economic alternatives, such as fava 
bean, snow peas, and broccoli, but over time, these crops proved vulnerable to the extreme 
conditions of the northern highlands. As a result, crop failures became common, and 
increasingly, income from agriculture did not meet basic needs. 
 
Figure 4.2 Average cultivated area under potato production (based on INEC data 
processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
Potato varieties 
 
Prior to agrarian reform, a large number of potato varieties were grown on the hacienda 
and on small plots in the wasipungos primarily for local purposes. Commonly, farmers on the 
wasipungo cultivated dozens of potato varieties, including numerous chauchas (or heirloom 
varieties) for household consumption. In the 1960s, the most popular potato was 
Curipamba, which represented about 40 percent of potatoes planted in Piartal and 20 
percent in La Libertad and Cuba. Meanwhile, Chola was the most popular cultivar in 
Mariscal and represented about 30 percent of all potatoes grown. Some of these potatoes 
were traded with haciendas for sale in distant markets, but most of the potato crop was for 
subsistence consumption. As a result, local cultural preferences weighed heavily in cultivar 
selection. Farmers concerned themselves with conserving the favourite local varieties, 
among which were: Morasurco, Pintona, Ratona, Chala, Curiquinga, Sarda, Corneta, 
Aguacata, Morada, Morcilla, Manzana, Pan de azúcar, Pestañaroja, Papapiedra, Cuya, and 
Churo. At the time of our arrival thirty years later, few if any of these potatoes could be 
found in the communities. Of the 94 farmers surveyed from the four research sites during 
the 2003-2004 season, we found an average of 1.30 cultivars in their fields, with a 
maximum diversity limited to 3.0 (Paredes and Sherwood database, 2004). 
 
The research team found that since market integration in the 1970s the number of varieties 
commonly grown in fields, including both commercial and heirloom cultivars, sharply 
decreased (Figure 4.3). As farmers began to produce for the markets in San Gabriel,  
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Tulcán, Ibarra, and Quito, commercial varieties from Colombia arrived to supplant the 
local cultivars.24 By the end of the 1970s the most popular potatoes were Ica-Huila (from 
Colombia), Curipamba, Chola, Guantiva, Violeta, Uva, and Martina. A decade later, a 
handful of highly commercial potatoes, particularly Chola, Superchola and Gabriela, 
dominated the landscape to the point where they represented over half of all potatoes 
planted (Figure 4.4).25 During the 1990s Chola and Superchola came to represent about 70 
percent of all potatoes grown in Mariscal, 60 percent in Cuba and 50 percent in Piartal, 
while only ten percent in La Libertad. By 2004 the percentage increased to about 90 
percent in Piartal, 80 percent in Mariscal and Cuba, and 60 percent in La Libertad.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Average number of potato varieties found in fields (those covering > 5% of 
total area reported) (data generated through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 
2004) 
 
The transition from the subsistence wasipungo system to landed smallholders who produced 
a cash crop for the market generated a loss of potato varieties. Farmers explained that this 
was due to market demand. Over time, they shifted to the variety that received the highest 
prices at the market. The popularity of varieties was determined by preferences in distant 
cities, independent of local environmental or cultural considerations. While Chola and 
                                                       
24 It is technically illegal to import potato from Colombia for phytosanitary reasons, but in practice a vibrant 
trade exists. 
25 Ecuadorian consumers regularly confuse the varieties Chola and Superchola, both of which have similar red 
skin colour, off-coloured dimpled eyes, yellow flesh, large size, and oblong shape. As a result, the two 
commonly demand the same price in national markets. For the purpose of this study, I refer to Chola and 
Superchola as the same variety, unless otherwise stated. Technically, this is incorrect, but it is convenient for 
compensating for the inherent imprecision of historical analysis. In Pumisacho and Sherwood (2002), 
Superchola is correctly described as a cross between Curibamba Negra, Solanum demissum, and Chola. Curiously, 
Superchola, Ecuador’s most popular potato, was not developed by the National Potato Program. Instead, an 
eccentric Carchense, Germán Bastidas, developed numerous potato varieties as well as breeds of meat and dairy 
cattle. 
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Superchola were difficult to grow and demanded heavy use of remedios (“remedies,” a 
common metaphor for pesticides), these crops offered farmers the highest price at the time 
of harvest. 
 
A number of factors governed market preference. Recently French fries and chips 
represented the principal increase in the potato market – from about five to ten percent of 
the national market (Herrera et al., 1999). The industrialisation of potato required varieties 
bred for consistent colour following frying, high dry matter content, and reduction sugars. 
In addition, the market for raw potatoes sold directly to household consumers was very 
resilient to change and tended to favour one or two varieties. The domestic market greatly 
preferred Chola and Superchola, which attracted a price commonly twice as high as that for 
any other potato. Urban consumers rarely recognized the variety they purchased. Instead, 
they simply choose a potato with a certain “look.” Thus, a newly introduced cultivar, in 
order to be commercially successful, needed to be similar in appearance to Chola or 
Superchola. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Average area planted under the three principal potato varieties (CIP and INIAP 
data processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
The predominance of one or two market-ready varieties meant that farmers faced 
increasingly similar problems, and they had little to no local genetic recourse for addressing 
them. In Carchi, selectively bred varieties developed by local breeders or the national 
agricultural research service (INIAP) accounted for over 80 percent of the potato 
population found in fields. New varieties generally were crossed with genetic stock from 
previously popular varieties (usually to ensure market acceptability), thus further limiting 
actual diversity in the agro-ecosystem. For example, the newly introduced Superchola was 
genetically very similar to the Chola variety that it replaced. Unfortunately for growers, 
Superchola was a slow maturing potato that had become highly susceptible to late blight 
and insect pests. As a result, it required six to seven months of time in the field (depending 
on elevation and temperature) and weekly fungicide applications.  
 
Only 50 years ago, dozens of potato varieties were consistently grown with no use of 
fungicides while today even the most resistant Chauchas need multiple applications. 
Although INIAP and CIP maintain extensive in vitro collections in their research stations, 
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as field-level genetic diversity has been lost, it has become increasingly difficult for plant 
breeders to manage and use those collections in a manner that would benefit the long-term 
healthy development of potato varieties under locally changing conditions. Over the long 
run, if local in vivo genetic banks are not developed and maintained, breeders no longer 
would have the basic knowledge and prime materials to continue to develop resistant or 
high yielding varieties. The loss of biological diversity undermines human nutrition and 
food security (Toledo and Burlingame, 2006). From a sustainable agriculture perspective, 
the capacity to adapt to changes depends on the variability present in the farming system 
(Qualset and Shands, 2005). The loss of genetic variability brought by market-driven 
mono-cropping increased the vulnerability of potato crops, thus placing into risk the well-
being farmers and their communities. 
 
Soil management 
 
Cropping intensification associated with market-oriented production further affected soil 
fertility. Agricultural modernisation emphasized the potato as the chief economic crop that 
displaced other, less marketable crops. The arrival of chemical fertilizers in the 1950s 
allowed farmers to intensify agriculture through closer planting distances (i.e., space) and 
shortened fallow periods (time). Essentially all potato farmers in Carchi use chemical 
fertilizers (Crissman et al., 1998; Yanggen et al., 2003). The compound fertilizer 18-46-0 
(18% nitrogen (N), 46% phosphorus (P), and 0% Potassium (K)), which responded to a 
phosphorous tie-up characteristic of black Andean soils, by far became the most common 
fertiliser applied. As a result, I focused on the use of 18-46-0 since the 1970s as a proxy 
indicator for soil fertility. 
 
The research team learned that 18-46-0 first arrived to the haciendas at the end of the 
1950s. The first batches were German-based products. These were quickly replaced by 
Colombian brands in the 1960s. Cheaper, though of lesser quality, Ecuadorian products 
became available in the late 1980s. Prices dropped from about $1.31/kg in 1980s to 
$0.17/kg in 1990. Following dollarisation, the price increased to about $0.38 kg in 2000. 
Farmers described a marked drop in soil fertility over time, causing them to increase 
fertilisation applications (Figure 4.5). In 2004, farmers told the research team that they 
applied “one-to-one” or “two-to-one,” which represented the ratio of the weight of 18-46-
0 applied to potato seed planted (Table 4.2). More precise field data showed that in 2004, 
farmers in the four communities applied an average of 152 kg/ha of N, 359 kg/ha of P, 
and 161 kg/ha of K (Paredes and Sherwood database, 2004), which was about ten percent 
more fertiliser per area than Crissman et al. (1998) reported for the period 1990-1992. 
Usually they used split dressings, with about half applied at planting and the remainder 
applied at the moment of the first aporque or hilling-up of the potato crop. 
 
During a meeting with people in Mariscal Sucre, the research team was told, “Before we 
produced 30 or 40 to one. Today, we are lucky to get ten to one. As a result of the overuse 
of chemicals, our land has become degraded and lost its fertility.” Despite increased use of 
fertilisers, farmers complained that the potato crop no longer responded as previously. 
Subsequently, CIP and INIAP researchers involved with the EcoSuelos project confirmed 
what modern potato farmers had discovered on their own: continual potato production 
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tied with the heavy use of fertilizers and pesticides in Carchi contributed to chemical and 
biological exhaustion of soils and long-term production declines.26 As summarised in 
Chapter 2, EcoSuelos discarded pathogenic nematodes (Globodera or Meloidogyne spp.) as a 
cause of soil fatigue, most likely due to the high rates of carbofuran use. The researchers 
found that modern potato cultivation caused a number of indicator soilborne fungal 
pathogens, such as Rhioctonia and Fusariums spp., to proliferate in the system. Additionally, it 
appeared to have a harmful affect on beneficial organisms, especially entomopathogens 
(useful for keeping down Andean weevil populations) and mycorrhizae (critical for P 
uptake in potato). Nevertheless, funding for the EcoSuelos project ended before the 
researchers could reach more conclusive results on the biological sustainability of soil 
management. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Average application rates of 18-46-0 fertiliser (kg/ha) (based on CIP-INIAP 
data processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
Table 4.2 Average fertilizer applications during the 2003-2004 planting season (Paredes 
and Sherwood database, 2004) 
 
 
Fertiliser 
La Libertad 
(n=16) 
Piartal 
(n=34) 
Cuba 
(n=19) 
Mariscal 
(n=25) 
Mean Std 
dev. 
Nitrogen (N) (kg/h) 134.16 156.16 144.21 161.39 151.39 60.19 
Phosphorus (P) (kg/h) 302.79 338.46 350.74 386.62 347.68 133.55 
Potassium (K) (kg/h) 90.48 145.13 201.56 196.88 161.00 79.71 
 
Insect and disease pests 
 
In all four communities, the research team found that the number of pesticide applications 
had increased since the 1980s, despite a 250 percent increase in potato input costs since 
dollarisation (An, 2004). Research that took place between 1990-1992 showed that Carchi 
farmers applied pesticides to their potato fields an average of seven times during a cropping 
season, with three pesticide products in each application (Crissman et al., 1994). In 1997, 
                                                       
26 Personal communication with Pedro Oyarzun, soil scientists formerly at CIP and INIAP. Also see the final 
report of the MAG/PROMSA supported project IQ-CV-049: “EcoSuelos: investigación para un manejo más 
productivo y sostenible de suelos andinos en la ecoregión centro-norte del Ecuador.” 
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Barrera et al. (1999) also found that farmers applied seven times, with a maximum of 15. 
Both studies found farmers who mixed up to seven products in each application. During 
the 2003-2004 planting season the farmers of Mariscal Sucre employed an average of 10.6 
applications of pesticides per season, followed by Cuba (7.0), Piartal (6.76), and La Libertad 
(4.0), for an overall average of 7.36 applications (Table 4.3). Since 1990, the Central Bank 
of Ecuador reports that the global sale of pesticides in Ecuador increased from about $37 
million to $100 million, even though area cultivated in the country did not increase 
significantly during that period. When I asked the farmers why pesticide use was increasing, 
the group laughed and told me what had become a major feature of modern agriculture: 
pest problems get worse; they don’t get better.  
 
To understand historical pest dynamics, I focused on the employment of the three most 
common pesticides as reported in Crissman et al. (1998) and Yanggen et al. (2003): 
mancozeb (dithiocarbamate family of fungicides used for late blight; these represented 80% 
by weight of active ingredient of all fungicides applied), carbofuran (carbamate-based 
insecticides used for the Andean weevil and 47% of all insecticides applied), and 
methamidaphos (organophosphate-based insecticides used for foliar insects and 43% of all 
insecticides applied). During interviews and workshops in communities, our research team 
referred to common product names to facilitate conversations on historic application 
patterns. 
 
Table 4.3 Average pesticide applications and contents during the 2003-2004 season 
(Paredes and Sherwood database, 2004) 
 
 
Pesticide 
La Libertad 
(n=16) 
Piartal 
(n=34) 
Cuba 
(n=19) 
Mariscal 
(n=25) 
Mean Std dev. 
Applications 4.0 6.76 7.0 10.6 7.36 2.92 
Dithiocarbamate 
fungicidesa  (kg/ha) 
6.47 15.20 14.46 18.69 14.49 7.34 
Organophosphate 
insecticidesb  (l/ha) 
0.72 0.87 2.32 1.94 1.42 1.25 
Carbamate insecticidesc  
(l/ha) 
1.09 1.38 1.82 1.90 1.56 1.55 
a. largely mancozeb-based formulations 
b. largely methamidophos-based formulations 
c. largely carbofuran-based formulations 
 
The research team found that mancozeb use had steadily increased since the early 1970s 
(Figure 4.6). Mancozeb was most frequently applied in the wetter climates of Mariscal and 
Piartal. In Mariscal, farmers increased applications from about 12 in 1970 to 14 in 2004. In 
Piartal farmers had increased from seven to 12. Farmers in La Libertad tended to use fewer 
pesticide applications overall. Paredes (in process) found that this was largely explained by 
their reliance on family labour. Nevertheless, in La Libertad average use of mancozeb rose 
from about four applications per season in the 1970s to ten in 2004. Similarly, in Cuba, 
mancozeb applications rose through the mid-1990s but decreased sharply after 1996, as a 
result of a shift towards a drier climate. In response to this trend, farmers explained that 
they not only increased the number of applications but also the quantity of product used 
(the application rate) from about one to two kg/ha (the recommended rate was 0.7 kg/100 
   Learning from Carchi  100 
litres of water or 1.4 to 2.0 kg/ha, depending on the stage of the crop).27 Nevertheless, 
more precise data from Crissman et al. (1998) and from the 2003-2004 season showed that 
farmers commonly mixed commercial fungicides with the same active ingredients, thereby 
raising the effective application rate to 3.0 to 4.0 kg/ha. On average, farmers applied 14.50 
kg/ha of dithiocarbamate fungicides (nearly all of which were mancozeb-based products) 
on their potato crop during the 2003-2004 season (Table 4.3). We came across farmers who 
applied 34 l/ha of mancozeb to their crop that season. Most farmers believed that late 
blight had become more resistant to fungicides, and as a result, it required both more and 
stronger applications. They generally increased mancozeb applications even after personal 
financial crisis and the doubling of prices for fungicides after 2000. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Average frequency of mancozeb applications for late blight (based on CIP-
INIAP data processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
Methamidaphos applications varied greatly within communities, but overall, the use of the 
insecticide had doubled since the 1970s – from about one to two applications in Cuba and 
La Libertad and two to four applications in Mariscal and Piartal (Figure 4.7). Similar to 
fungicides, application rates of methamidaphos increased from the recommended (250-500 
ml/100 l)28 to twice that in Piartal, Cuba, and La Libertad and four times the 
recommendation in Mariscal. On average, farmers applied a total of 1.42 l/ha of 
organophosphate insecticides (most of which were methamidaphos-base products) to their 
potato crops during the 2003-2004 season (Table 4.3). We found farmers who applied up 
to 8.0 l/ha of methamidaphos to their crop that season. Farmers interviewed explained that 
the reason was a proliferation of foliar pests, especially aphids (Myzus pericae and Macrosiphun 
euphorbiae) leaf flea beetle (Epitrix spp.), leaf miner fly (Liriomyza huidobrensis), and trips 
(Frankliniella tuberosi). This was a particular concern in dry years. In the case of leaf miner 
fly, the effects of insecticides on parasitic flies contributed to the pest’s proliferation. 
According to one individual from Cuba, “Farmers like to see the insects fall from the sky. 
Then, we know we can go home and sleep at night.” 
                                                       
27 Vedemécum Agrícola. 2004. División de Publicaciones Técnicas, EDIFORM, Quito, Ecuador. 
28 Ibid. 
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Figure 4.7 Average frequency of methamidaphos applications for foliar insects (based on 
CIP-INIAP data processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
The number of carbofuran applications for the Andean weevil varied greatly (Figure 4.8). 
Overall, since the 1970s farmers increased applications by a factor of two or four. The 
manufacturer recommended one to two applications (at planting and hilling),29 while 
previously INIAP recommended a maximum of one application.30 On average, farmers 
applied a total of 1.56 l/ha of carbamate insecticides (nearly all of which were carbofuran-
base products) to their potato crops during the 2003-2004 season (Table 4.3). We 
commonly came across farmers who applied up to 12 l/ha of carbamates that season. 
 
Figure 4.8 Average frequency of carbofuran applications for Andean weevil (based on 
CIP-INIAP data processed through focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
                                                       
29 Ibid. 
30 In large part due to the joint INIAP-CIP research in Carchi, in 2002 INIAP’s potato program stopped 
recommending highly toxic pesticides. 
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Farmers explained that previously, they produced potato with little to no weevil damage. 
Likely, the pest was controlled through numerous small plots, spacing between fields, and 
length of fallow season. As the size of potato fields grew and fallow seasons shortened, 
Andean weevil populations exploded, converting from a secondary insect to a major pest. 
Additionally, many farmers believed that the weevil had developed resistance to 
insecticides, so they needed to apply stronger rates. 
 
Patricio, a medium-scale potato farmer and former pesticide salesman from San Gabriel, 
summed up the modern pest problem: “If the gusanos [or worms] choose your crop, they 
win, hands down. No Ingeniero or God can help you.” He went on to tell what had become 
a familiar story: agricultural intensification in Carchi did not just lead to increases in potato 
production; it also produced soil degradation and a proliferation of pests. Most farmers 
said they generally were aware of the health problems associated with pesticide use. 
Nevertheless, modern time had introduced them to a new reality: the only thing worse than 
using pesticides was not using pesticides. They applied more and more fungicides and 
insecticides and used heavier application rates, but they still could not win against the pests. 
Resorting to pesticides was the best they could do to keep their crops alive and eke out a 
living, with the hope of someday being able to pay off their climbing debts. The only other 
option was to sell off land and animals and move to the city. Patricio concluded, 
“Pesticides permit us to live, so that we can plant another day.” 
 
Economic performance 
 
While processes of market integration in Mariscal and Piartal started in the 1930s and 
1950s, respectively, farmers there did not grow large quantities of potato for sale until after 
agrarian reform – about the same time that farmers in Cuba and La Libertad shifted 
towards commercial production. Previously, the farmers of Mariscal and Piartal met their 
debt payments primarily through wood harvesting and charcoal production. For the 
purposes of this research, I focused on economic trends in potato production since the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Particularly, I examined global tendencies in production by area, 
production costs, prices, and productivity. 
 
a) Production by area 
 
In all four communities, farmers said that adoption of mechanized tillage, fertilizer and 
pesticide technologies led to sharp increases in production during the 1970 and much of 
the 1980s, followed by slow but steady declines during ensuing decades (Figure 4.9). 
Despite steady increases in fertilizer use, the land no longer responded. The most drastic 
decline took place in Cuba, where in 1970, harvests reached 55 t/ha, but by the early 1990s, 
production decreased to about 16 t/ha. When I asked why, I was told that first, the soil had 
become “tired,” then the pests came, and finally, the weather changed. While I did not have 
precise weather data for Cuba, farmers emphatically argued that since the early 1990s, 
rainfall had declined and the monthly distribution of rainfall was less predictable than 
previously. 
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Figure 4.9 Average potato yields by area (based on CIP-INIAP data processed through 
focal group sessions by Carchi Research Team, 2004) 
 
While initially there were dramatic differences in production by area among the case study 
sites, differences reduced during the 1980s. Based on high quality, dynamic data from 1990-
1992, Crissman et al. (1998) found an average production of 21 t/ha. Based on interview 
data from 1997, which followed a particularly dry El Niño year, Barrera et al. (1999) 
reported average production of 16 t/ha. The 94 farmers who participated in our 2003-2004 
data collection produced an average of 15 t/ha during a season with normal climatic 
patterns, with average yields for communities varying between 12 and 18 t/ha. Combined, 
these studies generally support what we heard during 2003-2004 – potato farmers of Carchi 
experienced a sharp decline in production between the mid-1980s and the end of the 
1990s. 
 
b) Production costs 
 
Despite global potato production declines over the last several decades, farmers in Carchi 
continue to produce two to three times the national average.31 Nevertheless, farmers there 
also have the highest production costs in the country. Since the mid-1980s, production 
costs have increased steadily, with a sharp increase in the early 1990s due to the elimination 
of government price controls on agrochemicals in 1992, followed by a policy shift in 1993 
towards active management of currency exchange and steady decline in the real-effective 
exchange rate of the Sucre (Lee and Espinosa, 1998; Beckerman, 2002) (Figure 4.10). As a 
result, production costs rose sharply from about $250/ha in 1990 to $1,500/ha in 1993 
(Crissman et al., 1998).  
 
During the 1990s, labour represented about 25 percent of production costs in Carchi and 
external inputs about 75 percent (Crissman et al., 1998; Herrera et al., 1999). According to 
Herrera et al. (1999), fluctuations in real input costs generally explain the variations in 
potato production costs between 1989-1998. Input costs rose faster than labour due to 
revaluations of the Sucre in the early 1990s and the fact that essentially all agrochemicals 
used in Carchi were imported. Between 1997 and 1998, Ecuador experienced an economic 
                                                       
31 INEC, 2004. 
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crisis and spontaneous dollarisation that doubled the real-effective exchange rate of the 
Sucre, leading to a temporary drop in production costs and tremendous windfall profits for 
producers that levelled off following official dollarisation of the economy in 2000 
(Beckerman, 2002). Since that time, input costs increased steadily as a result of the inflation 
associated with dollarisation. In 2004, Paredes and I found potato production costs in 
Carchi at above $2,000/ha. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Potato production costs in Carchi (1984-2004) (Banco Nacional de Fomento and 
INIAP UVTT-Carchi data) 
 
c) Prices 
 
Generally, potato prices in Ecuador are inversely related to the available supply of the 
commodity (Figure 4.11). The supply of potato in the country is largely a function of 
aggregated production as a result of climate, soil fertility, and pest management rather than 
market demand for the crop (Herrera et al., 1999). Potato production has low market 
elasticity; only about 18 percent of production behaviour can be explained by market price. 
Location on the equator and the diverse environmental niches of the inter-Andean valley 
mean that farmers at different locations continually plant and harvest. Volatile weather 
conditions common to highland environments contribute unexpected periods of rainfall, 
drought and frost, with associated effects on insect pests and plant diseases, especially of 
devastating pests such as the Guatemalan potato moth and late blight. Additionally, since 
the environment in the Northern Andes permits continual production, varieties have not 
been selected for storage. Four to six weeks after harvest, potatoes turn green, so they must 
be sold right away. The inability to store potatoes until prices improve increases farmer 
vulnerability. The combined effects of environment, climate, pests, and lack of storability 
lead to highly unpredictable commodity supply. As a result, prices fluctuate tremendously, 
making potato production a high-risk enterprise. 
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Figure 4.11 Variability of potato price with production (MAG and Central Bank of 
Ecuador data, as reported in An, 2004) 
 
 
Figure 4.12 presents minimum and maximum prices for the varieties Chola and Gabriel at 
the Quito wholesale market between the period of 1990 and 2004. The two varieties show 
similar patterns of variability, with Chola consistently presenting higher prices at both 
peaks and nadirs. While minimum prices were relatively stable between years, varying by 
about 50 percent, maximums commonly varied by over 300 percent. In 1996, El Niño led 
to severe drought in the highlands. Price increases between 2000 and 2002 were due to 
inflation associated with the process of dollarisation. Meanwhile, the data on monthly 
prices for Chola at the Quito wholesale market provide greater resolution on the drama of 
price variability (Figure 4.13). With the exception of the 1996 El Niño, the bulk of variation 
in price occurs within years, with little to no perceptible pattern across the months. During 
2002 and 2003, average yearly potato prices tended to decline. Nevertheless, during that 
same period, monthly prices occasionally peaked and crashed to historic levels. During the 
1990s monthly prices fluctuated by a factor of three to six. Since dollarisation, prices have 
fluctuated from $0.80 to $20 per quintal, an astounding factor of 25 (Paredes, 2001; An, 
2004)! The odds of harvesting at a highpoint in market demand indeed were comparable to 
“winning the lottery.” 
 
In a study of price differences among producers, wholesalers and consumers between 1990 
and 1998, Herrera et al. (1999) found that producer prices had decreased 
disproportionately. While relative potato prices increased with inflation for wholesalers and 
consumers, as of 1995, real prices for producers dropped by about 30 percent, a 
relationship that continued through 2004. The potato region with the lowest prices for 
producers was Northern Ecuador. The odds of losing in potato production, especially in 
Carchi, had gone up. 
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Figure 4.12 Extreme monthly potato prices for Chola and Gabriela between 1990 and 
2004 (wholesale market, Quito) (MAG and Central Bank of Ecuador data) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Monthly variation in prices for Chola (1990-2004) (Quito wholesale market) 
(MAG and Central Bank of Ecuador data) 
 
d) Productivity 
 
We did not find reliable yearly data on productivity for the 1970s, but the fact that farmers 
managed to quickly pay off their debts associated with land acquisition and substantially 
increase area planted suggested they did well during that period. Barsky (1984) found that 
between agrarian reform and the mid-1970s production increased by about 40 percent and 
worker productivity by 33 percent. In contrast, INIAP’s data showed that potato 
productivity in Carchi steadily declined since the mid-1980s (Figure 4.14). When the 
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research team shared this data with farmers in the four communities, they concurred, 
explaining that in the 1970s and 1980s soils were more fertile and pests less problematic, 
allowing them to use less agrochemicals. Additionally, in those days prices were relatively 
high and stable. The farmers explained that their prosperity began to change in the early 
1990s. They experienced a series of average to bad years combined with an increase in 
fertilizer and pesticide costs. Lee and Espinosa (1998) explained that the rise in input prices 
during the early 1990s was due to a sharp decline in the effective role of tariff exemptions 
for agricultural inputs. The farmers at our research sites questioned the INIAP data 
showing positive productivity after 2001. Consistent with the findings of An (2004), 
following dollarisation of the Sucre in 2000, Carchense farmers experienced increases in 
input prices and labour costs of more than 200 percent, which negatively influenced the 
productivity of potato farming. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14 Productivity of potato production in Carchi (INIAP UVTT-Carchi) 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, Carchense farmers increasingly lost money on potatoes. Based on 
data from 1990-1992, Crissman et al. (1998) found that farmers in Carchi produced on 
average 21 t/ha, but they lost money on 43 percent of the potato fields they planted. 
During the 2003-2004 season, which farmers classified as a good year, Paredes and I found 
that farmers produced an average of 15 t/ha and lost money on 55 percent of their potato 
crops (Table 4.4). The empirical evidence of production decline and overall production 
failures was overwhelming, especially for certain styles of farming. For example, Don 
Brocardo was famous in Mariscal for betting everything he had on his potato crop. 
According to Paredes’ (2001 and in process) classification of farming styles, Don Brocardo 
was a clear example of a “high risk taker,” the most prestigious group of farmers in Carchi. 
When we visited him in 2004, he had just lost his vehicle, house, and land to mounting 
debts, which made him the talk of the town. According to Don Brocardo and the farmers 
we consulted, the problem was not potato production but rather prices, especially price 
variability. Don Brocardo fell into debt not because of field production but because he 
harvested when prices were low. Three losses in a row led him to financial collapse and the 
loss of his land. In sharp contrast to the successes of potato farmers in Carchi during the 
1970s and 1980s, Paredes and I found that the dramatic failures at the market place since 
the early 1990s were becoming legendary. 
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Table 4.4 Average yield, net revenue, and farmers who lost money on their potato crop 
during the 2003-2004 season (Paredes and Sherwood, 2004)a 
 
Community Average yield  
(t/ha) 
Average net revenue 
($/ha) 
Farmers losing money 
(% total) 
La Libertad (n=16) 17.99 690 31 
Piartal (n=34) 13.73 148 59 
Cuba (n=19) 12.36 -559 89 
Mariscal (n=25) 15.35 534 40 
Average 14.86 203 55 
a For comparison purposes, Paredes and I employed cost-benefit methodology consistent with that used in 
Crissman et al. (1998). 
 
Modernisation: motor of wealth, motor of decline 
 
In summary, performance of agricultural modernisation in Carchi followed a general 
pattern of a sharp rise followed by steady decline. The first communal harvests on 
degraded ex-hacienda soils were low at about 10:1, meaning that for each sack of potatoes 
planted, they harvested ten sacks, which was about 14 t/ha. During the early 1970s, State 
extensionists arrived to offer in-kind loans in the form of sacks of fertilizers and later, new 
varieties and pesticides that had to be paid back in cash. Initial use of agrochemicals led to 
sharp increases in production, so, after paying off debts, farmers were left with surplus cash 
for the first time in their lives. The research team found that fertilizers led to an immediate 
increase in production, often to a ratio of 30:1 (41 t/ha). The técnicos from MAG and 
INIAP advised them to shorten planting distances from about 1.40 m between rows to 
1.00 m, which further contributed to production by area.  
 
The early success of modernisation spread through communities like “wildfire.” The 
beneficiaries of agrarian reform built permanent houses, and entire families moved onto 
the communal land. Area under potato cultivation multiplied by a factor of five. While 
variable, potato prices were generally strong during the 1970s and the first half of the 
1980s, enabling a large number of farmers to “hit the lottery.” This enabled them to pay off 
debts and to accumulate wealth, often in the form of a truck or the purchase of additional 
land.  
 
Diverse success stories were present in each community and were widely known, inspiring 
an entire generation of farmers to go further into debt so that they could afford the use of 
greater quantities of agrochemicals. The farmers who invested most – the “high risk-
takers” – became an admired and highly regarded social group. Farmers generally sought to 
maximize area planted to potato. They increasingly converted pasture, forests, and páramo 
to the crop. Fertilizers enabled them to more intensively plant potatoes, and production by 
area climbed to over 50 t/ha.  
 
After ten or 15 years of accumulation, potato crops began to fail. Soils became tired, pests 
were more problematic, and potato production grew to be dependent on greater and more 
intensive use of agrochemicals. Meanwhile commodity prices became more variable, 
moving towards an overall tendency of decline. At the same time, the government 
dollarised the economy and input prices nearly tripled. As production failures became ever 
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more common and debts mounted, the odds of “winning the lottery” became 
insurmountable. Over thirty years, the products of agricultural modernisation made potato 
production an increasingly expensive and risky enterprise. In 2004, more and more rural 
families found themselves in dire economic straits, causing them to abandon not only 
potato production, but agriculture. For a growing number of rural families, the model of 
agricultural modernisation had reached a state of collapse. 
 
Social transformations 
 
What were the influences of agricultural modernisation on people and their communities? 
Following individual and group interviews on technical transformations, the research team 
moved on to conduct interviews with individuals and small groups of people in each 
community to learn how life had changed since agrarian reform. In 2004, the Carchi 
Research Team interviewed individuals in each community followed by larger community-
level meetings at the case study sites. It employed a common series of questions on the 
source of rural change, role of rural peasants in production and society, relationships 
between peasants and authority, sources and flows of knowledge and technology, 
livelihood strategies, and moments of collective organisation. While there was much 
discussion over terminology and dates of events, participants had little difficulty reaching 
consensus on four general “critical moments” of transition in Carchi: the “hacienda,” “land 
distribution,” “technification and market integration,” and most recently “dollarisation.” 
The synthesised results appear in Table 4.5. In continuation, I provide a summary 
description for each period. 
 
Hacienda period: “era of the patron” 
 
In Mariscal Sucre and San Pedro de Piartal (villages that managed to purchase land well 
before agrarian reform), we found mixed emotions about the hacienda period. The present-
day population of people who worked in the hacienda was low. Most people arrived 
following land purchase and either owned their own land since arrival or worked as 
jornaleros. These people were less dependent on the hacienda for their livelihood in the past. 
We were surprised to learn that parents and grandparents commonly had not told the 
youths about the difficulties on the hacienda. A father told me, “Why should we teach our 
children to hate?” The youth and the colonos or colonists tended to romanticize the hacienda 
time, saying for example, “Before we did not need to worry about our health. We did not 
need to go to see the doctor; we could cure ourselves with plants.” “There was greater 
interest in religious matters. People were more spiritual.” These comments provoked 
controversy. While many of the people who did live under the hacienda in Mariscal 
generally admired the patrón of the El Salado Hacienda, the people of Piartal who lived 
under the Indujel Hacienda had a very different experience. A woman from Piartal said, "In 
those [hacienda] days we suffered incredible poverty. Sometimes we went days without 
food to eat. In those days, not even the Government was around to help. The Government  
   Learning from Carchi  110 
Table 4.5 Summary descriptions of critical periods of modern agrarian change in Carchi 
 
Criteria Hacienda –  
“era of patron” 
Land – 
 “free at last” 
The market – 
 “the risk-taker” 
Dollarisation – 
“period of crisis” 
What is the source of 
change? 
Hacienda State State Market 
What is the dominant 
pattern of authority 
(authoritarian, 
paternalistic, 
democratic)? 
Authoritarian or 
paternalistic patrón 
(depending on 
patrón) – rigid or 
friendly control, 
but top-down 
Paternalistic 
State – help the 
poor farmers 
with land and 
credit 
Paternalistic State 
and técnico – help 
for the poor 
farmers with 
technologies. 
Paternalistic 
politicians – help 
the poor farmers; 
pacify with gifts, 
especially during 
election years 
How does authority 
view farmers? 
Peasants – passive 
agents that need 
supervision and 
control 
Generally 
irresponsible 
peasant farmers 
– need State’s 
care and 
supervision 
Generally 
irresponsible 
farmers or 
producers – need 
State’s care and 
technologies 
Generally 
irresponsible 
producers – need 
State’s care; need 
help to be 
competitive or to 
be given things 
What is the primary 
role of farmers in 
society? 
Follow orders and 
work 
Work – civilize 
land and plant 
crops to pay 
back State 
Produce and 
consume – buy 
products and 
produce so that 
you can pay for 
them 
Go into debt and 
consume – buy 
increasingly 
expensive 
products and try 
to survive 
How do farmers 
perceive authority 
(fear, gratitude, trust, 
or distrust)? 
Fear or gratitude – 
patrón is all 
powerful and 
deserves respect 
Gratitude –State 
is concerned 
about us and 
knows what is 
better for us 
Gratitude –State 
and its técnicos are 
concerned about 
us and know what 
is better for us 
Distrust –State is 
corrupt and 
exploits us; rich 
control markets 
From where does 
knowledge and 
technologies come? 
Patrón State Técnicos Market or private 
companies 
What do farmers need 
to know to be 
successful? 
• How to obey 
patrón 
• How to work 
hard 
• Obedience 
• Rules 
• How to obey 
State 
• How to work 
hard 
• Obedience 
• Rules 
• How to exploit 
services of State 
and NGOs 
• How to manage 
pesticides and 
fertilizers 
• How to produce 
• How to win 
lottery 
• How to exploit 
municipality and 
private industry 
• Integrated Crop 
Management 
• How to compete 
in unstable, lower 
value markets 
• Friends in the 
city who can 
employ children 
How does knowledge 
flow? 
From patrón to 
administrator to 
peasants 
From the State 
to farmers 
From técnicos to 
farmers; among 
farmers 
themselves 
From market and 
industry to 
farmers 
What is the principal 
livelihood strategy? 
Win confidence of 
patrón 
Make land 
produce; pay off 
debts 
Adopt 
technologies and 
win lottery 
Avoid debt; 
educate kids; 
migrate 
When do people 
organize collectively? 
According to 
needs of patrón 
To obtain lands 
and receive loans 
In mingas, to build 
and maintain 
infrastructure 
To protest; “We 
no longer 
organize.” 
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did not care because we were still living under the conquista." Another woman added, "The 
[hacienda] period was the epoch of slavery. The workers were the slaves of the owners and 
administrators." A man added, “We suffered a lot. My childhood was very sad. All we did 
was work for the patrón, and then later, we worked to pay off our land, harvesting charcoal 
and selling firewood.” 
 
In Cuba and La Libertad (villages that obtained land through relatively violent processes of 
social organisation and confrontation), we also found mixed emotions about the hacienda 
period. In each community, people made similar points: “The patrón provided work, a 
house, food in some cases, and education for your children through fourth grade.” “In 
those days we believed in God. We were endiosados [or blessed by God].” “There was forest 
and water, and the land gave us everything we needed.” “As youth we had our strength; be 
it good or bad, at least we were strong.” After hearing these comments, the elderly stepped 
up to remind the group of certain harsh realities of that period. “The youth of today has 
never known hunger.” “I was beaten and placed in jail because I was too sick to work one 
day. We watched compañeros die under the whip.” “We were slaves to the patrón and the 
mayordomo. The peones enjoyed a degree of security, but the jornaleros lived day-to-day.” “All 
we ever dreamed about was having our own little bit of land.” “All we wanted was a place 
for our children to live and work without having to pay rent.” 
 
In summary, communities remembered the hacienda period diversely. The opinions of 
those who lived through it were shaped by relationships with the patrón. There was a 
general impression that the natural environment – the forest, water, and land – was more 
intact and abundant. Compared to modern time, during the hacienda period people were 
more religious and respectful of authority. Nevertheless, the elderly reminded us that it was 
a period of social domination where wealth and prosperity lay in the hands of the few and 
the majority – the workers – lived as servants. Their role was to conform to the situation 
and accept the authority and will of the patrón, to follow orders and work. This produced 
fear in some and gratitude in others. As society was organised, the well-being and destiny 
of the rural peasant was placed in the hands of another. Nevertheless, through hard work 
and obedience, a peasant could win over the confidence of his or her patrón and be 
guaranteed a roof, food, and security. 
 
Land distribution: “free at last” 
 
The experience of obtaining land was less controversial than the hacienda period. The 
communities of Mariscal and Piartal acquired land through “colonisation,” which involved 
collective organisation and peaceful purchase from the haciendas. Cuba and Libertad 
obtained land by forced take-over, followed by government intervention and adjudication 
under the agrarian reform law. In all cases, peasant farmers found “land distribution” a 
period of unprecedented achievement and hope. 
 
In Mariscal a farmer proudly said, “We were united poor. The mingas [i.e., collective work 
parties] were a preponderant factor rooted in the mind and the heart of the Huaqueño. Los 
Huaqueños were the winners of the mingas of the road between Ibarra and Tulcán. They 
worked night and day, and their women worked just as hard.” The people of Mariscal and 
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Piartal made multiple references to the construction of the Pan-American Highway as a 
moment of inspiration (Box 4.2). 
 
Don Clodomiro Aguilar [the leader of the colonisation in Mariscal] said, the voice of God 
could not contradict him. He meant that colonisation was the only alternative for escaping 
our situation. We learned that we were good farmers – we were capable of earning money 
and employing people.” “Between the 50s and 70s we were minqueros de excelencia.” Farmers 
emphasized that they were groundbreakers; they did not receive government assistance or 
credit. In Mariscal, if we wanted something, we organised and worked for it. The people of 
Mariscal had achieved land and prosperity through “initiative, sweat, and tears,” decades 
before land reform. 
 
The people of Piartal told the research team, “We paid for the land with pure force of 
work. We wove panchos in workshops, cloths of wool, fine straw hats. The work in the 
mountains to obtain charcoal was extremely hard.” Another person added, “Before we did 
everything in groups. We brought together money through the force of work, for example, 
when we obtained land or built the roads. This produced value in a person’s word, honour, 
and solidarity. In those days, these values were very strong.” 
 
Not all people, however, were immediately ready to “liberate” themselves from the 
hacienda. One farmer from Cuba remembered fearing the event of separation from his 
patrón: “The illusion emerged from the mind of the very patrón – that we would be better 
off on our own, abandoned by the patrón. He proposed that we should create a pre-
cooperative so that we could own one of his mountains. Many of us were not so sure. I did 
not sleep at night.” As a result of such concern, Cuba’s first attempt of establishing a 
cooperative in the mid-1950s failed. 
 
Similar to their colleagues from Mariscal and Piartal, many farmers of Cuba and La 
Libertad dreamed of “owning land where we could plant, liberate ourselves, and not work 
until we became ill.” Nevertheless, the colonists from Mariscal and Piartal sometimes 
looked down upon communities that ended up receiving land through agrarian reform: 
“The people from Huaca said [of the people from Cuba], the communists have arrived 
there; only communist take land by force. But, we did not feel like communists.” “We were 
honest, hard-working people. We valued hard work and the great effort it took to meet 
debt payments; it was a great value to work organised [in groups].” In Cuba the great 
“illusion” or aspiration was to work together. “Everyone planted in union. We worked 
[together] three days each week. Everything we had, we planted. The credit was collective. 
We all would make it ahead, or we would all sink together.” In all four communities, the 
cooperatives paid off their debts on time.  
 
In summary, for the smallholder farmers of Carchi the period of land distribution brought 
a fundamental change to their lives, and it symbolised an era of great hope. For the first 
time, peasant farmers felt as though they had become a part of broader society – a feat 
beyond the dreams of their parents and grandparents. The State existed, and it supported 
them in the form of the Agrarian Reform Law, IERAC, Banco de Fomento, and MAG. The 
legal system defended their interests. At the time, they felt truly liberated, in the sense that  
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Box 4.2 Construction of the Pan-American Highway in Carchi (Carlos Raza-Salcedo, nd, as 
summarized in M. Landázuri, 2003 and C. Landázuri, 2003) 
 
Through the end of the 1920s the Province of Carchi was isolated from the rest of 
Ecuador. A trip between San Gabriel and Quito took about five days by horseback and 
other precarious means of travel. As a result, the people of Carchi had greater business and 
social interactions with the nearby city of Ipiales, Colombia than with the rest of Ecuador.  
Following a workers protest in 1925 that became known as the “Revolución Juliana,” the 
government decided to build a road between the city of Ibarra and the Rumichaca River on 
the Colombian border. It studied three routes across the highlands of Carchi and chose the 
shortest western flank of the Andes, which would pass through Chota, El Angel, and the 
unpopulated páramo to Las Juntas and finally to the border city of Tulcán. While this 
western route represented the seemingly most economical option, the communities along 
the eastern alternative – Bolivar, La Paz, Sand Gabriel, Cristóbal Colón, Dacha, and Julio 
Andrade – decided to change the calculus.  
 
While the government continued with the western highway, the people of Montúfar had 
decided to build an eastern highway on their own. Led by Manuel J. Bastidas, an eccentric 
farmer-researcher famous for his improvement of potato varieties and cattle, the able 
people of the villages of Montúfar united and on 25 September 1927 brought their picks 
and shovels with them to the main square of San Gabriel. Creating the “Pro-western 
highway Committee,” they took charge of tracing the route of the road, which included 
negotiations with the landowners, provision of tools, and obtaining horses for transporting 
rocks and logs. Additionally, they had to organize food, housing, and other logistical 
support for what would quickly become thousands. The first three-day minga took place 
between 25-27 September and involved 6,250 men, plus hundreds of women and children 
who prepared food, transported water, and provided other logistical support. By the 
afternoon of 27 September, a stretch of highway running North across the inter-Andean 
Valley and measuring some forty kilometres was opened. That same afternoon the first 
automobile arrived to San Gabriel from the city of Pasto, Colombia. This early success 
inspired them to look South. 
 
The highway to Ibarra posed greater challenges due to the difficult rocky and mountainous 
terrain. On 25-27 September 1930, a work party of some 15,000 volunteers, now from 
both Carchi and Imbabura, arrived to the banks of the Chota River, across from the town 
of Juncal, Imbabura. Over three years, the people of Northern Ecuador had opened over 
100 kilometres of road. Impressed by the enormity of this effort, the government ceded 
and financed the construction of the bridges as well as the repair of certain problematic 
sections that would take through October 1936 to finalize. In honour of this effort, in 
1934, the Ecuadorian Congress awarded the industrious people of Montúfar, for the first 
and only time in the country’s history, the “National Distinction of work.” Today, in the 
plaza where the decision was made to build what has become the northern stretch of the 
Pan-American Highway, stands a statue of a nude man with a pick and shovel – the 
anonymous worker and hero of Carchi. 
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they had greater control over their destinies. Their role was to “civilize the land” and make 
it productive so that the cities could eat. They also needed to make money so that they 
could pay back their loans and demonstrate that they were responsible people, which they 
did. In all four cases, the farmers felt that they had benefited from the acquisition of land, 
and they were eager to become modern, which involved producing for the market and 
adopting new technologies. 
 
Technification and market-oriented production: “era of the risk-taker” 
 
I have the vice of planting. Over the years, it has taken everything. We began with 
nothing, but later we made it to just a few steps short of indigence. I don't know if 
you have a vice, but I have only one... I am not a drug addict, I don't smoke, but 
yes, I have one major vice: I like to plant. – Patricio, a “high risk-taker” from San 
Gabriel 
 
Alfonso, from Cuba, told the research team that during the days of land distribution, “We 
believed that the land could produce on its own. All it needed was work and intelligence.” 
With the arrival of técnicos and modern technologies, they were taught that these resources 
were not enough. In Cuba and La Libertad the government-supported land credit was 
conditioned with “technification.” Barsky (1981) explains that technification was part of a 
government-led policy of “agricultural modernisation” in Ecuador built on a model of 
“technology generation and transfer.” The model involved MAG- and INIAP-supported 
“technical assistance” for specialised market-oriented production and the adoption of new 
varieties and agro-chemicals. The research team learned that during agrarian reform the 
different cooperatives in Carchi gained access to tractors, certified seed, fertilizers, and 
pesticides. Victor from Cuba explained, “A group of gringos from 4-H and ingenieros from 
MAG came to tell us how to plant like modern farmers, but we learned almost everything 
we know from other compañeros.” A colleague added, “Later, in 1977, there were more 
courses, but they were only for the Catholics.” Regardless, once they gained access to the 
new technologies, most of the learning came through empirical experience and informal 
farmer-to-farmer communication. 
 
In order to pay off land and product debts, the new farmers had to earn currency, which 
meant entering the markets. Similar to their predecessors in Mariscal and Piartal, the 
cooperative in Cuba decided to "convert the forest to cash" as a means of paying off the 
better part of its land debt. They organised collective work parties to cut down remaining 
outcroppings and reduce the wood to carbón that was sold in San Gabriel and Tulcán. 
Additionally, they pooled resources and planted in communal plots. "The people were very 
united and got together to work, play sports, talk or rotate guard duty. Mingas were very 
common, often every week, and people were willing to help with anything." In Cuba, 
Victor told the research team, “We worked [in groups] three days a week until we planted 
everything we had. We selected Juan Cuespud as our Administrator. He managed the 
money and negotiated with the buyers who came to the fields at harvest time to get drunk 
and pick up their quintales. In those days, no one risked taking out credit on his own.” 
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At all four locations the cooperatives paid off their debts on time. In La Libertad, the 
research team was told, “We, as rural people, like to be honourable. They [the government] 
did not forgive our debt. Instead, they came to complain. They said to us, ‘You have to pay 
your debt. If you don’t, its robbery.’” Later, individual members, especially the 
“opportunists” (those who were not farmers but arrived from outside to take part in land 
acquisition), decided that they wanted control over their own parcel of land. Sometimes 
members wanted to sell out and move to the city, but mostly they wanted access to credit 
for technology, and the banks demanded land titles as collateral. After paying off the land, 
the cooperatives in each village eventually divided up the land among members by lottery. 
 
While members were open to giving people land titles and allowing some to sell their plots, 
they did not necessarily want the cooperatives to disband. A man from Cuba said, “Our 
great error for the end of the organization was when the people began to sell. They did not 
respect the land as belonging to the community. They sold as if the land was theirs.” 
Humberto from La Libertad said, “We all paid our debts at the first opportunity. Later, 
each member [of the cooperative] started to take out credit for himself. This is what 
destroyed the 23 [the Cooperativa 23 de julio].” 
  
Barsky (1984) describes that immediately following land acquisition, rural Carchi 
experienced the spontaneous spread of industrial era technologies and market integration. 
As a result of new revenues from the oil boom, the Ecuadorian government invested in the 
transportation and communication infrastructure of the province, which further fuelled this 
development. Contrary to popular view of farmers as conservative actors resistant to 
change, the people of Carchi demonstrated remarkable adaptive capacity. They generally 
accepted everything that the técnicos and government asked of them. Barsky estimated that 
within five years 70 percent of villages had reorganised around the market. Within a 
decade, essentially the entire rural population of rural Carchi shifted to intensive potato 
production built on externally sourced knowledge, technology, and debt. 
 
Paredes’ research (2001 and in process) found that by the mid-1980s the most respected 
and admired farmers in Carchi became the ones who “bet it all.” These were cavalier 
individuals who planted in large scale and over-extended themselves with external 
technology and credit to the point of great financial risk. Patricio from San Gabriel was an 
example: "I don't plant small areas, I plant big areas – six hectares in one shot. I want to 
feel alive. If I do well, then I will feel reborn. If I fail, I also want to feel that. There's 
nothing like failing for making you feel alive." These were the “true” potato farmers – the 
people who determined local meanings of “good farming” and pioneered technological 
development. The era of technification produced a transformation of potato production as 
well as new farming style of great prestige: the “high risk-takers.”  
 
Dollarisation: “period of crisis” 
 
When I first heard people in Carchi speak of “dollarisation,” I understood it in purely 
economic terms. "Our money [the Sucre] of before was better. Today, a dollar is not worth 
anything; it does not buy a thing. The country has become poorer with dollarisation." 
Dollarisation of the Ecuadorian Sucre was tied to the banking crisis (Beckerman, 2002). 
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Nineteen of 25 national banks had been closed in 1999, causing people to lose confidence 
in financial institutions. A woman from Piartal highlighted a common sentiment: "Our 
cows have become our bank; our cuy [guinea pigs] and chickens our money boxes."32 
Converting from the Sucre to the dollar was difficult. What one day valued S25,000, the 
next day valued just $1. Beyond the problems of rounding off currency fractions, prices in 
dollars started to climb. Between 1999 and 2003, inflation for many items that rural people 
purchased was about 250 percent. Poverty in the country climbed by over 20 percent, with 
the great majority of that occurring in rural areas. The banking crisis combined with 
dollarisation of the Sucre caused 3.5 million people, most from rural areas, to abandon 
their families and communities and migrate to foreign lands. By any standards, it was a 
difficult period.  
 
The economic crisis certainly was part of dollarisation, but people explained that the crises 
went deeper. Thirty years of intensification introduced new social and environmental 
problems. The research team heard many stories about fragmentation between people and 
the land as well as among people themselves. Victor, from Cuba, explained, “Today, there 
is no way to organise ourselves, since no one has time. Each person looks after his own 
interests. Now, it’s the market that gives us orders. A farmer in Piartal confided that as a 
result of dollarisation, “Our land and our agriculture escaped from our hands.” Land 
distribution and market integration brought success beyond dreams, but it also brought a 
quick end to an early project of collectivisation. 
 
A mother in Mariscal told the research team, “The dollarisation has meant the degeneration 
of our youth.” According to a couple in Cuba, “All our children want is a cell phone and a 
one-way bus ticket to the city. All we want for our children is that they leave, so they don’t 
have to suffer as we have.” I responded, “But parents always have complained about the 
crazy ways of youth. I know I made my parents suffer.” The mother corrected me with a 
lengthy argument about how things were different now. Life had “accelerated,” she said, 
kids grew up rapidly and were vulnerable to distant influences. They used foreign words, 
dressed in weird clothing, and listened to strange music. Youth no longer wanted to work 
in the fields. Some children, she confided, had become so frustrated with life that they 
went off to join the guerrilla groups in Colombia – a delicate topic that everyone knew but 
that was rarely brought up in conversations, especially with a gringo in the room. “Forget 
about them going to church,” she said. The best thing that a parent could hope for, she 
repeated, was that their children someday would go off to study in the city and never look 
back. 
 
Additionally, many farmers described a “loss of control” over agriculture. Farming was 
always a risky enterprise, but now it had become more so. In the fields, crises were no 
longer seasonal but weekly, if not daily. Now pest outbreaks seemed to come from all sides 
– from the sky, neighbours’ fields, the seeds, and the soil. Pesticides continued to offer 
relief, but they also began to realise the new problems associated with pesticides, such as 
continual dizziness, headaches, and nausea, as well as the fear that they were not going to 
be able to meet debt payments, which would place into question their honour as campesinos. 
While prices were always a problem, fluctuations had accelerated. Peaks inspired families to 
                                                       
32 Quoted in Mera-Orcés, 2000: 15. 
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plant more, and nadirs carried them further into debt. Even the weather seemed more 
severe. Droughts arrived in the middle of the growing season, and when rainfall came, it 
was violent and accompanied by floods and hailstorms that destroyed crops. Look across 
the hillsides, Alfonso told me, and you won’t see any potatoes planted. That was not 
because they did not want to work, he explained, it was because they did not have the 
money to plant. Alfonso said, “We are living off the cows, but the pasture cannot pay our 
bills.” The success stories of the past had been supplanted by stories of failure. 
Increasingly, farmers were selling off their land. Once proud farmers had become landless 
jornaleros. Others had moved to the city. 
 
Some farmers blamed themselves for their situation: “We are brutos. They gave us the land, 
and we destroyed it. Now, we are all going to have to migrate to the cities.” Others 
expressed resentment towards different forms of authority. With the banking crisis and 
dollarisation of the Sucre, many no longer felt that the State represented their interests. In 
November 2003, thousands of farmers descended on the Pan-American Highway in 
protest over everything – from the economic situation, the cost of inputs, market prices, to 
the government support of the Free-Trade Agreement.33 According to the Sub-secretary of 
MAG who was assigned the task of ending the strike, “They seemed to be angry about 
everything.”34 Such sentiment had grown common throughout rural Ecuador and was 
reflected in a landslide victory for the Correa candidacy in 2006 with the mandate to hold a 
constitutional assembly and put an end to the political oligarchy. Additionally, previous 
blind acceptance of the técnicos and their technologies began to become questioned. For 
example, a farmer from San Gabriel said, “First the ingenieros told us to use agrochemicals. 
Now they are telling us not to use them. Whom are we supposed to believe?” When I 
arrived in Piartal during my final visit in 2006, the President of the Farmer Field School 
told me that the previous night they had ordered a pesticide salesman to leave town. He 
said the farmers had grown tired of being taken advantage of by the industry. As far as I 
know, that had never happened in Carchi.  
 
Discussion 
 
The agricultural treadmill of Carchi 
 
Carchi produced a unique expression of Cochrane’s (1958) agricultural treadmill. As we 
saw in the four communities, following agrarian reform and land acquisition, a large 
number of smallholder farmers rapidly converted to market-oriented production of a single 
crop: potato. As a result of this structure, they became “price takers,” so getting ahead 
depended on stepping on a treadmill of continual technological innovation. Early on, 
essentially all farmers took on debt to finance access to externally based technologies, such 
as potato seed, mechanised tillage, and agrochemicals. At first, groups of farmers produced 
collectively. Nevertheless, in all four cases people quickly chose to divide up property so 
that individuals could own land and thereby obtain access to loans and have greater control 
over their production systems. This development was accompanied by the growth of an 
                                                       
33 This event is further described in Chapter 7. 
34 Personal communication with Fausto Merino, Sub-secretary for the Highlands and Amazon, Ministry of 
Agriculture, January 2002. 
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agriculture support industry made up of government research and extension agents from 
MAG and INIAP, agrochemical vendors from private national and international 
companies, and lending institutions, particularly the public Banco de Fomento, which together 
became an indispensable part of Carchense agriculture. Within a decade of agrarian reform, a 
large number of smallholder farmers in Carchi adopted modern agriculture technologies 
and integrated with commercial markets, leading to substantial increases in production by 
area and worker productivity (Barsky, 1984 and Figure 4.8). By the end of the 1970s, Carchi 
became Ecuador’s largest producer of potatoes, and farmers there began to accumulate 
wealth. 
 
As found in the four communities studied in this Chapter, a decade later this prosperity 
began to take a turn. In contrast to Cochrane’s explanation of the agricultural treadmill, 
however, this did not necessarily occur due to a saturation of the market and a decline in 
prices or because certain farmers could not keep up with the innovation of others. The 
combined effects of a highly variable mountain environment and climate, pest outbreaks, 
and lack of storability of potatoes in Carchi made supply highly unpredictable, leading to 
unstable prices (Figure 4.13). Additionally, environmental and ecological disturbances 
associated with modern agriculture led to new pest problems and soil degradation, making 
external inputs in the forms of pesticides and fertilizers indispensable. Meanwhile, in the 
1990s, international pressure would cause the government to withdraw public support for 
research and extension as well as credit, leaving agricultural support in the hands of private 
industry. 
 
It is possible that increases in production costs would have been offset by higher potato 
prices, if it were not for the porous borders with Colombia and Peru. Following economic 
instability during the 1990s and dollarisation in 2000, input costs rose dramatically (by 
about 300 percent), leading to sharp increases in the cost of production for Ecuadorian 
farmers (Figure 4.10). Meanwhile dollarisation created a comparative advantage for farmers 
in Colombia and Peru, which led to the importation of potatoes, thereby filling the void of 
supply in Ecuador and counteracting potential price increases for Carchense farmers (An, 
2004). 
 
In contrast to Cochrane’s (1958) agricultural treadmill, Carchense agriculture did not 
experience scale enlargement in potato production. While farmers continued to rely on the 
potato-pasture system for livelihoods, the concentration of potato cultivation per farm 
family decreased from a high of about 7,000 families planting 15,000 ha per year (2.14 ha of 
potato/family) in the early 1990s to about 4,200 families planting about 6,200 ha per year 
(1.47 ha of potato/family) in 2000 and 2004 (MAG and INEC data). According to Herrera 
et al. (1999) and the most recent MAG and INEC data from 2004, the land tenure 
structure of potato production in Carchi had not changed significantly following land 
distribution. Roughly 65 percent of Carchi potato production remained in the hands of 
smallholders (owning less than 10 ha), 20 percent in medium size producers (10 to 20 ha), 
five percent in large producers (greater than 20 ha), and ten percent in landless farmers, 
who commonly obtained access to land through rental arrangements and sharecropping.  
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According to Paredes (in process), essentially all farmers from the four communities we 
studied who had abandoned agriculture and migrated to urban centres or other countries 
avoided selling their land. Instead, emigrants loaned or handed over land to family 
members, who converted it to pasture for dairy and cattle production or rented it to others. 
The modality of land rental may have contributed to some scale enlargement in terms of 
potato production per individual producer. Nevertheless, this growth in scale usually was 
not achieved through land ownership, but rather through share cropping with 
moneylenders who owned local businesses or who received remittances from family 
members living abroad. 
 
In summary, price declines did not drive the “rat race” of the agricultural treadmill in 
Carchi. Instead, it was driven by price variability associated with the inherent difficulty of 
farming in the highland Andes, all of which was aggravated by what Röling and Jiggins 
(1998) describe as the “second-generation” problems associated with modern agriculture – 
i.e., the externalisation of human health and the environmental costs of external input, 
market-oriented production. As summarised in Chapter 2 and described by farmers of the 
four communities presented in this Chapter, modern potato production in Carchi 
generated serious human health problems due to pesticide exposure as well as 
environmental problems in the forms of chronic pest outbreaks and soil fertility decline. In 
addition to the externalisation of costs, the aforementioned inflation of input costs 
associated with dollarisation worked against Carchense potato producers, causing many to go 
into debt and, most recently, to abandon agriculture. Further, when potato production 
became more expensive in Ecuador, imports from Colombia and Peru filled voids in 
supply and tended to keep down prices. According to this analysis, over time an interactive 
combination of economic, social, and environmental factors made modern potato farming 
in Carchi unsustainable. 
 
Rural transformation 
 
Drawing on ecological, economic, and to a lesser extent, social perspective, “resilience” 
theory attempts to explain the spontaneous and unpredictable dynamic cycles of social 
organization and collapse apparent in interactive human-natural systems (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002). Holling (2000) proposed the “lazy eight” as a stylized representation of 
ecosystem renewal (Figure 4.15). The cycle is based on two central elements of 
spontaneous adaptation: (1) the potential that is inherent in the accumulated “capital” of 
natural resources or social organisation (Y-axis), and 2) the degree of “connectedness” 
between variables (X-axis). Low connectedness is associated with loosely connected, 
diffuse elements and high outward relations and influence by outside variability. High 
connectedness is associated with tightly aggregated elements and inward relations and 
limited outside influence and externally driven variability. The interactions of the X- and Y-
axes produce four phases: 
1. Conservation (K) – slow change; resources structurally “locked up” 
2. Release (!) – rapid change; previously locked up resources released 
3. Reorganization and renewal (!) –  system boundaries tenuous; restructuring 
around emergent opportunities 
4. Growth and exploitation (r) – resources made available 
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The exit from the cycle at the left of the figure describes how certain potentials may escape 
the system to catalyze new adaptive cycles. 
 
 
Figure 4.15 The “lazy eight” adaptive cycle (Holling, 2000) 
 
Holing (2000) utilises this model to describe the alternating fluctuations between longer 
periods of aggregation and transformation of resources and shorter periods of 
"opportunities" for exploitation and reorganisation as fundamental dimensions of complex 
systems – from cells to ecosystems to societies. Other authors have applied this cycle to 
describe diverse phenomenon, including organisational development (Hurst, 1995), 
Integrated Pest Management (Röling, 2005), natural resource management (Maarleveld and 
Dangbégnon, 2002), and water management (Jiggins et al., 2007). 
 
Holling (2000) describes transformation in socio-biological systems as the release of 
accumulated tendencies. Change is dependent on three interacting processes: myopia, 
pathology, and reflex. Myopia involves, for example, a conceptual limit of institutions that 
may lead to a fragmentation or structural distancing with a locality. In Carchi, for example, 
modern institutions of agriculture came to preoccupy themselves with the forces of distant 
markets, which eventually drove farmers to substantially change crops and varieties, 
planting schemes and rotations that survived in the wasipungos. This represented a structural 
break with long-established forms of organization, which could be described as a 
“loosening” of the coupling between local culture and the environment. As observed in 
this chapter, the products of this uncoupling included diverse forms of environmental 
pathologies expressed in the fields of farmers. As they organised around private interests, 
the activity of institutions, such as the hacienda and later the scientific and agrochemical 
industries, deepened tendencies. This chapter shows how a certain “entrenchment” around 
modes of technology such as mechanised tillage and agrochemicals has led to dysfunctional 
environmental interactions. Associated pathologies produced socio-biological feedback. 
Emergent reflexes contained elements of past legacies, such as an existing social hierarchy, 
as well as innovations, such as land redistribution and the introduction of new market 
arrangements and technologies. Reflexes led to reordering of social forms and interactions 
with the environment, such as those associated with the transition of the hacienda system 
to post agrarian reform society. 
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Drawing on the historical information presented in Chapter 3 and the socio-biological 
developments around modern agriculture presented in this chapter, Table 4.6 is an attempt 
to summarise the global processes of rural transformation in Carchi. The central qualities 
of socio-biological change during the Cuasmal period appeared to be characterised by 
episodic change, meaning periods of slow accumulation of natural or social energies 
punctuated by sudden releases and reorganizations of earlier legacies. Beginning with the 
Incan and Spanish arrivals, periods in Carchi were marked by historical contingencies with 
relatively slow aggregating socio-biological variables and faster disaggregating tendencies. 
Periods of consolidation and the emergence of new organization and stability followed. In 
modern time, the pathology of ecosystem decline has reached epidemic proportions. 
Similar to Giddens’ (1990) explanations of “reflexive modernisation,” drivers of transition 
led to transformations of epoch, marked by seemingly isolated and interactive socio-
biological reorganizations.  
 
Table 4.6 Global processes of rural transformation in Carchi 
 
Period Socio-cultural 
novelties 
Biophysical 
novelties 
Slow, 
aggregating 
variables 
Fast, dis-
aggregating 
variables 
Drivers of 
transition 
Cuasmal 
 
• Closed socio-
technical systems 
• Vertical 
organization of 
agriculture 
• Stable 
ecologies 
• Highly moist 
to wet 
conditions 
• Inhospitable 
environment 
• Internal 
cultural 
dynamics 
• Caste 
system 
• Climate 
• Opening of 
economies 
• Incan arrival 
• Spanish 
arrival 
• Social 
upheaval and 
war 
Hacienda 
 
• Exposure of 
economies  
• Horizontal 
organization of 
agriculture 
• Encomienda 
(indentured 
servitude) 
• Deforestation 
• Introduction 
of species  
• Extensive 
agriculture 
• Heightening 
social 
domination 
and control 
• Ecological 
limits 
• Climate 
• Expanding 
external markets 
• Introduction of 
species 
• Urban growth 
• Social 
disparities and 
conflict 
• Urbanization 
• Market 
growth 
• Technology 
developments 
• Population 
growth 
Land reform 
and 
technification 
 
• Open 
economies 
• Resource re-
distribution  
• Land 
privatisation 
• Market 
integration 
• Potato-pasture 
monoculture 
• Continuous 
cropping 
• Social re-
distributions 
• Rise of 
external 
inputs and 
technologies 
• Financial 
dependencies 
• Unequal 
financial rewards 
• Initial crop 
failures 
• Price variability 
• Industrial 
development 
• Market 
growth 
• Globalised 
markets 
Dollarisation 
and trade 
liberalization 
 
• Highly open 
economies 
systems 
• Deepening of 
market 
integration 
• Political 
instability 
• Declining 
potato 
cultivation 
• Increasing 
pasture 
• Testing 
alternative crops 
(broccoli, 
flowers) 
• Technology 
dependencies 
• Financial 
dependencies 
• Market 
domination 
• Pest and 
disease outbreaks 
• Declining soil 
fertility 
• Price variability 
• Emigration 
• Conflict 
• External-
oriented 
markets 
• Ecosystem 
collapse 
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A global tendency of modernity in Carchi, beginning with the Incan and Spanish arrivals 
and deepening since, has been both a simultaneous and interactive ecological and social 
disconnection, what I refer to as a systematic “disembedding” from localities. The research 
presented in this thesis suggests that through the undermining the fundamental 
mechanisms of ecosystems and social relations, it may represent a systematic breakdown of 
the earlier described adaptive mechanisms. The result is not just a reflex in a cycle, but a 
destruction of the cycle’s integrity. The novelty is that this event is the result of human-
dependent activity. If this were true, the expected product would not be resurgence, as 
described by Holling, but rather an endless rise of uncertainty. 
 
Historically, after two or three cropping seasons, land became biologically and chemically 
fatigued, which led farmers to leave fields to fallow for “rest” or recuperation. 
Nevertheless, in the 1990s farmers began to find that fields did not recover as previously. 
They generally began to experience falls in productive capacity of land and insect pest and 
disease epidemics became increasingly common. The land had lost its recuperative capacity 
despite continual and usually increasing use of agrochemicals. As a farmer from San Pedro 
explained, "In my father's time, they produced 30 or 40 [potatoes harvested] to one [potato 
planted]. And they did not use chemicals. Now, we cannot even expect ten to one."  
 
During each episode in Carchi, stability led to accumulated potential and resources and 
environmental capital. Simultaneously, this signified accumulated vulnerabilities. Over time, 
social systems became less resilient and more sensitive to some internal or external catalytic 
event. For the Andean weevil, it was monoculture and the accumulation of potato leaves as 
an energy source that fuelled proliferation. Foci of late blight epidemics on potato led to 
spore showers over entire regions and increased prevalence of the pathogen. The shift 
towards continual cropping led to strategic depletion of soil nutrients associated with the 
continual growth of a single crop and variety, which in turn led to “weaker” plants, 
increasingly vulnerable to insect pests and diseases.35 After reaching a maximum potential 
in the early 1980s, the system of monoculture increasingly appeared to become a 
manifestation of what Beck (2001: 269) called, “… an accident waiting to happen.” 
 
Holling (1973) explains that historically, human-nature interactions appeared to be “tightly 
wrapped”. In the Andes, endless novelties were tied in with this robustness, such as diverse 
soil biota capable of regulating unstable conditions. For example, entomopathogens that 
evolved on the Andean weevil increased in populations with the pest until they too fell 
vulnerable to change. Further mycorrhizae could enable plants to compensate for nutrient 
imbalances until other soil distortions became so severe that they too fell off, demanding 
increased fertilizer applications to sustain crop yields. Additionally, potato varieties 
included chemical or morphological means to warding off P. infestans until the pathogen 
mutated and overcame them, demanding a change of variety or more commonly increased 
fungicide use. In the end, a perceived acceleration of change coupled with practices, such 
as pesticides and mechanised tillage, that indirectly killed off recuperative biological 
mechanisms appeared to have outpaced environmental means of adjustment. From a 
human perspective, this brought about system failure and collapse. In reference to 
                                                       
35 Chauboussou (2004) explains the biochemistry involved plant health decline as a result of modern 
agriculture. 
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academia’s preoccupation with market-oriented, external input agriculture, Röling (2006) 
summarised this phenomenon as the product of the “death sciences” – i.e., an emphasis on 
the abiotic factors of production (e.g., nutrients), rather than the biological conditions that 
sustain life and ecological processes in agriculture. 
 
Thinking about multinational corporations and industry, the economist Schumpeter (1987) 
described the phenomenon of "creative destruction" – destruction in the sense that it 
triggered system collapse, but also creative in the sense that it released energy that fuelled 
new organization and social forms. From a human ecology point of view, the Cuasmal 
civilization fell victim to the arrival of the Incan Empire, which in turn, fell victim to the 
Spanish Conquest. Each time, societies settled into new structures that, over time, were 
marked by accumulation of potentials and vulnerabilities. Internal or external forces led to 
collapse and change. In modern time, the novelty was a perception of accelerated rate of 
change, technologies of “death,” and effects at new scales. 
 
As presented in Chapter 3, traditional agriculture distributed risks across vertical ecologies. 
The hacienda system reorganized this arrangement during the 18th and 19th centuries 
around markets in distant cities or Europe. The horizontal redistribution of farming in the 
highland Andes eventually lead to the accumulation of cropping vulnerabilities to climate, 
pests and disease that, from a biological systems perspective, would demand new 
compensating mechanisms. This created the conditions for the introduction of agricultural 
technologies and the growth of a new industry in Carchi and elsewhere in Ecuador that 
decades later would become a powerful social force capable of shaping science and 
education policies as well as entire ministries, congresses, and administrations – i.e., 
government. I will further explore this occurrence in Chapter 7. 
 
The growth of urban-based populations in the 1950s and 1960s increased the demand for 
food production, which led to the need for increased agricultural productivity. The low 
productivity of extensive agriculture combined with the exploitative labour conditions of 
the haciendas led to an accumulation of potential and vulnerabilities and release as agrarian 
reform. An emerging industrial agri-technology power matrix quickly repackaged agrarian 
reform policies as “intensification” through credit and green revolution technologies, 
which in turn led to a commoditization of rural life and a tying of smallholder farmers to 
relatively external and distantly referenced markets.  
 
The growth of the agrochemical industry and its increasing influence in government during 
the 1970s and 1980s led to an end of the land distribution component of agrarian reform 
before the policy was fully meted. In its stead, the industry re-emphasized agriculture 
intensification through further “technology adoption” and “market integration” leading to 
the Ley de Fomento Agrícola in 1979. The subsequent Law of Modernisation of the Agrarian 
Sector in 1989 further entrenched these tendencies around notions of enabling smallholder 
producers to “compete in the global marketplace.” 
 
At the end of the 1990s, the collapse of Ecuador’s banking system led to the “dollarisation” 
monetary policy that generated triple digit inflation and sharp increases in the country’s 
poverty rates. In Carchi, agrochemicals prices and labour costs increased dramatically 
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without an increase in potato prices. These tendencies coupled with outbreaks of the 
Guatemalan tuber moth caused the area of potato production to drop from about 15,000 
to 8,000 hectares in 2004, with most farmers leaving systems in pasture fallow and living 
off of milk production. When we visited in 2005, the deepening financial crisis was causing 
farmers to slaughter cows to pay off debts, and several had abandoned farming and were 
working as labourers in remaining haciendas or the flower industry. 
 
In the early part of the twenty-first century, farmers began to describe the natural 
environment as “exhausted" and "inhospitable” for farming and the social environment as 
increasingly "fragmented" and "anti-social,” even "hostile.” Some felt that they were better 
off under the hacienda system, when at least someone, the patrón, cared about them. Many 
farmers did not want their children to continue in their footsteps. Previously, some had 
wanted their sons to become ingenieros, but due to a growing distrust in técnicos or experts, 
they had changed their minds, deciding it would be best for their children to become 
computer or information technicians or not to study at all and to go into business in the 
cities. Youth were migrating to the cities to study or in search of work. In other cases, 
youth had “disappeared,” which commonly meant that they had joined one of the 
revolutionary groups in Colombia. 
 
Farmers spoke in richly diverse ways of mistrust in earlier authority figures such as the 
técnicos and officials from the municipality. One night during a workshop a farmer got up to 
tell a joke: “How does an ingeniero change a light bulb? First he checks his books. When he 
does not find an answer, he calls a meeting in his office, where he asks a farmer to do it, 
that is, after charging him for the light bulb.” The ingenieros and politicians became the 
target of jokes. Two of the four villages in our study had chased away agrochemical 
salespeople. It was common for rural people to label public authority and government as 
"corrupt" and increasingly "out-of-touch with reality.” 
 
Perhaps more important than the farmers who were forced to abandon agriculture in 
recent time were the farmers who managed to carry on. In 2004, Paredes and I found that 
farmers from communities with relatively ample soil and water resources, such as Mariscal 
Sucre and Libertad, still managed to survive the Carchense agricultural treadmill in 
comparison with their counterparts from lesser endowed Piartal and Cuba (Table 4.5). 
Additionally, Paredes (in process) found significant differences across the farming styles of 
individual households. Farmers who relied heavily on external inputs (locally known as 
arriesgados or high-risk takers) failed disproportionately. In contrast, those who favoured 
local knowledge and technology, employed family labour, and nurtured broad social 
networks (the curiosos or inquisitive and pragmatic farmers) were more effective at avoiding 
the risks associated with modern potato. 
 
According to the resilience literature that is summarized in Gunderson et al. (1995) and 
Gunderson and Holling (2002), it is inevitable that the limits of a compensating mechanism 
will be reached. Nevertheless, modern co-developments have permitted the perpetuation of 
what scientists, farmers, government officials and industry representatives increasingly 
understand as forms of self-destructive behaviour. In ecological terms, the compensating 
mechanisms – i.e., agrochemicals – enabled increased potential to the point where one 
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could expect an increasingly violent release – in environmental terms, social ones, and 
perhaps both. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In reference to agricultural intensification as “the misguided utilisation of chemical 
pesticides and fertilisers,” the French plant physiologist, Francis Chaboussou, concluded 
that healthy plants resisted pests and disease and agrochemicals actually weakened crops by 
interfering with the chemical and ecological processes of resistance. He argued (2004: 209), 
“…we need to overcome the idea of ‘the battle’: that is, we must try to annihilate the 
parasite with toxins that have been shown to have harmful effects on the plant, yielding the 
opposite effect to that desired.” Instead, Chaboussou called for a “revolution in attitude,” 
followed by a complete change in the direction of research towards crop health. In other 
words, agriculture needed to learn to work with, rather than against, biology and ecological 
systems. Carchi is a case in point. 
 
Following agrarian reform, smallholder potato production based on mono-cropping and 
externally sourced technologies, especially mechanized tillage, synthetic fertilizers and 
pesticides, quickly transformed the Carchense landscape. As a result, short-term production, 
both by area and labour input, intensified dramatically. Production increased to three times 
the national average, and productivity in terms of return on investment and labour 
heightened. Nevertheless, this progress did not occur without cost. 
 
Market integration and technification were accompanied by potato monoculture, a decrease 
in planting distances, the introduction and increased use of agrichemicals, and a shortening 
of fallow periods. Over time, market forces led farmers to greatly reduce the potato 
biodiversity of their fields. A very fragile, chemically intensive monoculture of a single 
dominant variety, Superchola, came to predominate the landscape. Such changes had 
severe consequences on the ecology and, due to chronic exposure to the compensating 
intervention of agrochemicals, human health. Further, economies became affected. 
 
By the mid-1990s production by area and productivity levelled off and declined. 
Concurrently, real prices for inputs grew – chiefly as a result of dollarisation of the 
economy – and market prices for potato showed increasing rates of variability, with an 
overall tendency towards decline. Studies beginning in the early 1990s showed that farmers 
lost money on a majority of their plantings – from about 43 percent in 1991-1992 
(Crissman et al., 1998) to over 60 percent in 2004 (Paredes and Sherwood database, 2004). 
At the same time, farmers and their families suffered adverse health effects as a result of 
their continual exposure to chemicals (Cole et al., 1997a and b; Cole et al. 2002), which 
negatively influenced the economy of farm management (Antle et al., 1994; Antle et al., 
2003). While agricultural modernisation brought increased production and wealth in the 
short-term, ultimately it undermined the stability of agro-ecosystems and worked against 
the economic interests of rural families, leading to collapse. 
 
The longer-term social effects of modern agriculture were equally dramatic. Processes of 
transformation from the hacienda signified a break with the cruel exploitation of the 
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hacienda system, but they also led to new mechanisms of control. Over time, the 
independent Pasto indigenous groups of Carchi became the wasipungos who, in turn, became 
today’s rural poor, highly vulnerable to the environment and the market and in need of 
external assistance in the forms of technologies and technical assistance. Thirty-five years 
after market integration and technification, an increasing number of rural families found 
themselves in a crisis they called “dollarisation.” The fragile natural resource base and 
volatile compensation for commodities endangered earlier bimodal systems of production. 
This period was marked by growth of two sectors: the landless labourer and the urban 
migrant. A product of agriculture modernisation was a simultaneous and interactive 
ecological and social disembedding that, over the long term, ran in counter to the well-
being of farmers and their communities. Increasing rates of abandonment of agriculture 
and emigration suggested that modernisation placed into question the viability of rural life. 
 
 Chapter 5 
 
Cultural Encounters: Learning from Cross-disciplinary 
Science and Development Practice 
 
 Stephen Sherwood, Donald Cole, and Charles Crissman1  
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Overcoming ecosystem health challenges calls for breaking down disciplinary and 
professional barriers. Based on reflection of the EcoSalud project that used both research 
and development action to address pesticide-related concerns in Carchi, this chapter 
presents the conflicts and the accommodations made between the two dimensions with 
respect to such issues as staff recruitment, baseline assessments, community education, 
and advocacy. In so doing, it exposes underlying problems of paradigm and process 
inherent in bringing researchers and development practitioners together and the 
problematic role of advocacy associated with joint agriculture and health, research and 
development initiatives. 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout Latin America, as in other parts of the world, human activity is increasing the 
pressure on ecosystems, which in turn feed back onto livelihoods and well-being. As 
Ulrich Beck (1992) makes clear, the complex biological and social consequences of 
ecosystem decline spin off effects that cut across geographic, disciplinary and professional 
boundaries, rendering earlier designs of ecosystem analysis and management obsolete. 
Researchers and development practitioners are under pressure to answer this challenge 
with new ways of conceptualizing concerns and mobilizing effective change. 
 
In recent times, scientists, development agents, and the public increasingly have become 
aware of the multi-dimensional nature of ecosystem decline,2 and hence the need to co-
operate across scientific disciplines and professional and practitioner cultures. Research 
methods are expanding to simultaneously accommodate not only biophysical aspects of 
agriculture and health, but also the ecological and cultural systems from which practice 
emerges and operates, leading to an erosion of the boundaries between scientific 
disciplines as well as between science and rural development. Emergent approaches are 
steering rural development practice towards interactive designs that emphasize social 
“brokerage” among actors (for a comprehensive explanation, see Leeuwis, 2004). While it 
                                                       
1 A version of this chapter was originally published as: S. Sherwood, D. Cole, and C. Crissman. 2007. Cultural 
encounters: learning from cross-disciplinary science and development practice over ecosystem health. 
Development in Practice, 17(2): 179-195. 
2 See for example, van Haaften et al. (1998), which shows that psychological factors such as stress and 
alienation proved to be highly correlated with land degradation in African villages of the Sahel. 
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is commonly assumed that such brokerage needs be applied to mediate the differences 
between external projects and communities, we found the challenges of cross-disciplinary 
practice to be substantial. Differences clearly exist among academic disciplines – from 
health professionals, to agronomists, economists, and sociologists. Contrasts underlay the 
assumptions, perspectives, values, and practices of quantitative researchers and grassroots 
development practitioners.  
 
In this chapter, the authors – a rural development specialist, occupational/environmental 
health specialist, and agricultural economist – share their experience with a joint 
knowledge generation and development intervention for greater ecosystem health in 
Northern Ecuador. For each, established approaches to conducting work became 
uprooted, at times leading to questioning the usefulness of the collaboration. Eventually, 
common ground was found, or rather built, however imperfect. This paper examines the 
challenges encountered and the compromises made, as it highlights remaining issues for 
the design and practice of interactive cross-disciplinary research and development. 
 
Setting the scene: EcoSalud 
 
Pesticide dependency is one unexpected and undesired outcome of science and 
development policy, with health consequences globally (for examples, see: Dasgupta et al., 
2002; Eddleston et al., 2002). Since the early 1990s, a number of national and international 
organizations have been working with communities in Carchi, Ecuador’s northernmost 
province, to assess the role and effects of pesticide use in potato production and to reduce 
its adverse impacts.3  Carchi is nationally famous for potato production, growing 40 
percent of the country's potatoes on only 25 percent of the land dedicated to the crop. 
Although potato has been a staple crop in the Andes for millennia, industrial technologies, 
such as tractors and agrochemicals, and market integration have driven unprecedented 
agricultural intensification. Fertilizers and pesticides have enabled increased potato 
production, but at great costs to ecosystem health and exposing farmers to toxic 
substances. 
 
Researchers provided quantitative assessments of community-wide pesticide use and its 
adverse effects during a first phase of research in Carchi. A full summary of the research is 
beyond the scope of this paper but has been reported in detail elsewhere.4 Most 
alarmingly, rates of pesticide poisoning among the rural population were among the 
highest reported in the world.  Medical and psychometric testing revealed that two-thirds 
                                                       
3 Principal collaborators included: INIAP (National Institute of Agricultural Research from Ecuador), CIP, 
Montana State University (USA), McMaster University and University of Toronto (Canada), Wageningen 
University (the Netherlands), and the FAO’s Global IPM Facility. 
4 The research in Carchi has been widely published (see Appendix A) and is summarized in two compendia: 
Crissman, Antle, and Capalbo (1998) and Yanggen, Crissman, and Espinosa (2003). The initial economic 
research on the productivity impacts of pesticides was first published in Antle (1994). The pesticide poisoning 
research appeared in Cole, Carpio, and Leon (2000). The results of two in-depth sociological studies on the 
effects of pesticides on women and farming styles can be found in Mera-Orcés (2001) and Paredes (2001). A 
description of the development approach and lessons learned can be found in Sherwood, Crissman, and Cole 
(2004). Summaries and a link to a two-part BBC World Service Program on pesticide use in Carchi can be 
found at: www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/1646_dying/index.shtml. 
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of the rural population suffered neurotoxic effects from pesticide exposure. Among 
farmers, these effects were associated with measurable decreases in farm productivity. 
Through system modelling, we demonstrated the potential of different strategies to lessen 
pesticide dependency and thereby improve ecosystem health. 
 
Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) established the Ecosystem 
Approaches to Human Health Program on the belief that ecosystem management affects 
human health in multiple ways and that holistic, gender-sensitive, interactive approaches 
to identification and remediation of the problem was the most effective manner to achieve 
improvements (Forget and Lebel, 2001; www.idrc.ca/ecohealth). The research into health 
improvement proposed under the ecosystem approach to human health considers two 
principal aspects: exploration of determinants of health (be they environmental, social, 
cultural, or economic) and attention to associated socio-environmental interactions. In 
development terms, this line of research is intended both to critically assess how 
interventions may mediate change consistent with ecosystem health goals. The program 
demands extensive community involvement in research as a means of assuring project 
accountability to local interests (Figure 5.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 IDRC’s iterative strategy for improving ecosystem health (Forget and Lebel, 
2001)  
 
The model mandates a mix of research and intervention while incorporating attention to 
social diversity and more deliberate interaction among scientists, community stakeholders, 
and policy makers in the construction of alternatives. While fine in theory, such design 
embodies inherent contradictions associated with current research and development 
practice.  This chapter shares reflections on the experience from one IDRC Ecosystem 
Health funded project – EcoSalud. We implemented our project in three stages: 
 
Stage I: Start-up and engagement 
 
This stage involved community selection, recruitment of families from those communities 
willing to participate in both the research and intervention activities, the commencement 
of data collection and the initial participatory encounters with individuals, families and the 
community. Once we selected the three community locations, it included baseline surveys, 
followed by preliminary data analysis to guide the overall project plan. After meetings with 
communities where past research and initial findings were discussed, individuals and 
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families were encouraged to enlist in learning activities, especially Farmer Field Schools 
(FFS). Originally scheduled for six months, stage I lasted nine months due to delays in 
staff training, development and testing of research tools, and information collection and 
preliminary analysis.  
 
Stage II: Expansion of community activities  
 
This stage involved completion of the neurobehavioral measurements and on-going 
research on specialized themes, such as identification and documentation of pesticide 
exposure pathways and measurement of individual nutritional status, a potential 
confounding factor in neurobehavioral impacts. It also involved implementation of FFS in 
each community, educational campaigns, and other intervention activities. We planned to 
complete this stage in one year, but it lasted nearly two years, with certain activities 
continuing through to the end of the project.  
 
Stage III:  Reassessment, sustainability and policy efforts 
 
The stage included the completion of ex-post neurobehavioral assessments and visits to 
each participating farm household to assess changes in pesticide practices. It included 
efforts to inform the public on preliminary research outcomes and advocate policy, both 
in Carchi and at the national level. The project ended before we fully achieved our policy 
objectives, but fortunately new partner initiatives took up some of what EcoSalud left 
behind. 
 
Throughout these stages, implementation of the varied research and development tasks in 
EcoSalud involved continual negotiations among team members. Table 5.1 summarises 
points of difference that emerged during the project and associated outcomes and 
consequences. We go on to highlight four decisive moments: staff recruitment, 
quantitative design and data collection, development intervention design, as well as 
advocacy and policy intervention. 
 
Moments of divergence 
 
Staffing 
 
Divergent ways of seeing, valuing and doing first surfaced during staff recruitment. A CIP 
Senior Scientist, an agricultural economist, was the EcoSalud Project Leader. He recruited 
two Ecuadorian agricultural researchers who had participated in the first phase of research 
in Carchi: a farming systems specialist from the national agricultural research institute 
(INIAP) and an agricultural economist on CIP staff who would lead the research 
component and take responsibility for quantitative objectives associated with before-and-
after measurements. A medical doctor and occupational/environmental health specialist 
based in Canada, who also had participated in the earlier research, continued to support 
the health research components of the project as well as providing input to health-related 
training activities. In addition, a rural development and Integrated Pest Management 
(IPM) specialist was hired to lead the training and development component.  
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Table 5.1 Outcomes and consequences of clashes between the EcoSalud research and 
development teams 
 
Moment of 
divergence 
Research perspective Development 
perspective 
Outcomes and 
consequences 
Staff recruitment Technical expertise Cultural background and 
facilitation skills 
• Technical skills with 
investments in participatory 
training 
Preoccupation Rigor; high quality 
information and analysis 
Relevance to 
community's interests; 
high quality process 
• Rigor over relevance 
Project planning Based on objectives; 
pre-established plan 
Based on learning; 
interactive and iterative 
process 
• Pre-established plans with 
milestones generally not met by 
staff 
Baseline Objective, reliant on 
high quality information 
prior to project 
intervention 
Subjective; should be 
based on methodologies 
such as a participatory 
rural appraisal 
• Lengthy structured surveys; 
communities unmotivated by 
intrusive questions 
• Corruption of baseline 
Project sample 
selection 
Should be random and 
representative of the 
population 
Self-selection based on 
interest 
• Self-selection bias of Farmer 
Field Schools (FFS) 
• Difficulties with quantitative 
design and statistical analysis 
Sample 
maintenance 
Minimize sample loss to 
protect investments in 
data collection and 
maintain observations 
for statistical analysis 
Greater tolerance for 
participant drop out from 
pesticide education 
interventions 
• Selected interventions 
designed to cover all 
participants without option of 
self-selection 
Understanding 
of change 
Better information; 
effective technologies 
High quality dialogue and 
social learning 
• Technologies over process 
Intervention 
design 
Based on outcomes of 
research and technology 
transfer 
Based on community 
priorities and capacity 
building 
• Focus on project priority: 
pesticides 
• Difficulty with community 
participation, especially during 
financial crisis 
Participatory 
approaches to 
training 
Effective but slow and 
expensive 
Necessary investment for 
lasting change 
• FFS became the lead 
methodology 
Community 
incentives 
Financial incentives 
acceptable for inspiring 
change in practice 
Financial incentives 
inappropriate and 
interfere with local 
initiative 
• Use of interest-free loans for 
personal protective equipment  
 
Political 
intervention 
Conflict with researcher 
mandate of neutrality 
Appropriate and 
necessary for change 
• At first limited to 
information, but later, as the 
industry became involved, pro-
active advocacy 
 
The EcoSalud leaders employed a field level staff made up of both research assistants and 
community facilitators based at the INIAP provincial office in Carchi. They would be in 
charge of data collection, community organization, and training. The first differences 
among the project leaders arose over women’s representation in the staff. Some leaders 
were more committed to hiring women, while others were more concerned with hiring 
people who they could count on to complete tasks and act as confidants. Based on the all 
male presence in the INIAP field office and the EcoSalud leadership, bolstered by IDRC's 
demands for gender balance, we agreed to give preference to woman applicants. On the 
